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COME NOW Defendants in the above-entitled matter, by and through Elam & 
Burke, P.A., their attorneys of record herein, and, pursuant to Rules 7 and 16, Judicial Rules of 
Procedure of the Idaho Industrial Commission, hereby move the Industrial Commission for an 




order compelling discovery responses on the grounds that Claimant has failed to supplement her 
discovery responses as requested in Defendants' Request for Supplementation of Discovery 
Responses filed March 17, 2004. 
Defendants, therefore, respectfully move this Commission for its order compelling 
Claimant to respond to Defendants' Request for Supplementation of Discovery or, in the event of 
failure to comply, to impose sanctions for such failure. 
This motion is based on the affidavit of counsel for Defe oants, file herewith. 
DATED this -* day of April, 2004. 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this .8t'/-· day of April, 2004, I caused the above and 
foregoing instrument to be served as folio~ 
Vernon K. Smith 
Attorney at Law 
1900 West Main Street 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
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ELAM & BURKE, P.A. 
251 East Front Street, Suite 300 
P.O. Box 1539 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Telephone: (208) 343-5454 
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Attorneys for Defendant 
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THE STATE OF IDAHO 
STACY A. GIBSON, 


















AFFIDAVIT OF COUNSEL 
ADA COUNTY SHERIFF'S OFFICE, 
Employer, 
and 
STATE INSURANCE FUND, 
Surety, 
Defendants. ______________ ) 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
) ss. 





JON M. BAUMAN, having first been duly sworn, upon his oath deposes and says as 
follows: 
AFFIDAVIT OF COUNSEL - 1 
G:\SHARED\0179\9303\D!SCOVERY\compd-uffitlavit-2,wp<l 
( 
1. I am an attorney in the employ of the law firm of Elam & Burke, P.A., attorneys 
of record at all relevant times for Defendants in the above-entitled matter. In that capacity, I have 
personal knowledge of the contents of the file and of all matters set forth herein. 
2. On or about March 17, 2004, Defendants caused to be served on counsel for 
Claimant Defendants' Request for Supplementation of Discovery Responses. 
3. As of the date hereof, Claimant's counsel has failed to respond or object in any 
fashion whatsoever to Defendants' Request for Supplementation of Discovery Responses. 
4. The delay caused by Claimant is prejudicial to Defendants in preparing for the 
hearing which is currently scheduled to commence May 13, 2004. 
5. Your affiant makes this affidavit in support ofDefe ants' Motion to Compel 
Discovery Responses. 
Further your affiant sayeth naught. 
DATED this 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this "d' 1 'fAday of April, 2004 . 
............. ,,,,. 
~,.,.,."1 :\ pAV'Jl) ,,,,.".-
"' .. ~,<;;;, ........ ~ ,:~~.. . .. ~ 
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\ ~ \.. pu-e.'-' I~ i 
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AFFIDAVIT OF COUNSEL - 2 
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. otary Public for Idaho 
Residing at '--//M~ / , 
Commission Expi;; ~D [@, 5 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this~ day of April, 2004, I caused a true and correct 
copy of the above and foregoing instrument to be sent by the method i 
Vernon K. Smith (ISB #1365) 
Attorney at Law 
1900 West Main Street 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
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FI l ED 
APR 2 9 2004 
l~i:'lUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
On March 30, 2004, Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss Complaint or Limit Issues to 
be Tried at Hearing. Defendants argue that as a matter of law, Claimant is unable to prove her 
case under Idaho Code§ 72-451. On April 27, 2004, Claimant filed a Response with exhibits. 
Upon review of the submissions of the parties and the legal file of this matter, the Referee 
finds the Notice of Hearing identified issues to be decided at hearing. All issues identified 
therein are within the subject matter jurisdiction of the Industrial Commission. Issues not so 
identified will not be considered. Federal statutes, Idaho Code Titles 18 and 31, ordinances and 
policies of political subdivisions ofidaho, and other matters not pertinent to the Idaho Workers' 
Compensation Law are beyond the scope of the instant proceeding. The Industrial Commission 
will not allow its forum to become a back door for discovery in litigation or other purposes 
outside the Idaho Workers' Compensation Law. A motion in limine or other objection to 
the testimony of individual witnesses not possessing evidence directly bearing upon these 
identified issues may be appropriate. 
Defendants' motion is essentially a motion for summary judgment. The Industrial 
Commission has no such procedure. The Referee will not prejudge whether Claimant may or 
ORDER - 1 
may not have a compensable claim. 
This matter is scheduled for two days of live hearing. The parties will be required to 
present their evidence within the scheduled time, exclusive of expert medical testimony as 
allowed by Judicial Rules of Practice and Procedure relating to post-hearing depositions. 
A pre-hearing telephone conference may be scheduled if necessary. 
Wherefore subject to the explanation and direction stated above, Claimant's Request 
for Additional Time is DENIED, and Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Complaint or Limit Issues 
is DENIED. 
SOORDERE~i 
DATED thi£ day of April, 2004. 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
$ ' 
I hereby certify t~~! ?n~ day of A.~ril, 2004, a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
ORDER was ~fffihylfqik/#/iJief:Mik~f'fiil!i':}il#Jil ONLY upon each of the following: 
Vernon K. Smith 
1900 West Main Street 
Boise, ID 83702 
Ryan P. Armbruster 
Jon M. Bauman 
P.O. Box 1539 
Boise, ID 83701-1539 
db 
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Fax#: 345-1129 
Fax #: 384-5844 
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STACY A. GIBSON, 
Claimant, 
v. 
ADA COUNTY SHERIFF'S OFFICE, 
Employer, 
and 


















MOTION TO COMPEL 
FILED 
MAY - 5 2004 
I.WUS'FRIAL COMMISSlml 
On April 27, 2004, Defendants filed a Motion to Compel Discovery Responses, and 
Claimant filed a response thereto on May 3, 2004. The Referee having reviewed the file herein and 
being fully advised in the premises, 
HEREBY ORDERS that Defendants' motion is DENIED for the reason that, from 
Claimant's response, it appears that Defendants' motion is moot. 
DATED this if day of May, 2004. 
INDUS\ COM:ISSION 
~ ~---
Vernon K. Smith Fax#: 345-1129 Ryan P. Armbruster Fax #: 384-5844 
1900 West Main Street Jon M. Bauman 
Boise, ID 83702 P.O. Box 1539 
Boise, ID 83701-1539 
db 
ORDER DENYING MOTION TO COMPEL - 1 
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LC. No. 01-015332 
MOTION IN LIMINE 
Defendants, by and through Elam & Burke, P.A., their attorneys of record, pursuant to the 
Industrial Commission's Judicial Rules of Practice and Procedure and applicable provisions of 
MOTION IN LIMINE - 1 
G:\SHAREO\ll!79\9J03\J>LEADINGSIM01ion ;11 Li mine. wp<l 
the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure hereby move this Commission for its Order in Limine 
excluding from the evidentiary record of this case the following items, identified in Claimant's 
Rule 10 Disclosure of Witnesses and Exhibits as proposed exhibits to be offered at the hearing in 
this matter. 
This case involves a claim for worker's compensation benefits from alleged 
psychological injury occuning as a result of questioning the Claimant on July 20, 1999, from 
approximately 3:00 to 5:30 p.m., by two detectives who were Claimant's co-employees at the 
Ada County Sheriff's office. Claimant was questioned on that date about whether she was aware 
of overpayments made beginning in the fall of 1998 and ending in June 1999 whereby she 
received approximately double her ordinary wage. Defendants acknowledge that Ada County 
erred in overpaying Claimant these wages. The question before the Industrial Commission, 
namely, whether Claimant sustained a psychological injury as a result of her questioning by the 
detectives, however, has nothing to do with ancillary issues such as whether other employees of 
the Sheriff's department were overpaid or underpaid, the quality of Claimant's overall 
employment performance, whether Claimant voluntarily undertook additional training related to 
her employment, or the ultimate decision of the Sheriff's office to te1minate Claimant's 
employment. Many of Claimant's proposed exhibits pertain to these ancillary matters and are 
irrelevant to determination of the issues before the Industrial Commission. The Industrial 
Commission has already ruled, by its order dated April 29, 2004, that issues not identified in the 
Notice of Hearing will not be considered by the Industrial Commission. These defendants 
respectfully submit that most of Claimant's proposed exhibits have no bearing on the issues 
identified in the Notice of Hearing and therefore should not be admitted as exhibits in these 
MOTION IN LIMINE - 2 
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( 
proceedings. Discussion of the proposed exhibits which are the subject of this motion as to 
which an order in limine is sought, together with Defendants' objections thereto, follows. 
The following proposed exhibits, identified by the number used in Claimant's Rule 10 
Disclosure, should be excluded, on the grounds set forth herein: 
Exhibit 5 
Plaintiffs' Proposed Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order in Woodbridge and 
Perkins v. County of Ada and Vaughn Killeen, In the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District 
of the State of Idaho, in and for the County of Ada, bearing Case No. 95957. Claimant's 
proposed Exhibit 5 is irrelevant to any of the issues in this case. This proposed exhibit was 
prepared by attorney Alan Herzfeld in 1994, three years before Claimant was even hired by the 
Ada County Sheriff's Office. There is no indication whether these proposed findings of fact 
were adopted by the court or modified in that case. Claimant appears to be offering this 
document in order to try to establish that a wage claim was brought against Ada County by two 
other County employees years before Claimant was even employed by Ada County. The 
document has no relevance to the issues before this Industrial Commission, namely, whether 
Claimant sustained psychological injury pursuant to Idaho Code Section 72-451, and if so, to 
what worker's compensation benefits she may be entitled. 
Exhibit 6 
Claimant's proposed Exhibit 6 involves communication between Claimant and a 
supervising sergeant of the Sheriff's office pertaining to the amount of sick leave she had used in 
September 1997. Again, this document is irrelevant. Claimant alleges that her industrial 
accident occurred on July 20, 1999. This document is irrelevant to the issue of whether Claimant 
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is entitled to worker's compensation benefits based on the events that occurred on July 20, 1999. 
The questioning of Claimant on that date pertained only to her awareness that she was being 
overpaid during the last two months of 1998 and the first six months of 1999. It is irrelevant 
whether Claimant had to clarify issues of how much sick leave time she had used more than a 
year before the overpayments even began, and almost two years before the alleged industrial 
accident The Industrial Commission should not be obliged to consider evidence of every aspect 
of Claimant's employment with the Sheriff's office, over the course of more than two years, in 
order to determine whether, on her last day worked (July 20, 1999), she sustained a compensable 
industrial accident, as she alleges. 
Exhibits 7, 8, 11 
Claimant's probationary employee monthly evaluation reports and performance reviews 
are irrelevant to the issue of whether she sustained a compensable industrial accident and are 
irrelevant to the subject of her interviews on July 20, 1999. The quality of Claimant's 
performance of her job duties has nothing to do with whether she sustained a compensable 
industrial injury. These documents are self-serving and irrelevant to any issue before the 
Industrial Commission. 
Exhibits 9. 10, 12, 13 
These documents are irrelevant and self-serving: whether Claimant undertook additional 
training to do her job or not has nothing to do with whether she sustained a compensable 
industrial injury. Further Claimant is no longer employed by the Ada County Sheriff's Office 
and therefore it is irrelevant what supplemental training she undertook with the Sheriff's Office 
for a job she has not held since December 1999. 
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Exhibit 14 
Defendants object to the inclusion of proposed Exhibit 14 on the grounds that it violates 
the privacy of individuals who are in no way connected with the instant litigation. The Industrial 
Commission should not be asked to review exhibits and hear testimony concerning whether other 
employees were overpaid or underpaid by the Sheriff's department. To the extent proposed 
Exhibit 14 pertains to Claimant, it is irrelevant to the issue whether she sustained psychological 
injury as a result of questioning conducted by Sheriff's deputies on July 20, 1999, as she alleges. 
Exhibits 21 and 22 
Whether Claimant's overpayment was the subject of a referral to the Canyon County 
prosecutor's office in August 1999, after Claimant's interview by the Sheriff's deputies in July 
1999, is irrelevant to the issue whether she sustained an industrial accident on July 20, 1999, and 
if so, to what worker's compensation benefits she may be entitled. 
Exhibit 25 
This letter to Claimant's attorney from the former legal advisor to the Sheriff, dated 
November 3, 1999, pertains to an internal personnel matter of the Sheriff's office and has nothing 
to do with the question whether Claimant sustained a compensable industrial injury on July 20, 
1999, or if so, what benefits she is entitled to. 
Exhibit 27 
Purported entries from the journal of John Gibson are irrelevant as hearsay and self-
serving ad hoc declarations. Except for a few perfunctory notations, the entire contents of this 
"journal" appear to be entries made for the sole and calculated purpose of depicting Claimant's 
condition for blatantly self-serving purposes. It is also irrelevant what John Gibson's 
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impressions were of Claimant's condition, inasmuch as there is no foundation to establish that he 
is a psychiatrist, psychologist, practitioner of the healing arts, or otherwise qualified to render an 
expert opinion as to Claimant's mental state. 
Exhibit28 
The fact that Claimant appealed from her termination of employment has no relevance to 
whether she sustained an industrial injury as a result of the events of July 20, 1999. This 
Commission has specifically held that "no compensation shall be paid for psychological injuries 
arising from employment termination." Montgomery v. Dillon Auto Park & Truck Center, Inc., 
96 IWCD 9586, 1996 IIC 1021, 1029 (Sept. 11, 1996). As a matter of law, Claimant's 
termination is not relevant to a claim for alleged psychological injuries arising under Idaho Code 
Section 72-451. Accordingly, whether Claimant appealed from the decision to terminate her 
employment, and whether a hearing was held with respect to that appeal, is even farther removed 
from the issues within the Industrial Commission's purview. 
Exhibit 30 
The response of the Sheriff's legal advisor to the Complaint submitted by Claimant's 
husband to the Idaho State Board of Medicine about a physician employed by the Sheriff's 
department is irrelevant, immaterial, and prejudicial. 
Exhibit 32 
This document consists of confidential legal analysis to the Board of County 
Commissioners by the Chief Civil Deputy from the Ada County Prosecutor's Office pertaining to 
payroll issues. As discussed above, Defendants acknowledge that Claimant was overpaid by Ada 
County during late 1998 and the first six months of 1999. The reasons for the clerical error that 
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led to the overpayment have nothing to do with whether Claimant sustained psychological injury 
by reason of interviews which concerned whether Claimant was aware that she had been 
overpaid. The Industrial Commission has already ruled that issues outside the Notice of Hearing 
will not be considered. Plainly, whether the County received legal advice concerning payment 
practices in general is beyond the scope of the issues set forth in the Notice of Hearing. 
Exhibits 36 and 37 
It is irrelevant whether the Sheriff's legal advisor wrote to Claimant's physician, 
Dr. Spencer, with respect to conclusions reached in his medical reports. The letter of R. Monte 
Macconnell has nothing to do with whether Claimant sustained a psychological injury. Its 
inclusion represents parts of an ongoing effort by Claimant's counsel to broaden the issues in this 
case and inflame prejudice against the Defendant employer. The same reasoning applies to 
Exhibit 37. 
Exhibit39 
Exhibit 39 is a self-serving declaration by Claimant's attorney. It is mere argument and 
not evidence of any fact bearing on this case. The attachments are already set forth in other 
exhibits, with the exception of Jewel Roberts' Jetter of August 10, 2001, to the effect that the 
State Insurance Fund was investigating Claimant's claim. 
Exhibit 40 
The affidavit of Claimant's attorney is a self-serving document filed before the District 
Court of the Fourth Judicial District of the State of Idaho, in and for the County of Ada, in Case 
No. CV OC 01-07394D, and has no bearing on the matters before this Commission. 
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Exhibit43 
The affidavit of Sharon Ullman pertaining to the Fair Labor Standards Act and Idaho 
Code Title 31 is irrelevant and should be excluded pursuant to the Industrial Commission's 
Order of April 29, 2004. 
Exhibit44 
The decision of the Idaho Supreme Court pertaining to an appeal from the district court's 
determination with respect to the termination of Claimant is irrelevant. As noted above, whether 
Claimant was terminated from her employment is irrelevant to the issues before this 
Commission. Claimant's termination from employment, her appeal of that determination, and 
proceedings before the Fourth Judicial District Court or the Idaho Supreme Court pertaining to 
her appeal are irrelevant to the issues set forth in the Notice of Hearing. 
Exhibit 48 
This document is a lengthy and irrelevant, self-serving statement by Claimant's attorney. 
It is mere argument and not evidence bearing on any issue before the Commission. Most of the 
attachments are already included in Claimant's proposed exhibits and several are discussed 
elsewher5e in this Motion. In addition, the "Addendum: Errors and Rebuttal to Dr. Cynthia 
Brownsmith's Independent 'Medical' Evaluation of Stacy A. Gibson" dated October 29, 2003, is 
unauthenticated and unsigned. It is merely a self-serving declaration by an unidentified person or 
persons, whose credentials are unknown. The document has no standing because there is no way 
to identify its author, or the source of the observations set forth therein, the basis for the 
knowledge of the person who prepared it, or the motives for its preparation. Exhibit 48 and the 
attachments thereto should be excluded. 
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CONCLUSION 
The foregoing exhibits pertain to matters outside the scope of the issues set forth in the 
Industrial Commission's Notice of Hearing. The Industrial Commission by its Order of April 29, 
2004, has already ruled that issues not set forth in the Notice of Hearing will not be adjudicated 
by the Industrial Commission and that evidence pertaining to other issues will not be received. 
Notwithstanding this ruling, and the specific enumeration by the Industrial Commission of legal 
issues that will not be addressed by the Industrial Commission, Claimant's counsel has submitted 
literally dozens of proposed exhibits that do not pertain to the issues set forth in the Industrial 
Commission's Notice of Hearing. Defendants respectfully submit that the foregoing exhibits 
should be excluded from evidence in this matter and respectfully so mo e. 
DATED this£_ day of May, 2004. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
.-
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this ..:2_ day of May, 2004, I caused a true and correct 
copy of the above and foregoing instrument to be served by the method indicated below to the 
following: 
Vernon K. Smith 
Attorney at Law 
1900 West Main Street 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
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VERNON K. SMITH 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
1900 West Main Street 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
Idaho State Bar No. 1365 
Telephone: (208) 345-1125 
Fax: (208) 345-1129 
BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
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I.C. Case No. 01-015332 
CLAIMANTS RULE 10 






COMES NOW The Claimant above-named, through counsel, and does 
disclose the following witnesses and exhibits pursuant to the Idaho Industrial 
Commission's Judicial Rules of Practice and Procedure, Rule 10. 
WITNESSES 
Claimant will call as witnesses at hearing the following individuals: 
1. Stacy A. Gibson 
2. John M. Gibson 
3 Dr. Joe A. Lipetzky, Psy.D. 
CLAIMANT'S RULE 10 DISCLOSURE OF WITNESSES AND EXHIBITS P. 1 
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4. Dr. F. LaMarr Heyrend, M.D. 
5. Dr. Stephen E. Spencer, M.D. 
6. Vernon K. Smith, Attorney at Law 
7. Merrily Wilfong 
8. Marsha Eiguren 
Claimant reserves the right to call as witnesses at the hearing of this matter 
any individuals identified by Defendants as witnesses. 
EXHIBITS 
Claimant intends to use as exhibits at hearing the following documents, 
copies of which are attached hereto. 
1. Curriculum Vitae of Dr. Joe A. Lipetzky, Psy. D., Licensed 
Psychologist. 
2. Curriculum Vitae of Dr. F. LaMarr Heyrend, M.D. Clinical Psychiatrist. 
3. Dr. Joe A. Lipetzky's Evaluation and diagnosis of Claimant, Stacy 
Gibson, will be presented as evidence on or before the Idaho Industrial 
Commission Hearing, currently scheduled to commence on May 13, 2004 (Rule 10 
G, J.R.P.P.). 
4. Dr. F. LaMarr Heyrend's Evaluation and diagnosis of Claimant, Stacy 
Gibson, will be presented as evidence on or before the Idaho Industrial 
Commission Hearing, currently scheduled to commence on May 13, 2004 (Rule 10 
G, J.R.P.P.). Due to unforeseen circumstances, Dr. Heyrend was not available to 
complete his evaluation report of Claimant, because he was out of town from 
Friday, April 23, 2004, until late Friday, April 30, 2004. 
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5, A copy of Plaintiff's August 8, 1994 Proposed Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law and Order, from Fourth District Court Case No. 95957, 
Woodbridge and Perkins v. Ada County and Ada County Sheriff, Vaughn Killeen. 
6. Sergeant Gary Rouse's October 24, 1997 response to Claimant's 
Memorandum regarding payroll errors she had discovered in her wages and 
benefits. 
7. Copies of Claimant's Monthly Evaluation R._eports from July 19, 1997 
through May 19, 1998. 
8. A copy of Claimant's July 1998 Performance Review Report. 
9. Sergeant Gary Rouse's July 2, 1998 response to Claimant's request 
for additional off-duty training. 
10. Claimant's July 29, 1998 request to Sergeant Gary Rouse for 
permission to undertake additional off-duty training. 
11. Copies of Claimant's Monthly Evaluation Reports from January 16, 
1999 through June 1999. 
12. Copies of Claimant's Ada County Sheriff's Office Employee Training 
History concerning additional and correspondence courses she completed from 
March 22, 1998 through June 17, 1999. 
13. May 3, 1999 e-mail from Lieutenant Dale Woodcock concerning his 
search for a non-commissioned officer (white shirt) to undertake advanced training 
in computers; this position is one of several Claimant, Stacy Gibson, had submitted 
her name for, so she could receive additional training. 
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14. Merrily Wilfong's (Ada County Payroll Technician) July 19, 1999 
facsimile transmission to Kelli Bolicek, Ada County Sheriffs Office Budget Director, 
concerning nine (9) Sheriffs Office employees who Coun1y Payroll determined . 
were owed back wages for overtime from October 1998 through June 1999. 
15. Transcribed copies of the interrogation of Claimant conducted by 
Detective Arville Glenn on July 20, 1999. 
16. Transcribed copies of the interrogation of Claimant conducted by 
Detective Scott Johnson on July 20, 1999. 
17. A copy of the Ada County Sheriffs Case Log No. !A 99-008, initiated 
on July 19, 1999. 
18. Dr. Spencer's July 23, 1999 Progress Notes of Claimant, Stacy 
Gibson. 
19. Copy of the August 3, 1999 Case Status Report that Detective Arville 
Glenn forwarded to the Ada County Prosecutor's Office. 
20. Dr. Spencer's letter dated August 5, 1999. 
21. Ada County Prosecutor, Greg Bower's August 9, 1999 letter to John 
A. Christensen, Chief Criminal Deputy Prosecutor, Canyon County, Idaho. 
22. John A. Christensen's August 20, 1999 letter to Greg Bower. 
23. Dr. Spencer's August 20, 1999 Progress Notes of Claimant, Stacy 
Gibson .. 
24. Dr. Spencer's August 20, 1999 letter. 
25. Legal Advisor to Sheriff Killeen, R. Monte MacConnell's November 3, 
1999 letterto Vernon K. Smith. 
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26. Dr. Spencer's November 12, 1999 letter. 
27. A copy of the handwritten diary John M. Gibson kept from July 20, 
1999 through January 12, 2000, detailing his observatio~s of his wife, Stacy 
Gibson. 
28. A copy of the transcript concerning Claimant's separation hearing 
before the Ada County Personnel Hearing Officer on January 25th and 26th, 2000. 
29. Dr. Charles D. Steuart's January 2000 letter to the Idaho State Board 
of Medicine. 
30. R. Monte MacConnell's January 28, 2000 letter to the Idaho State 
Board of Medicine. 
31. Dr. Spencer's February 3, 2000 letter to the Idaho State Board of 
Medicine. 
32. February 12, 2001 letter with five (5) attachments from Theodore E. 
Argyle, Chief Civil Deputy Prosecutor for Ada County, to the·Ada County Board of 
Commissioners. 
33. Vernon K. Smith's May 15, 2001 letter to Gary Stivers, Director, Idaho 
Industrial Commission. 
34. Gary Stivers June 8, 2001 letterto Vernon K. Smith. 
35. Stacy A. Gibson's July 9, 2001 letter to Gary Stivers, Director, Idaho 
Industrial Commission. 
36. R. Monte MacConnell's August 2, 2001 letter to Dr. Stephen E. 
Spencer, M.D. 
37. Dr. Spencer's August 7, 2001 letter to R. Monte Macconnell. 
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38. The Idaho Industrial Commission's August 7, 2001 Certification of 
Service with copies of two (2) letters attached. 
39. Vernon K. Smith's September 14, 2001 letter to Jewel Roberts, 
Senior Claims Examiner, State Insurance Fund. 
40. May 6, 2002 Affidavit of Vernon K. Smith. 
.) 
41. Dr. Heyrend's December 3, 2002 letter to Dr. Craig Beavers, Ph.D. 
42. Dr. Heyrend's December 3, 2002 letter to Vernon K. Smith. 
43. January 30, 2003 Affidavit of Sharon M. Ullman. 
44. Idaho Supreme Court Decision, Gibson v. Ada County Sheriff's 
Department, 139 Idaho 5, 72 P.3d 845 (2003). 
45. Dr. Heyrend's April 21, 2003 letter to Vernon K. Smith. 
46. Dr. Heyrend's October 22, 2003 Progress Note of Claimant, Stacy 
Gibson. 
47. Dr. Heyrend's October 24, 2003 Progress Note of Claimant, Stacy 
Gibson. 
48. Vernon K. Smith's October 29, 2003 letter to Dr. Cynthia Brownsrnith, 
Ph.D., including attachments and the rebuttal narrative to her August 27, 2003 
Evaluation Report of Claimant, Stacy Gibson. 
49. Rite Aid Pharmacy Customer History Repo~ for Claimant, Stacy 
Gibson, generated May 3, 2004, for prescribed medications dispensed to Claimant 
during the period of January 1, 1998 through May 3, 2004. 
Claimant reserves the right to use as exhibits at the hearing of this matter 
any documents disclosed by Defendants during the course of discovery, identified 
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by any witnesses during deposition testimony, or identified in documentation as 
potential witnesses or disclosed to have possession of exhibits. Claimant may 
intend to take post-hearing depositions in this matter, and does reserve the right to 
doso. 
Dated this 3~day of May 2004. 
Vernon K. Smith 
Attorney for Claimant 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
<1 
I HEREBY CERTIFY That on the 7 ;:;.--day of May 2004, I caused a true 
and correct copy of the above and foregoing to be delivered to the following 
persons at the following addresses as follows: 
Idaho Industrial Commission 
P.O. Box 83720 
Boise, Idaho 83720-0041 
Jon M. Bauman 
Elam & Burke 
P.O. Box 1539 
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CLAIMANTS RESPONSE 
TO DEFEND.ANTS' MOTION 
IN LIMINE 
COMES NOW The Claimant above-named, through counsel, and does 
.respectfully move the Idaho Industrial Commission to reject ,,nd deny Defendants' 
request in their Motion in Limine, therein requesting the C,,mmission to exclude 
some exhibits submitted to be included in evidence by Claimant, for the reasons 
and upon the grounds as follows: 
Exhibit 5: This exhibit is a court document, a matter of public record, and 
is evidence produced to insure all parties (and the Commission) are aware of the 
pre-existing, historical arrogance, past conduct and general attitude of the Ada 
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County Sheriff, Vaughn Killeen, as it demonstrates the manner in which the 
Sheriff's Office employees are treated, in a fashion not fair, not lawful and with 
complete disregard concerning the Fair Labor Standards Act, U.S. 201 et seq., and 
Ada County ordinances as it concerns employee wages, benefits, and overtime 
issues. Specifically, in Exhibit 5, Sheriff Killeen portrayed his attitude as he stated: 
"I don't give a shit what the Ada County Ordinance says." See page 5, paragraph 
X. Furthermore, this evidence concerning the ongoing failure and inadequate 
behavior of Ada County to provide accurate, correct and lawful calculation of wages 
to Sheriff's Office employees was provided to Dr. Stephen E. Spencer, Dr. Joe A. 
Lipetzky and Dr. F. LaMarr Heyrend, to demonstrate the disregard of employee 
rights and reason for employee fears of unlawful threats made to them. The 
general mentality has been the Sheriff is simply above the kiw, and will do to you 
what he wants, and you are helpless in preventing that en:J result. The attitude 
instills absolute fear of death by these employees. This exhibit demonstrates the 
ongoing attitude as it is portrayed to employees, and that fear sets the stage and is 
part of the res gestae, an exception to any concern of hearsay, and relevant as to 
the foreseeable reaction of psychological harm to an employee. The testimony of 
the specialists relate to this relevance in their professional medical opinion about 
how this predisposed and arrogant attitude of Vaughn Killeen contributed to and 
caused the consequential and diagnosed psychological work-place injury suffered 
by Claimant on July 20, 1999, due to the known nature of the Sheriff and 
outrageous conduct employed during the interrogation by two (2) Sheriff's Office 
detectives. These medical professionals utilized the information contained within 
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this document to enable them to understand the basis for the trauma in their 
diagnosis and prognosis of Claimant. 
Exhibit 6: This documentary evidence clearly shoyvs that Claimant had 
contacted her immediate supervisor, Sergeant Gary Rouse, when on one occasion 
she determined Ada County Payroll Department had created administrative errors 
concerning her wages and benefits. This evidence confirms Sergeant Rouse 
instructed Claimant to contact Karen Bond to have Payroll address those 
administrative errors concerning her wages and benefits. . Defendants' Rule 10 
Disclosure of Witnesses and Exhibits listed Sergeant Gary Rouse as a witness at 
the hearing presently scheduled in this matter. Furthermore, information 
concerning the pre-existing and ongoing failure and behavior of Ada County to 
provide accurate, correct and lawful wages to Sheriff's Office employees was 
provided to Dr. Stephen E. Spencer, Dr. Joe A. Lipetzky and Dr. F. LaMarr 
Heyrend, and this exhibit is again part of the res gestae, as Claimant had the belief 
the voucher errors would be corrected by Payroll before disbursements were made, 
or corrected in subsequent pay entries, as Claimant was told would occur by Ms. 
Bond from those earlier discussion with Ms. Bond. The testimony of the specialists 
relate to the relevance in their professional medical opinion about how this attitude 
of Ada County Payroll assumed the role for accuracy and would make the only 
corrections made, and this attitude contributed to the consequential results for the 
diagnosed psychological work-place injury suffered by Claimant on July 20, 1999, 
as she had no control over what took place, coupled with the outrageous conduct 
during the interrogations conducted by the two (2) Sheriffs Office detectives. 
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These medical professionals utilized the information contained within this document 
to enable them to understand the basis for the trauma Claimant suffered. It 
presents a fear of the unknown, over which she had no control, yet she was blamed 
for the effect of errors the County arrogance created. The specialists used this 
material in their analysis to determine their diagnosis and pro[Jnosis of Claimant. 
Exhibit 7, 8, 11: These exhibits will be utilized as evidence to 
substantiate the testing and evaluations of Claimant conducted by Dr. F. LaMarr 
Heyrend, and Dr. Joe Lipetzky. These Idaho licensed professionals received for 
' review, and were made fully aware of these documents, and Claimant and her 
witnesses should be allowed to see them again during the hearing, to further 
confirm Claimant was "a good to excellent employee" prior to the investigation. 
Exhibit 7 and 8 were prepared and signed by Defendants' witness, Sergeant Gary 
Rouse, and Claimant's counsel may wish to verify with Sergeant Rouse as to the 
meaning and content of those documents. Furthermore, information concerning 
Claimant's work ethics, attitude, commitment, and determination as an employee of 
the Ada County Sheriffs Office was provided to Dr. Stephen E. Spencer, Dr. Joe A. 
Lipetzky and Dr. F. LaMarr Heyrend, to demonstrate the claimed fault was not 
about Claimant's work performance, or any rational basis for employee discipline. 
These exhibits may be utilized during their testimony to demonstrate their 
professional medical opinion about how her work performance was not an issue, 
and that it was this misguided idea of fault over a pay error that was grossly 
distorted by the outrageous conduct of Detective Scott Johnson on July 20, 1999, 
that led to the consequential psychological work-place injury suffered by Claimant. 
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These medical professionals utilized the information contained within these 
documents to enable them to understand the basis for the trauma. This material 
was used in their analysis to determine their diagnosis and prygnosis of Claimant. 
' 
Exhibit 9, 10, 12, 13: These exhibits will be utiiized as evidence to 
substantiate the testing and evaluations of Claimant conducted by Dr. F. LaMarr 
Heyrend, and Dr. Joe Lipetzky. These Idaho licensed professionals received for 
review, and were made aware of these documents, and Claimant and her 
witnesses should be allowed to see them again during the hearing to further 
confirm Claimant had, in addition to working her regular shift, worked an average of 
forty-seven (47) hours of overtime each month (January 1, 1999 through June 
1999), and had completed 204 hours of correspondence courses on her own time. 
Defendants have attempted to raise a prejudicial doubt concerning the fact 
Claimant has stated she went to the Sheriffs Office to meet [t)etective Arville Glenn 
; 
on July 20, 1999, because she thought he was requesting ,her to "volunteer" for 
some "special work assignment" as is described in Exhibit .13. See Defendants' 
' Memorandum in Support of Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Complaint or Limit 
Issues to Be Tried at Hearing (March 30, 2004), at page 8 and page 21. 
Furthermore, information concerning Claimant's work ethics, attitude, commitment, 
determination and volunteering for "special work assignments" as an employee of 
the Ada County Sheriffs Office was provided to Dr. Stephen E. Spencer, Dr. Joe A 
Lipetzky and Dr. F. LaMarr Heyrend, and these exhibits may be utilized during their 
testimony to ascertain their professional medical opinion about how this evidence 
led to the consequential psychological work-place injury suffered by Claimant due 
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to the outrageous conduct of Detective Scott Johnson on July 20, 1999, , and how 
these medical professionals utilized the information contained within these 
documents to determine their diagnosis and prognosis of Claimant. 
Exhibit 14: Defendants' argument that use of this document violates the 
"privacy of individuals who are in no way connected with the instant litigation" is 
irrelevant and moot. This document was provided by Ada County to Claimant, and 
has thereafter been provided to the Fourth District Court and the Idaho Supreme 
Court as an exhibit in Claimant's other pending matters. Exhibit 14 was prepared 
by Merrily Wilfong, one of Claimant's Rule !O Disclosed Witnesses, and 
communicated to one of Defendants' Rule 10 Disclosed Witnesses, and those 
witnesses can be expected to testify as to what the exhibits mean and the accuracy 
of their content. Furthermore, information concerning the pre-existing and ongoing 
failure and behavior of Ada County to provide accurate, corre,;t and lawful wages to 
Sheriffs Office employees was provided to Dr. Stephen E. Spencer, Dr. Joe A. 
Lipetzky and Dr. F. LaMarr Heyrend, and this exhibit was part of the documents 
utilized to ascertain their professional medical opinion about how this attitude of 
Ada County Payroll contributed to and caused the consequential and diagnosed 
psychological work-place injury suffered by Claimant on July:: 20, 1999, due to the 
outrageous conduct and interrogation by two (2) Sheriffs Office detectives, and 
I 
how these medical professionals utilized the information contained within this 
document to determine their diagnosis and prognosis of Claimant. 
Exhibit 21 and 22: Evidence concerning Ada County's treatment of 
Claimant and their malicious attempt to prosecute Claimant for felony grand theft 
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because of the County's own administrative record-keeping errors was provided to 
Dr. Stephen E. Spencer, Dr. Joe A. Lipetzky and Dr. F. LaMarr Heyrend, and these 
exhibits were utilized to ascertain their professional medical opinion about how this 
attitude of Ada County and its Sheriff contributed to tho consequential and 
I. 
diagnosed psychological work-place injury suffered by Claimant on July 20, 1999, 
' 
due to the outrageous conduct and interrogation by two (2) Sheriffs Office 
detectives, and how these medical professionals utilized the Jnformation contained 
within these documents to determine their diagnosis and prognosis of Claimant. 
These documents show a basis for genuine fear over the unconceivable conduct of 
the Defendants and fear of incarceration because that was the threat, and they act 
above the law with no conscious regard for their outrageous conduct, exhibited for 
years as being beyond reach of the law, if you fell on the wror:g side of their cause. 
Exhibit 25: This evidence concerns Ada County's teatment of Claimant 
and their capricious and malicious attempts to prevent Claimant from contacting 
friends and co-workers at the Ada County Sheriffs Office. ft was provided to Dr. 
Stephen E. Spencer, Dr. Joe A. Lipetzky and Dr. F. LaMarr Heyrend, and this 
exhibit was utilized to ascertain their professional medical opinion about how this 
attitude of Ada County and its Sheriff contributed to the consequential and 
diagnosed psychological work-place injury suffered by Claim3nt on July 20, 1999, 
and culminated from the outrageous conduct and interrogriion by these two (2) 
Sheriff's Office detectives. These medical professionals utilized the information 
contained within these documents to enable them to understand the basis of the 
trauma, and the cumulative effects of this power crazy cond'lct, and to determine 
CLAIMANT'S RESPONSE TO DEFENDANTS' MOTION IN LIMINE P. 7 
their diagnosis and prognosis of Claimant. Exhibit 25 also /elates to the issue of 
Ada County's refusal to allow Claimant access to those medical records that were 
specifically created by Dr. Charles D. Steuart concerning her on October 5, 1999. 
In the Rule 10 Disclosure of Witnesses and Exhibits, Defendants have listed as 
exhibits the medical records of Stacy Gibson from Dr. Steuart (Bates No. 03001-
03004). 
Exhibit 27: This evidence concerns the handwritten notes taken by 
Claimant's husband, John Gibson (a disclosed witness), regarding his observations 
of Claimant's mental and physical appearances immediately after Claimant was 
); 
brutally interrogated by two (2) Sheriffs Office detectives on July 20, 1999. Mr. 
Gibson personally made an appointment for Claimant to see Dr. Spencer on July 
23, 199, and was responsible for transporting Claimant to Dr. Spencer's office on 
July 23, 1999. During this initial visit with Dr. Spencer, Mr. Gipson told Dr. Spencer 
he was keeping a handwritten diary of his observations of Claimant and that he 
would continue to do so, since Claimant was so severely traumatized and having 
' 
memory loss concerns and problems which had been triggered by the July 20, 
1999 interrogations. Mr. Gibson and Dr. Spencer discussed this issue, and both 
thought it was a good idea for Mr. Gibson to track his observations, as to the effects 
and results of what has occurred to her, and especially important to document 
reactions to the medications Dr. Spencer had prescribed, and being concerned 
about the memory loss the trauma had imposed. The doctor was concerned how 
she was feeling, what activities she was involved in, and whet changes he noticed. 
Furthermore, Exhibit 27 was provided to Dr. Joe A. Lipetzky and Dr. F. LaMarr 
CLAIMANT'S RESPONSE TO DEFENDANTS' MOTION IN LIM!NE P. 8 
( ( 
Heyrend, and these exhibits were utilized to ascertain their' professional medical 
i 
' opinion about how this conduct of the detectives had affected Claimant, as shown 
by the observations, records, and that evidence was considered in determining the 
consequential psychological work-place injury suffered by Claimant due to the 
contemptible conduct of Detective Scott Johnson on July 20, ~999 .. These medical 
i 
professionals utilized the information contained within these ,documents to enable 
them to understand the results of the conduct, and the degree of trauma she 
experienced to determine their diagnosis and prognosis of Cl~imant. 
Exhibit 28: Information contained within Exhibit 28' was provided to Dr. 
Stephen E. Spencer, Dr. Joe A. Lipetzky and Dr. F. LaMarr Heyrend, and this 
exhibit was utilized to ascertain their professional medic?! opinion about the 
consequential psychological work-place injury suffered by Claimant due to the 
outrageous conduct of Detective Scott Johnson on July 20, 1999. These medical 
professionals utilized the information contained within Ihese documents to 
I 
determine their diagnosis and prognosis of Claimant. Furthermore, Defendants' 
Rule 10 Disclosure of Witnesses and Exhibits does list Kelli Bolicek, Arville Glenn, 
and Scott Johnson, and Claimant may examine those witnesses as to the 
testimony they provided during the January 25th and 26th , 2000 hearing concerning 
Claimant's termination from the Ada County Sheriff's Office. 
Exhibit 30: Information contained within Exhibit 30 was provided to Dr. 
i 
Joe A. Lipetzky and Dr. F. LaMarr Heyrend, and this e~hibit was utilized to 
ascertain their professional medical opinion about the ongoing psychological work-
place injury suffered by Claimant due to the outrageous cond1Jct of Detective Scott 
CLAIMANT'S RESPONSE TO DEFENDANTS' MOTION IN LIMINE P. 9 
i 
Johnson on July 20, 1999. These medical professionals utilized the information 
contained within this document to determine their diagnosis and prognosis of 
Claimant. 
Exhibit 32: Information contained within Exhibit 32: was provided to Dr. 
Joe A. Lipetzky and Dr. F. LaMarr Heyrend, and this exhibit was utilized to 
ascertain their professional medical opinion about the consequential psychological 
work-place injury suffered by Claimant due to the outrageou~ conduct of Detective 
Scott Johnson on July 20, 1999, and how these medical professionals utilized the 
information contained within these documents to determine their diagnosis and 
prognosis of Claimant. 
Exhibit 36 and 37: Information contained within Exhibit 36 and 37 was 
provided to Dr. Stephen E. Spencer and Dr. F. LaMarr Heyre,1d, and these exhibits 
were utilized to confirm the ongoing nature of Ada GJunty to arrogantly, 
capriciously and maliciously intimidate professional medical, providers when they 
complete medical diagnosis and prognosis concerning a County employee, and 
their diagnosis and prognosis confirmed the County's attitude' was an issue and the 
underlying fault, and contributed to the ongoing psycholog•ical work-place injury 
suffered by Claimant due to the outrageous conduct of Detective Scott Johnson on 
July 20, 1999. These medical professionals utilized the information contained 
within these documents to determine their diagnosis and prognosis of Claimant. 
Exhibit 39: Information contained within Exhibit 39, was provided to Dr. 
Joe A. Lipetzky and Dr. F. LaMarr Heyrend, and this exhibit was utilized to 
ascertain their professional medical opinion about this psy\::hological work-place 
CLAIMANT'S RESPONSE TO DEFENDANTS' MOTION IN LIMINE P. 10 
injury suffered by Claimant due to the outrageous conduct of Detective Scott 
Johnson on July 20, 1999. These medical professionals utilized the information 
contained within this document to determine their diagnosis and prognosis of 
Claimant. 
Exhibit 40: Information contained within Exhibit 40 was provided to Dr. 
Joe A. Lipetzky and Dr. F. LaMarr Heyrend, and this exhibit was utilized to 
ascertain their professional medical opinion about the psychological work-place 
injury suffered by Claimant due to the outrageous conduct of Detective Scott 
' Johnson on July 20, 1999, and how these medical prof;:lssionals utilized the 
information contained within this document to determine their diagnosis and 
prognosis of Claimant. 
Exhibit 43: Information contained within Exhibit 43 was provided to Dr. 
Joe A. Lipetzky and Dr. F. LaMarr Heyrend, and this exhibit was utilized to 
ascertain their professional medical opinion about this consequential psychological 
work-place injury suffered by Claimant due to the outrageou~ conduct of Detective 
Scott Johnson on July 20, 1999. These medical professionals utilized the 
i 
information contained within this document to enable them to understand the 
history of what caused this trauma and to determine their diagnosis and prognosis 
of Claimant. 
Exhibit44: Information contained within Exhibit 44 was provided to Dr. 
Joe A. Lipetzky and Dr. F. LaMarr Heyrend, and this exhibit was utilized to 
ascertain their professional medical opinion about this consequential psychological 
work-place injury suffered by Claimant due to the outrageou8 conduct of Detective 
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Scott Johnson on July 20, 1999. These medical professionals utilized the 
' ' information contained within this document to enable them to understand the 
trauma and to determine their diagnosis and prognosis of Claimant. 
Exhibit 48: Information contained within Exhibit 48 was provided to Dr. 
Cynthia Brownsmith, Dr. Joe A. Lipetzky and Dr. F. LaMarr Heyrend, and this 
exhibit was utilized, in part, to understand the entire spectrum of issues, and to 
ascertain their professional medical opinions about this consequential work-place 
psychological work-place injury suffered by Claimant due to ttie outrageous conduct 
of Detective Scott Johnson on July 20, 1999, These medica: professionals utilized 
the information contained within these documents to determine their diagnosis and 
prognosis of Claimant. Furthermore, this narrative and rebutiHI to Dr. Brownsmith's 
' 
Evaluation of Claimant was assembled to correct the errors, misstatements and 
! 
misperceptions Dr. Brownsmith had compiled in her evaluation report, Those 
errors, misstatements and misperceptions create significant concerns about Dr. . 
Brownsmith's evaluation of Claimant, as she did not give a medical opinion as to 
Claimant's psychological work-place injury, and only determined, in her opinion, 
Claimant did not suffer from the full definition of Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder 
(PTSD), because she had not determined a clear and present danger of facing 
death, or a life threatening experience. 
Dr. Joe A. Lipetzky and Dr. F. LaMarr Heyrend have reviewed and are in 
possession of all documentary evidence (Exhibits 1-48) co'ntained in Claimant's 
Rule 10 Disclosure of Witness and Exhibits, and Claimant 1should be allowed to 
introduce each Exhibit during the hearing currently scheduled 1-o commence on May 
CLAIMANT'S RESPONSE TO DEFENDANTS' MOTION IN LIMINE P. 12 
,. 
13th and 14th, at 9:00 a.m., as these documents were avaffable and utilized to 
develop the entire spectrum of concern, and support the diagnosed condition 
addressed. Defendants' Motion in Limine, requesting exclusion of certain of these 
' 
exhibits should be Denied. 
Dated this __ day of May 2004. 
Vernon K. Smith 
Attorney for Claimar,t 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY That on the --,-- day of May 2004, I caused a true 
and correct copy of the above and foregoing to be delivered to the following 
persons at the following addresses as follows: 
Idaho Industrial Commission ( ) U.S.Mail 
P.O. Box 83720 ( ) Fax 
Boise, Idaho 83720-0041 ( ) i Hand Delivered 
Jon M. Bauman ( 
Elam & Burke ) Fax 
P.O. Box 1539 ( ) Ha) Delive d 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Vernon K. Smith 
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( 
BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
STACY A. GIBSON, ) 
) 
Claimant, ) IC 01-015332 
v. ) 
) 





IDAHO STATE INSURANCE FUND, ) 
MAY 1 3 2004 ) 
Surety, ) 
l»mlSTRlAL COMMISSIOM Defendants. ) 
On May 12, 2004, at 4:55 p.m., Claimant's attorney Vernon K. Smith initiated a 
telephone conference with Referee Douglas A. Donohue. The Referee immediately connected 
Defendants' attorney, Jon M. Bauman, with the telephone conference. During the conference, 
Mr. Smith announced that he had a criminal hearing set May 13 and 14, 2004. Mr. Smith further 
requested that the Industrial Commission hearing set May 13 and 14, 2004, in the above-entitled 
matter be vacated. The Referee reviewed the file and, pursuant to Mr. Smith's request, 
HEREBY ORDERS that the hearing set for May 13 and 14, 2004, in Boise in the 
above-entitled matter, be and the same is hereby VACATED. i'[~tmiftfitYittiii'?fl-f~;ii~~H.t<lll 
ORDER VACATING HEARING - 1 
f~wg:,t~Jil'wJt~i"i'<iiii¢st f'dt;~i~(§ri:i (s'igj,~Ji~~2iiirsihlilN:~t'G~'niti~"ti~(llat1i1 
~)l,~y:,11M!J~!P,J~S.,J\~~PfflRI!~~~~114~}tlf!!~~l~~ 
DATED this\:> day of May, 2004. 
lNDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
ORDE~ ~~~rT~~gy ~~~~:~~rfiiL~~~~~y;lf~~~~(~~o~;~~ C:!h ~~ 
the following: 
Vernon K. Smith 
1900 West Main Street 
Boise, ID 83702 
Jon M. Bauman 
P.O. Box 1539 
Boise, ID 83701 
db 
Fax#: 345-1129 
Fax #: 384-5844 
ORDER VACATING HEARING - 2 
' 
VERNON K. SMITH 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
1900 West Main Street 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
Idaho State Bar No. 1365 
Telephone: (208) 345-1125 
Fax: (208) 345-1129 
BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
STACY A. GIBSON 
Claimant, 
V. 
ADA COUNTY SHERIFF'S OFFICE, 
Employer, 
and 























I.C. Case No. 01-015332 
REQUEST FOR HEARING 
TO: EMPLOYER AND DEFENDANT SURETY AND THEIR ATTORNEY OF 
RECORD, JON BAUMAN AND CALENDARING CLERK: 
COMES NOW The Claimant above-named, through counsel, Vernon K. 
Smith, and does request the Idaho Industrial Commission to schedule a hearing in 
the above-referenced matter, in accordance with the following information: 
1. · The title and number of the case are as shown above. 
REQUEST FOR HEARING P. 1 ORIGINAL 
2. Claimant and her counsel believe this matter may be ready to 
proceed with hearing; further medical analysis has been requested and almost 
completed, and additional medical documents will be presented to address 
Claimant's state of impairment/disability as diagnosed and addressed to date, as it 
relates to the extreme injury sustained by Claimant in the workplace environment 
and the psychological mishap resulting in her physical injury, disability and 
impairment. 
3. The nature of this action is recovery of all applicable benefits and 
entitlements due Claimant under Idaho's Workman's Compensation laws, and to 
support that right to recovery Claimant will present factual testimony and medical 
evidence to support her claim for benefits. 
4. Claimant may elect to call witnesses, if written statements and 
medical documents are not deemed adequate for a full review. To date there are 
presently in excess of 90 documents that are relevant and relate to the issues of 
this workplace environment, the physical consequences of this psychological injury, 
and all such documentation and related analysis will be submitted with medical 
evidence and diagnosis to address the lawful right to recovery from this injury or 
psychological mishap resulting from this workplace state of employment. Claimant 
and her counsel anticipate a two {2) day hearing, assuming a conventional process 
of testimonial and evidentiary presentation is utilized, with an effort made to reduce 
witness testimony and rely upon documents, where possible. 
5. This Claim does contain specific issues relating to a workplace 
caused injury, being psychological in nature in the inception, and causing physical 
REQUEST FOR HEARING P. 2 
injuries and damage from the severity of the psychological mishap, which has 
manifested itself into physical injuries and impairment. Aspects of such a 
psychological mishap and resulting physical injury under the statute may be 
consistent with a first impression to this Commission, but is recognized in other 
Workman's Compensation forums. The psychological workplace injury was 
caused, pursued and imposed by employer agents, who violated a series of 
Federal, State and County Code provisions and policies, and consequently violated 
protected rights and property interests of Claimant. 
This case does involve what may be considered novel circumstances and 
create a complex set of facts, and will be viewed under Idaho Code, § 72-451 (1), 
(3), (4), (5), (6) and Idaho Code, § 72-604. Case authority will be submitted to 
support the legal basis of this claim. Because this case may be one of first 
impression, and does involve a complex set of facts, Claimant does request the • 
Commission consider whether the hearing be conducted by the full Commission of .. 
the Idaho State Industrial Commission, or be assigned to a Referee, conducted at 
the Idaho Industrial Commission, 317 Main Street, Boise, Idaho 83702. 
6. Claimant would request the hearing be set in a manner to 
accommodate the need for at least a two (2) day period to present evidence, as we 
currently anticipate some testimonial evidence may be required to supplement the 
documentary evidence, to address the compiled documentation and summary of 
the medical assessments. This matter should be set for a time period convenient to 
the Idaho Industrial Commission and opposing counsel, and Claimant. 
REQUEST FOR HEARING P. 3 
( ( 
"'·· 
7. Suggestions have been made as to the need for a fair settlement, 
and Ada County has been requested to engage in settlement negotiations with a 
meaningful objective to be sought by all parties, but to date no settlement offers 
have been submitted in this case, and the employer (Ada County) has chosen to 
call this injury one of a "mental-mental" category only, rather than as a 
psychological mishap with a "mental-physical'' injury, recognized by authority in 
these psychological mishap cases. Ada County had chosen to ignore the effect 
and consequences their agents' conduct has had on Claimant, and has preferred to 
focus on a way to escape liability, if possible, rather than resolve the claim in the 
context of good faith, and recognize the physical injuries suffered from the County's 
conduct. 
6. Attorney for Claimant is: 
Vernon K. Smith 
1900 West Main Street 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
7. Opposing counsel is: 
Mr. Jon Bauman 
Elam & Burke 
251 East Front Street 
Suite 300 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
8. Dates available to Vernon K. Smith for hearing in this matter are as 
follows: 
March 21•t, 22nd, 23rd , 24th and 25th, 2005. 
April 18th, 19th, 20th, 21 st and 22nd, 2005. 
May 23rd, 24th, 25th, 26th and 27th, 2005. 
June 20th , 21"\ 22nd , 23rd and 24th, 2005. 
REQUEST FOR HEARING P. 4 
-/y 
Dated thisdl.. day of October 2004. 
Vernon K. Smith 
Attorney for Claimant 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
-r-
1 HEREBY CERTIFY That on the .J7 day of October 2004, I caused a 
true and correct copy of the above and foregoing to be delivered to the following 
persons at the following addresses as follows: 
Idaho Industrial Commission ( ) U.S. Mail 
P.O. Box 83720 ( ) Fax 
Boise, Idaho 83720-0041 ( v> Hand Delivered 
Mr. Jon Bauman ( v) U.S. Mail 
Elam & Burke ( ) Fax 
251 East Front Street ) Delivered 
Suite 300 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
REQUEST FOR HEARING P. 5 
Ryan P. Armbruster 
Jon M. Bauman 
ELAM & BURKE, P.A. 
251 East Front Street, Suite 300 
P.O. Box 1539 
Boise, Idaho 83701-1539 
Telephone: (208) 343-5454 
Facsimile: (208) 384-5844 
Armbruster - ISB #1878 
Bauman - ISB #2989 
Attorneys for Defendants 
BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO 
STACY A. GIBSON, 
Claimant, 
V. 
ADA COUNTY SHERIFF'S OFFICE, 
Employer, 
and 
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Defendants Ada County Sheriff's Office and Idaho State Insurance Fund, by '@ct thfi:iiigh 
z 
Jon M. Bauman of the firm of Elam & Burke, P.A., their attorneys of record herein, hereby 
respond to Claimant's Request for Hearing as follows: 
RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR HEARING - 1 
G:\SHARED\0179\9303\PLEADINGSl.r~p<:)11!\C to f1¼14heari11g-2. wp<l 
1. Readiness for Hearing: This matter will be ready for hearing by the time a hearing 
can be scheduled. 
2. Factual and Legal Issues: Claimant has failed to articulate the factual and legal 
issues to be decided at hearing. Defendants respectfully submit the following issues should be 
tried by the Industrial Commission at the hearing of this cause: 
a. Defendants deny that the accident or occupational exposure alleged in 
Claimant's Amended Complaint occurred on or about the time claimed. 
b. Defendants deny that the condition for which benefits are claimed was 
partly or entirely caused by an accident arising out of and in the course and scope of Claimant's 
employment. 
c. Defendant_s allege that Claimant is seeking to recover compensation for 
conditions attributable in whole or in part to a pre-existing injury, condition, or infirmity, and 
Claimant's compensation, if any should be appointed pursuant to Idaho Code Section 72-406. 
d. Defendants assert that Claimant did not give timely notice to the Employer 
after the claimed occupational disease was first manifest. 
e. Defendants allege that Claimant is seeking to recover compensation for a 
condition or conditions resulting from a subsequent intervening cause. 
f. To the extent attorney fees are sought by Claimant's Amended Complaint, 
Defendants deny that they have acted unreasonably, and Claimant is therefore not entitled to an 
award of attorney fees pursuant to the provisions of Idaho Code Section 72-804. 
g. Defendants deny that Claimant's claim is compensable. 
RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR HEARING - 2 
G:"5HARED\O ! 79\9303\PLEADINGS\reponse n> n.-i14he1lring· 2. wpd 
\ \ .. 
h. To the extent Claimant seeks benefits for mental, psychological, 
psychiatric or emotional injury, her claim fails under the provisions of Idaho Code Section 72-
451 and Claimant cannot satisfy and has not complied with the provisions of that statute. 
i. Claimant's claim is barred by her failure to comply with the applicable 
statute of limitations set forth in Idaho Code Section 72-706. 
j. Claimant's claim is barred by her failure to timely make a claim pursuant 
to the provisions ofldaho Code Section 72-70 L 
k. Defendants respectfully submit that Idaho Code § 72-604 has no 
application to these proceedings. 
3. Location of Hearing: Defendants believe the hearing should be held in Boise, 
Idaho. 
4. Desired Dates of the Hearing: Defendants believe that a hearing in this matter 
should not be held any sooner than March 21, 2005. 
5. Unavailable Dates of Counsel: 
April 2, 6, 7, 11, 13, 21, 2005; 
May 4, 5, 9, 11, 17, 19, 2005; 
June 2, 3, 8, 16, 2005; 
July 7, 8, 11, 13, 21, 22, 2005; and 
August 3, 4, 8, 10, 18, 2005. 
6. Estimated Length of Hearing: The hearing in this matter need not consume more 
than one (1) day. 
7. Status of Settlement Negotiations: No settlement negotiations are currently 
underway and at this time no substantial likelihood exists that this matter will be settled prior to 
hearing. 
RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR HEARING - 3 
G:\SHARED\0 l 79\9303\PLEAD!NGS\rtop(lllSC: to rt,44h"'arilll,(· 2. wpd 
8. Hearing by Commission or Referee: This c~se does not present a question of first 
impression, a "situation to overturn or modify precedent," or involve novel or complex facts. It 
may therefore be heard, at the Commission's discretion, by the full m ·ssion, any member 
thereof, or by a Referee. 
DATED this 'L- day of November, 2004. 
CERTIFICA 
I HEREBY CERTIFY That on this ..:Z. day of November, 2004, I caused a true and 
correct copy of the above and foregoing instrument to be sent by the method indicated below to: 
Vernon K. Smith 
Attorney at Law 
1900 West Main Street 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR HEARING - 4 
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C ( 
BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
STACY A. GIBSON, 
Claimant, 
v. 
ADA COUNTY SHERIFF'S OFFICE, 
Employer, 
and 

















IC 01-015332 - f 
ORDERAND 
NOTICE OF HEARING 
FILED 
NOV 1 7 2004 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
Pursuant to Claimant's request that the hearing in this case be conducted by the 
full Commission, the Referee reviewed the file and being fully advised in the premises, 
HEREBY ORDERS that Claimant's request is DENIED, and 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that a hearing will be held in the above-entitled matter 
on M~}J;f;~ix~Ii'.ifiilfo'~:~Ti''j:QqfJ~\Nf:;.i?§'.Rt'f~Q'.iijir~, in the Industrial Commission 
hearing room, 317 Main Street, City of Boise, County of Ada, State of Idaho, on the 
following issues: 
1. Whether Claimant has complied with the notice and limitations 
requirements set forth in Idaho Code§ 72-701 through Idaho Code 
§ 72-706, and whether these limitations are tolled pursuant to Idaho Code 
§ 72-604. 
2. Whether the condition for which Claimant seeks benefits was caused by 
the alleged industrial accident. 
3. Whether Claimant suffered an injury caused by an accident arising out of 
and in the course of employment. 
4. Whether Claimant's condition is due in whole or in part to a subsequent 
intervening cause. 
ORDER AND NOTICE OF HEARING - 1 
/ 
( 
5. Whether and to what extent Claimant is entitled to the following benefits: 
a) Temporary partial and/or temporary total disability benefits 
(TPD/TTD); 
b) Permanent partial impairment (PPI); 
c) Disability in excess of impairment; and 
d) Medical care. 
6. Whether apportionment for a pre-existing condition pursuant to Idaho 
Code § 72-406 is appropriate. 
7. Whether Claimant's condition is compensable under Idaho Code § 72-451 
DATED this (?~ day of November, 2004. 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
'"" ~ ........ ... ------~ h~'t1':f.ft:- glas A. Donoh , Referee 
.ts:L/.llU.~~l.Ll~~~~ ._J,-.; s j~\ 
! ~ril '~! 
1 t.P.- \ I \~:... ..ti• I 
ill;. '11." -········ ~,, •• ..... OP/Df,.'1<0 ,,,,•• ,,,.,.,., .. ,,, 
I hereby certify that on th:E;zt1t::~:v:::;~0:4, a tme and corr~ct ~PY ofth~ 
ORDER AND NOTICE OF HEARING was served by ij~jf}J;i}~'Il~:'Ji:Jl.l~C~E)~\Jtffl~ll 
~ upon each of the following: 
Vernon K. Smith 
1900 West Main Street 
Boise, ID 83702 
Jon M. Bauman 
P.O. Box 1539 
Boise, ID 83701 
and by regular United States mail to: 
M. Dean Willis, CCR 
P.O. Box 1241 
Eagle, ID 83616 
db 





Law Offices of Vem·on· K. Smith 
1900 West Main Street, Boise, Idaho 83702 
Telephone: (208} 345-1125 · 
Fax: (208) 345-1129 
P!!,aes~ · ~ ...: _ , 
: I . ' ' 
... ~ -- - ,, . 
Ret cc, 
Cl UQJent .)(,or Review Cl Please: ~mmont Cl Original by U.8. Mall 
• Comments: The p~es comprising this facsimile transmlesion contain conffdentlal information from 
Vernon K. Smith. . Thi~ Information I~ solely for use by the indlvtdual entity named as the recipient 
hereof, If you are not the Intended recipient be aware that any dlsolosure, r;:opylng, dJetrfbution or use 
of the eontents of this transmission ls prohibited. If you have received this transmi$$ion In error, please 
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Jon M. Bauman 
Elam&Burke 
P.O. Box 1539 
(? 
Boise, Idaho 83701-1539 
RE: . Stacy.A. Gibson 
VERNON K, SMITH 
4'TTIJRtfl;Y AT LAW 
1SIDO W. MAIN IITRE~ 
IUJISE, IOAHO 113702 
2DIM145• 1 1 :Z5 
:ZDE1·345• 1 1 29 !F'AXI 
March 11, 2005 
I.C. Case No. 01·015332 
Dear Mr. Bauman: 
I have infonned John and Stacy Gibson of your desire to have thern meet 
with Dr. Brownsmith, as a further interview to update her Initial psychological 
evaluation of Ms. Gibson. 
In light of Dr. Brownsmith's lack of understanding of the capricious conduct 
utilized by the Ada County agents and officials who wrongfully terminated Ms. 
Gibson from her employrnent, In violation of her Federally protected rights, we are 
very reluctant to engage in any further conta~ with Ms. Brownsmlth at this time. 
We are concerned over the fact Dr. Brownsmlth is not familiar with the 
administrative payroll errors which were created solely by County Payroll 
Department personnel, and Dr. Brownsmith's lack of sufficient training and 
knowledge to appropriately provide a relevant psychological diagnosis and 
prognosis of Ms. Gibson's mental-physical Injuries and condition resulting from the 
violation of her rights and protected privileges and the resulting misconduct of Ada 
County . .§mt 3 Arthur Larson, et al., Larson's Workers' Compensation law, § 56.02 
and Digest to Chapter 56i Roberts v. Dredge Fund, 71 fdah9 380, 232 P.2d 975 
(1951), addressing the substance of a mental-physical Injury qualification and 
PTSD criteria. Copies are enclosed for your convenient reference. 
on October 29, 2003 we sent our letter and addendum rebutting the 
contents of Dr. Brownsmith's report and her psychological evaluation of Ms. 
Gibson, therein requesting an amended report ba$ed upon the actual facts cf this ~ 
matter. To date, we have nothing to confirm Dr. Brownsmith has corrected the 5i 
erroneous and ~isleading entries In that report she submitted qoncerning the ;iJ 
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March 11, 2005 
Dr. Heyrenq, Dr. Lipet?kY and Mr. Gibson have no desire to conduct further 
control of the qamage caused by this questionable report, and will again most likely 
cause fi,Jrther emotional disturbance by circumstances arising again from @ntact 
between Ms. Gibson and Dr. Brownsmith, as it does appear Dr. Brownsmith was 
hired for the purpose to deflect fault away from Ada County, not honestly assess an 
individual's damage sustained in a mental-physical workplace injury under the 
Workers' Compensation Act. 
The Gibsons, with the approval of Stacy's doctors, will participate In any 
. further interview with Dr. Brownsmith, only under certain restrictive condition$. In 
addition to John arid Stacy being present, I, along with Or. F. Lamarr Heyrend 
and/or Dr. Lipetzky, will be present, and the session will be recorded. Plea$e 
provide my office with 3 or 4 d11tes and times Dr. Brownsmlth will be available to 
conduct suet) a proceeding, and I will have the office $taff coordinate those dates 
with each doctor's office ·schedule. 
I trust we need to work tog er and get 'through several ems 
expressed by Ors. Heyrend and Up lzky, and we agaln would request ur 
assistance in further equitable efforts t resolve thi alter prior e heari g 





cc: F. Lamarr Heyrend, M.D. 
Joe A. Upetzky, Psy.D. 
' 
.,,.., , ,, - ... ~,.. ,..,,,..,..,. , "n "'vuuu-..JU"l'"I' 
JON M. BAUMAN 
VIA FACSIMILE 
#332-7558 
Referee Douglas A. Donohue 
Industrial Commission 
317 West Main Street 
Boise, I~o 83702 
Attn: Dena Burke 
ELAM&BURKE 
A FN>/c-):JiunalN'Jocialiun 
ATTORNi\'S AT LAW 
251 EAST FRONT STKIIT, su,ra 300 
POST OFFICE SOX 1539 
ao1s1, 10A,..o s3101 
March 14, 2005 
-< .. ... 
Re: Stac.1 A. ·Gibmn v. Ada County and State Insurance Fund 
I.e. No. 01-015332 









I would like to request that a telephone conference be scheduled in the above-noted 
matter. Given the conditions demanded by Claimant's counsel, I am seeking a detennination of 
how to proceed with a follow-up interview of Claimant and of her husband by Dr. Cynthia 
Brownsmith in order to update the information obtained pxior to the last scheduled heiiring date. 
Thank you for your courtesy in this regatd. Should you have any questions concerning 
this request, please do not hesitate to contact me. 
JMB:sd 
cc: Vernon K. Smith (via facsimile) 
Jewel Owen (via U.S. mail) 





BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
STACY A. GIBSON, ) 
) 
Claimant, ) IC 01-015332 - G-
V. ) 
) 
ADA COUNTY SHERIFF'S OFFICE, ) NOTICE OF 




IDAHO STATE INSURANCE FUND, ) FILED 
) 
MAR 1 7 201!5 Surety, ) 
Defendants. ) INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that a telephone conference will be held in the above-entitled 
matter on ~'(piji~4{~QQ§/~i.iz:i'JO p'{Mi}iji:>,p'ij'TMij,]iMij, The Referee will initiate the 
calls. All parties shall be prepared to discuss the Defendants' request for telephone conference filed 
March 14, 2005, and any lsponse thereto. 
DATED this / 7 day of March, 2005. 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
~IQ __ jL ~ j_ 
Douglas A. Dofhue, Ref;¥ 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the / 7tfA_ day of ¥~rc~',20?5,_ -~ ~e m-1:d/fl.T~ct.,copy of 
NOTICE OF TELEPHONE CONFERENCE was .§J~i{fiy/#4~~iif!f!~wfa.'r:!Ji~g11rd~gf~ upon 
each of the following: 
Vernon K. Smith Fax#: 345-1129 
1900 West Main Street 
Boise, ID 83702 
db 
NOTICE OF TELEPHONE CONFERENCE - 1 
Jon M. Bauman Fax#: 384-5844 
P.O. Box 1539 
Boise, ID 83701 
fJna_l{~ 
Referee Douglas A Donohue 
Idaho Industrial Commission 
317 West Main Street 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
Attn: Dena Burke 
VERNON K, SMITH 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
1900 W, MAIN STREET 
BOISE, IDAHO 83702 
2D8·345•1 125 
208·345• 1 129 lf'AXl 
March 18, 2005 
RE: Stacy A. Gibson v. Ada County and State Insurance Fund 
I.C. No. 01-015332 
Dear Ms. Burke: 
• 
It is my understanding Mr. Jon Bauman has requested we participate in a 
telephone conference with Mr. Donohue concerning Mr. Bauman's desire tc have 
Dr. Cynthia Brownsrnith conduct a further interview with the Claimant, Stacy A. 
Gibson. 
As you are aware from the letter I sent Mr. Bauman on March 11, 2005 
(faxed to your office on March 14, 2005), Mr. and Ms. Gibson will participate in a 
further evaluation, conducted by Dr. Brownsmith, but only under restrictive 
conditions and settings as we before outlined. 
On June 19, 2003, I submitted a response, objecting to the Commission's 
Notice of Intent to direct Ms. Gibson be evaluated by Dr. Brownsmith. That 
response was based upon the medical advice given to Ms. Gibson by F. LaMarr 
Heyrend, M.D., and communicated to my office by Dr. Heyrend on April 21, 2003, 
as he was very much concerned as to the possible consequence of a re-
victimization episode resulting to his patient from any such "forensic" experience. 
Dr. Heyrend's opinion was valid and became fulfilled, and his concern is now even 
stronger than it was on April 21, 2003, because of what Ms. Gibson experienced 
from her encounter with Dr. Brownsmith. Dr. Heyrend has a strong concern Ms. 
Gibson will again be re-victimized by any further efforts undertaken by Ms. 
Brownsmith, especially under the appearance she was "retained" by Ada County 
and the State Insurance Fund, solely as a forensic advocate to deflect blame from 
the County, and give the appearance the resulting consequences of Ms. Gibson's 
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experience with Ada County should more logically rest upon Ms. Gibson's 
shoulders, as a consequence of an employment separation, and not be seen as it 
was, the very wrongful conduct of her employer, who had committed a variety of 
Federal law, State law and County ordinance violations, and serious violations of 
the County Merit System. 
In an effort to more clearly demonstrate our concerns over the potential for 
re-victimizing Ms. Gibson, I direct your attention to our October 29, 2003 response 
to Dr. Brownsmith's report and evaluation submitted by Dr. Brownsmith, after she 
conducted her forensic psychological evaluation of Ms. Gibson. That report was 
received in my office on August 29, 2003, and after thoroughly dissecting Dr. 
Brownsmith's report, I submitted a letter, addendum, and various enclosures to her, 
requesting she amend her report to correctly state the facts of this case, without 
utilizing further attempt to nullify the County's malicious and capricious conduct, and 
impugning Ms. Gibson's character, as we saw the intended course of those events. 
To date, we have nothing to confirm Dr. Brownsmith has undertaken any effort to 
correct the errors and misleading entries in that report she submitted. 
Pursuant to § 9.01 (a), "Ethical Principals of Psychologists and Code of 
Conduct (2002)", psychologists are required to base the opinions in their reports 
upon sufficient information and techniques to substantiate their findings. Because 
of the insufficient, false and misleading aspects contained in Dr. Brownsmith's 
report, and the fact she has made no attempt to correct those errors contained 
therein, we are of the opinion Dr. Brownsmith will not undertake to substantiate her 
findings from the diagnosis of Ms. Gibson, and will leave the false entries based on 
erroneous information. 
Dr. Heyrend has diagnosed Ms. Gibson to have sustained a Post Traumatic 
Stress Disorder (PTSD). Our insistence that restrictive conditions be placed on any 
further interviews with Dr. Brownsmith stem from the definition and criteria 
attributed to PTSD, in combination with Dr. Heyrend's medical recommendation 
and his ongoing concerns for the safety and well being of his patient. PTSD is a 
psychiatric disorder that can occur following certain experiences or witnessing life-
threatening events such as military combat, natural disasters, terrorist incidents, 
serious accidents, or violent personal assaults, just as she was exposed to and 
suffered from the malicious treatment by Ada County. PTSD is marked by clear 
biological changes as well as psychological symptoms. PTSD is complicated by 
the fact it frequently presents itself within the framework and frailty of other mental 
conditions that are affected by related disorders of depression, fear, phobias, 
substance abuse or sensitivity to substances or conditions, and surrounded at 
times with problems of memory and cognition, and other problems of physical and 
mental health. 
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With all due respect, we must conclude Dr. Brownsmith lacks sufficient 
knowledge of PTSD to appropriately provide a correct and relevant diagnosis of Ms. 
Gibson's "mental-physical" injuries and resulting PTSD, and the injuries resulting 
from the violations of her rights and protected privileges, caused solely from the 
misconduct of Ada County agents and officials. In reviewing Dr. Brownsmith's 
curriculum vitae, it appears her experience and education would allow her to 
evaluate disorders, more so with marriage counseling and family relationships, and 
not conditions of a "mental-physical" nature, such as would include there resulting 
consequences,:including PTSD. 
Copies of all correspondence and enclosures identified above are provided 
herewith for your convenient reference. Once you and Mr. Donohue have an 
opportunity to fully review the materials, and assess these concerns raised from 
these written materials I have enclosed, you will then have a clear understanding of 
our concern over the significance of Ms. Gibson's injuries,, and the issue of her 
potential reaction to further re-victimization. After making a full assessment, please 
contact my office to indicate a need to reschedule the time for anx needed 
telephone conference. The notice we received has indicated March z4t at 12:30 
p.m. I may still be in court at that time, due to nw-erE;seiflk:oorrt schedule. If that 
date and time remains, I may have to call · , as I may still be in · e, in the 4th 
District Court. 
If you have questions, or if I can b of further a · ance, please 
Until then, I remain, 
VKS/jmg 
Enclosures 
cc: Jon M. Bauman 
F. LaMarr Heyrend, M.D. 
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INTRODUCTION AND APPLICABILITY 
The American Psychological Association's (APA's) Ethical Principles of Psychologists and Code of Conduct (hereinafter 
referred to as the Ethics Code) consists of an Introduction, a Preamble, five General Principles (A- E), and specific 
Ethical Standards. The Introduction discusses the intent, organization, procedural considerations, and scope of 
application of the Ethics Code. The Preamble and General Principles are aspirational goals to guide psychologists toward 
the highest ideals of psychology. Although the Preamble and General Principles are not themselves enforceable rules, 
they should be considered by psychologists in arriving at an ethical course of action. The Ethical Standards set forth 
enforceable rules for conduct as psychologists. Most of the Ethical Standards are written broadly, in order to apply to 
psychologists in varied roles, although the application of an Ethical Standard may vary depending on the context. The 
Ethical Standards are not exhaustive. The fact that a given conduct is not specifically addressed by an Ethical Standard 
does not mean that it is necessarily either ethical or unethical. 
This Ethics Code applies only to psychologists' activities that are part of their scientific, educational, or professional roles 
as psychologists. Areas covered include but are not limited to the clinical, counseling, and school practice of psychology; 
!research; teaching; supervision of trainees; public service; policy development; social intervention; development of 
, assessment instruments; conducting assessments; educational counseling; organizational consulting; forensic activities; 
. program design and evaluation; and administration. This Ethics Code applies to these activities across a variety of 
contexts, such as in person, postal, telephone, internet, and other electronic transmissions. These activities shall be 
distinguished from the purely private conduct of psychologists, which is not within the purview of the Ethics Code. 
'Membership in the APA commits members and student affiliates to comply with the standards of the APA Ethics Code 
and to the rules and procedures used to enforce them. Lack of awareness or misunderstanding of an Ethical Standard is 
not itself a defense to a charge of unethical conduct. 
The procedures for filing, investigating, and resolving complaints of unethical conduct are described in the current Rules 
and Procedures of the APA Ethics Committee. APA may impose sanctions on its members for violations of the standards 
of the Ethics Code, including termination of APA membership, and may notify other bodies and individuals of its actions. 
Actions that violate the standards of the Ethics Code may also lead to the imposition of sanctions on psychologists or 
students whether or not they are APA members by bodies other than APA, including state psychological associations, 
other professional groups, psychology boards, other state or federal agencies, and payers for health services. In addition, 
APA may take action against a member after his or her conviction of a felony, expulsion or suspension from an affiliated 
state psychological association, or suspension or loss of licensure. When the sanction to be imposed by APA is less than 
expulsion, the 2001 Rules and Procedures do not guarantee an opportunity for an in-person hearing, but generally 
provide that complaints will be resolved only on the basis of a submitted record. 
The Ethics Code is intended to provide guidance for psychologists and standards of professional conduct that can be 
applied by the APA and by other bodies that choose to adopt them. The Ethics Code is not intended to be a basis of civil 
liability. Whether a psychologist has violated the Ethics Code standards does not by itself determine whether the 
psychologist is legally liable in a court action, whether a contract is enforceable, or whether other legal consequences 
occur. 
The modifiers used in some of the standards of this Ethics Code (e.g., reasonably, appropriate, potentially) are included in 
the standards when they would (1) allow professional judgment on the part of psychologists, (2) eliminate injustice or 
inequality that would occur without the modifier, (3) ensure applicability across the broad range of activities conducted by 
psychologists, or (4) guard against a set of rigid rules that might be quickly outdated. As used in this Ethics Code, the term 
reasonable means the prevailing professional judgment of psychologists engaged in similar activities in similar 
circumstances, given the knowledge the psychologist had or should have had at the time. 
In the process of making decisions regarding their professional behavior, psychologists must consider this Ethics Code in 
addition to applicable laws and psychology board regulations. In applying the Ethics Code to their professional work, 
psychologists may consider other materials and guidelines that have been adopted or endorsed by scientific and 
professional psychological organizations and the dictates of their own conscience, as well as consult with others within the 
field. If this Ethics Code establishes a higher standard of conduct than is required by law, psychologists must meet the 
higher ethical standard. If psychologists' ethical responsibilities conflict with law, regulations, or other governing legal 
authority, psychologists make known their commitment to this Ethics Code and take steps to resolve the conflict in a 
responsible manner. If the conflict is unresolvable via such means, psychologists may adhere to the requirements of the 
law, regulations, or other governing authority in keeping with basic principles of human rights. 
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PREAMBLE 
Psychologists are committed to increasing scientific and professional knowledge of behavior and people's understanding 
of themselves and others and to the use of such knowledge to improve the condition of individuals, organizations, and 
society. Psychologists respect and protect civil and human rights and the central importance of freedom of inquiry and 
expression in research, teaching, and publication. They strive to help the public in developing informed judgments and 
choices concerning human behavior. In doing so, they perform many roles, such as researcher, educator, diagnostician, 
therapist, supervisor, consultant, administrator, social interventionist, and expert witness. This Ethics Code provides a 
common set of principles and standards upon which psychologists build their professional and scientific work. 
This Ethics Code is intended to provide specific standards to cover most situations encountered by psychologists. It has 
as its goals the welfare and protection of the individuals and groups with whom psychologists work and the education of 
members, students, and the public regarding ethical standards of the discipline. 
The development of a dynamic set of ethical standards for psychologists' work-related conduct requires a personal 
commitment and lifelong effort to act ethically; to encourage ethical behavior by students, supervisees, employees, and 
colleagues; and to consult with others concerning ethical problems. 
GENERAL PRINCIPLES 
This section consists of General Principles. General Principles, as opposed to Ethical Standards, are aspirational in 
nature. Their intent is to guide and inspire psychologists toward the very highest ethical ideals of the profession. General 
Principles, in contrast to Ethical Standards, do not represent obligations and should not form the basis for imposing 
sanctions. Relying upon General Principles for either of these reasons distorts both their meaning and purpose. 
Principle A: Beneficence and Nonmaleficence 
Psychologists strive to benefit those with whom they work and take care to do no harm. In their professional actions, 
psychologists seek to safeguard the welfare and rights of those with whom they interact professionally and other affected 
persons, and the welfare of animal subjects of research. When conflicts occur among psychologists' obligations or 
concerns, they attempt to resolve these conflicts in a responsible fashion that avoids or minimizes harm. Because 
psychologists' scientific and professional judgments and actions may affect the lives of others, they are alert to and guard 
against personal, financial, social, organizational, or political factors that might lead to misuse of their influence. 
Psychologists strive to be aware of the possible effect of their own physical and mental health on their ability to help those 
with whom they work. 
Principle B: Fidelity and Responsibility 
Psychologists establish relationships of trust with those with whom they work. They are aware of their professional and 
scientific responsibilities to society and to the specific communities in which they work. Psychologists uphold professional 
standards of conduct, clarify their professional roles and obligations, accept appropriate responsibility for their behavior, 
and seek to manage conflicts of interest that could lead to exploitation or harm. Psychologists consult with, refer to, or 
cooperate with other professionals and institutions to the extent needed to serve the best interests of those with whom 
they work. They are concerned about the ethical compliance of their colleagues' scientific and professional conduct. 
Psychologists strive to contribute a portion of their professional time for little or no compensation or personal advantage. 
Principle C: Integrity 
Psychologists seek to promote accuracy, honesty, and truthfulness in the science, teaching, and practice of psychology. 
In these activities psychologists do not steal, cheat, or engage in fraud, subterfuge, or intentional misrepresentation of 
fact. Psychologists strive to keep their promises and to avoid unwise or unclear commitments. In situations in which 
deception may be ethically justifiable to maximize benefits and minimize harm, psychologists have a serious obligation to 
consider the need for, the possible consequences of, and their responsibility to correct any resulting mistrust or other 
harmful effects that arise from the use of such techniques. 
Principle D: Justice 
Psychologists recognize that fairness and justice entitle all persons to access to and benefit from the contributions of 
psychology and to equal quality in the processes, procedures, and services being conducted by psychologists. 
Psychologists exercise reasonable judgment and take precautions to ensure that their potential biases, the boundaries of 
their competence, and the limitations of their expertise do not lead to or condone unjust practices. 
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Principle E: Respect for People's Rights and Dignity 
Psychologists respect the dignity and worth of all people, and the rights of individuals to privacy, confidentiality, and self-
determination. Psychologists are aware that special safeguards may be necessary to protect the rights and welfare of 
persons or communities whose vulnerabilities impair autonomous decision making. Psychologists are aware of and 
respect cultural, individual, and role differences, including those based on age, gender, gender identity, race, ethnicity, 
culture, national origin, religion, sexual orientation, disability, language, and socioeconomic status and consider these 
factors when working with members of such groups. Psychologists try to eliminate the effect on their work of biases based 
on those factors, and they do not knowingly participate in or condone activities of others based upon such prejudices. 
ETHICAL STANDARDS 
1. Resolving Ethical Issues 
1.01 Misuse of Psychologists' Work 
If psychologists learn of misuse or misrepresentation of their work, they take reasonable steps to correct or minimize the 
misuse or misrepresentation. 
1.02 Conflicts Between Ethics and Law, Regulations, or Other Governing Legal Authority 
If psychologists' ethical responsibilities conflict with law, regulations, or other governing legal authority, psychologists 
make known their commitment to the Ethics Code and take steps to resolve the conflict. If the conflict is unresolvable via 
such means, psychologists may adhere to the requirements of the law, regulations, or other governing legal authority. 
1.03 Conflicts Between Ethics and Organizational Demands 
If the demands of an organization with which psychologists are affiliated or for whom they are working conflict with this 
Ethics Code, psychologists clarify the nature of the conflict, make known their commitment to the Ethics Code, and to the 
extent feasible, resolve the conflict in a way that permits adherence to the Ethics Code. 
1.04 Informal Resolution of Ethical Violations 
When psychologists believe that there may have been an ethical violation by another psychologist, they attempt to resolve 
the issue by bringing it to the attention of that individual, if an informal resolution appears appropriate and the intervention 
does not violate any confidentiality rights that may be involved. (See also Standards 1.02, Conflicts Between Ethics and 
Law, Regulations, or Other Governing Legal Authority, and 1.03, Conflicts Between Ethics and Organizational Demands.) 
1.05 Reporting Ethical Violations 
If an apparent ethical violation has substantially harmed or is likely to substantially harm a person or organization and is 
not appropriate for informal resolution under Standard 1.04, Informal Resolution of Ethical Violations, or is not resolved 
properly in that fashion, psychologists take further action appropriate to the situation. Such action might include referral to 
state or national committees on professional ethics, to state licensing boards, or to the appropriate institutional authorities. 
This standard does not apply when an intervention would violate confidentiality rights or when psychologists have been 
retained to review the work of another psychologist whose professional conduct is in question. (See also Standard 1.02, 
Conflicts Between Ethics and Law, Regulations, or Other Governing Legal Authority.) 
1.06 Cooperating With Ethics Committees 
Psychologists cooperate in eth.lcs investigations, proceedings, and resulUng requirements of the APA or any affiliated 
state psychological association to which they belong. In doing so, they address any confidentiality issues. Failure to 
cooperate is Itself an ethics violation. However, making a request for deferment of adjudication of an ethics complaint 
pending the outcome of litigation does not alone constitute noncooperation. 
1.07 Improper Complaints 
Psychologists do not file or encourage the filing of ethics complaints that are made with reckless disregard for or willful 
ignorance of facts that would disprove the allegation. 
1.08 Unfair Discrimination Against Complainants and Respondents 
Psychologists do not deny persons employment, advancement, admissions to academic or other programs, tenure, or 
promotion, based solely upon their having made or their being the subject of an ethics complaint. This does not preclude 
taking action based upon the outcome of such proceedings or considering other appropriate infonmation. 
2. Competence 
2.01 Boundaries of Competence 
(a) Psychologists provide services, teach, and conduct research with populations and in areas only within the boundaries 
of their competence, based on their education, training, supervised experience, consultation, study, or professional 
experience. 
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(b) Where scientific or professional knowledge in the discipline of psychology establishes that an understanding offactors 
associated with age, gender, gender identity, race, ethnicity, culture, national origin, religion, sexual orientation, disability, 
language, or socioeconomic status is essential for effective implementation of their services or research, psychologists 
have or obtain the training, experience, consultation, or supervision necessary to ensure the competence of their services, 
or they make appropriate referrals, except as provided in Standard 2.02, Providing Services in Emergencies. 
(c) Psychologists planning to provide services, teach, or conduct research involving populations, areas, techniques, or 
technologies new to them undertake relevant education, training, supervised experience, consultation, or study. 
(d) When psychologists are asked to provide services to individuals for whom appropriate mental health services are not 
available and for which psychologists have not obtained the competence necessary, psychologists with closely related 
prior training or experience may provide such services in order to ensure that services are not denied if they make a 
reasonable effort to obtain the competence required by using relevant research, training, consultation, or study. 
(e) In those emerging areas in which generally recognized standards for preparatory training do not yet exist, 
psychologists nevertheless take reasonable steps to ensure the competence of their work and to protect clients/patients, 
students, supervisees, research participants, organizational clients, and others from harm. 
(f) When assuming forensic roles, psychologists are or become reasonably familiar with the judicial or administrative rules 
governing their roles. 
2.02 Providing Services in Emergencies 
In emergencies, when psychologists provide services to individuals for whom other mental health services are not 
available and for which psychologists have not obtained the necessary training, psychologists may provide such services 
in order to ensure that services are not denied. The services are discontinued as soon as the emergency has ended or 
appropriate services are available. 
2.03 Maintaining Competence 
Psychologists undertake ongoing efforts to develop and maintain their competence. 
2.04 Bases for Scientific and Professional Judgments 
Psychologists' work is based upon established scientific and professional knowledge of the discipline. (See also 
Standards 2.01e, Boundaries of Competence, and 10.01b, Informed Consent to Therapy.) 
2.05 Delegation of Work to Others 
Psychologists who delegate work to employees, supervisees, or research or teaching assistants or who use the services 
of others, such as interpreters, take reasonable steps to (1) avoid delegating such work to persons who have a multiple 
relationship with those being served that would likely lead to exploitation or loss of objectivity; (2) authorize only those 
responsibilities that such persons can be expected to perform competently on the basis of their education, training, or 
experience, either independently or with the level of supervision being provided; and (3) see that such persons perform 
these services competently. (See also Standards 2.02, Providing Services in Emergencies; 3.05, Multiple Relationships; 
4.01, Maintaining Confidentiality; 9.01, Bases for Assessments; 9.02, Use of Assessments; 9.03, Informed Consent in 
Assessments; and 9.07, Assessment by Unqualified Persons.) 
2.06 Personal Problems and Conflicts 
(a) Psychologists refrain from initiating an activity when they know or should know that there is a substantial likelihood that 
their personal problems will prevent them from performing their work-related activities in a competent manner. 
(b) When psychologists become aware of personal problems that may interfere with their performing work-related duties 
adequately, they take appropriate measures, such as obtaining professional consultation or assistance, and determine 
whether they should limit, suspend, or terminate their work-related duties. (See also Standard 10.10, Terminating 
Therapy.) 
3. Human Relations 
3.01 Unfair Discrimination 
In their work-related activities, psychologists do not engage in unfair discrimination based on age, gender, gender identity, 
race, ethnicity, culture, national origin, religion, sexual orientation, disability, socioeconomic status, or any basis 
proscribed by law. 
3.02 Sexual Harassment 
Psychologists do not engage in sexual harassment. Sexual harassment is sexual solicitation, physical advances, or 
verbal or nonverbal conduct that is sexual in nature, that occurs in connection with the psychologist's activities or roles as 
a psychologist, and that either (1) is unwelcome, is offensive, or creates a hostile workplace or educational environment, 
and the psychologist knows or is told this or (2) is sufficiently severe or intense to be abusive to a reasonable person in 
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the context. Sexual harassment can consist of a single intense or severe act or of multiple persistent or pervasive acts. 
(See also Standard 1.08, Unfair Discrimination Against Complainants and Respondents.) 
3.03 Other Harassment 
Psychologists do not knowingly engage in behavior that is harassing or demeaning to persons with whom they interact in 
their work based on factors such as those persons' age, gender, gender identity, race, ethnicity, culture, national origin, 
religion, sexual orientation, disability, language, or socioeconomic status. 
3.04 Avoiding Harm 
Psychologists take reasonable steps to avoid harming their clients/patients. students, supervisees, research participants, 
organizational clients, and others with whom they work, and to minimize harm where it is foreseeable and unavoidable. 
3.05 Multiple Relationships 
(a) A multiple relationship occurs when a psychologist is in a professional role with a person and (1) at the same time is in 
another role with the same person, (2) at the same time is in a relationship with a person closely associated with or 
related to the person with whom the psychologist has the professional relationship. or (3) promises to enter into another 
relationship in the future with the person or a person closely associated with or related to the person. 
A psychologist refrains from entering into a multiple relationship if the multiple relationship could reasonably be 
expected to impair the psychologist's objectivity, competence, or effectiveness in performing his or her functions as a 
psychologist, or otherwise risks exploitation or harm to the person with whom the professional relationship exists. 
Multiple relationships that would not reasonably be expected to cause impairment or risk exploitation or harm are not 
unethical. 
(b) If a psychologist finds that, due to unforeseen factors, a potentially harmful multiple relationship has arisen, the 
psychologist takes reasonable steps to resolve it with due regard for the best interests of the affected person and maximal 
compliance with the Ethics Code. 
(c) When psychologists are required by law. institutional policy, or extraordinary circumstances to serve in more than one 
role in judicial or administrative proceedings, at the outset they clarify role expectations and the extent of confidentiality 
and thereafter as changes occur. (See also Standards 3.04, Avoiding Harm, and 3.07, Third-Party Requests for Services.) 
3.06 Conflict of Interest 
Psychologists refrain from taking on a professional role when personal, scientific, professional, legal, financial, or other 
interests or relationships could reasonably be expected to (1) impair their objectivity, competence, or effectiveness in 
performing their functions as psychologists or (2) expose the person or organization with whom the professional 
relationship exists to harm or exploitation. 
3.07 Third-Party Requests for Services 
When psychologists agree to provide services to a person or entity at the request of a third party, psychologists attempt to 
clarify at the outset of the service the nature of the relationship with all individuals or organizations involved. This 
clarification includes the role of the psychologist (e.g., therapist, consultant, diagnostician, or expert witness). an 
identification of who is the client, the probable uses of the services provided or the information obtained, and the fact that 
there may be limits to confidentiality. (See also Standards 3.05, Multiple Relationships. and 4.02, Discussing the Limits of 
Confidentiality.) 
3.08 Exploitative Relationships 
Psychologists do not exploit persons over whom they have supervisory, evaluative, or other authority such as 
clients/patients, students, supervisees, research participants, and employees. (See also Standards 3.05, Multiple 
Relationships; 6.04, Fees and Financial Arrangements; 6.05, Barter With Clients/Patients; 7.07, Sexual Relationships 
With Students and Supervisees; 10.05, Sexual Intimacies With Current Therapy Clients/Patients; 10.06, Sexual Intimacies 
With Relatives or Significant Others of Current Therapy Clients/Patients; 10.07, Therapy With Former Sexual Partners; 
and 10.08, Sexual Intimacies With Former Therapy Clients/Patients.) 
3.09 Cooperation With Other Professionals 
When indicated and professionally appropriate, psychologists cooperate with other professionals in order to serve their 
clients/patients effectively and appropriately. (See also Standard 4.05, Disclosures.) 
3.10 Informed Consent 
(a) When psychologists conduct research or provide assessment. therapy, counseling, or consulting services in person or 
via electronic transmission or other forms of communication, they obtain the informed consent of the individual or 
individuals using language that is reasonably understandable to that person or persons except when conducting such 
activities without consent is mandated by law or governmental regulation or as otherwise provided in this Ethics Code. 
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(See also Standards 8.02, Informed Consent to Research; 9.03, Informed Consent in Assessments; and 10.01, Informed 
Consent to Therapy.) 
(b) For persons who are legally incapable of giving informed consent, psychologists nevertheless (1) provide an 
appropriate explanation, (2) seek the individual's assent, (3) consider such persons' preferences and best interests, and 
(4) obtain appropriate permission from a legally authorized person, if such substitute consent is permitted or required by 
law. When consent by a legally authorized person is not permitted or required by law, psychologists take reasonable steps 
to protect the individual's rights and welfare. 
(c) When psychological services are court ordered or otherwise mandated, psychologists inform the individual of the 
nature of the anticipated services, including whether the services are court ordered or mandated and any limits of 
confidentiality, before proceeding. 
(d) Psychologists appropriately document written or oral consent, permission, and assent. (See also Standards 8.02, 
Informed Consent to Research; 9.03, Informed Consent in Assessments; and 10.01, Informed Consent to Therapy.) 
3.11 Psychological Services Delivered To or Through Organizations 
(a) Psychologists delivering services to or through organizations provide information beforehand to clients and when 
appropriate those directly affected by the services about (1) the nature and objectives of the services, (2) the intended 
recipients, (3) which of the individuals are clients, (4) the relationship the psychologist will have with each person and the 
organization, (5) the probable uses of services provided and information obtained, (6) who will have access to the 
information, and (7) limits of confidentiality. As soon as feasible, they provide information about the results and 
conclusions of such services to appropriate persons. 
(b) If psychologists will be precluded by law or by organizational roles from providing such information to particular 
individuals or groups, they so inform those individuals or groups at the outset of the service. 
3.12 Interruption of Psychological Services 
Unless otherwise covered by contract, psychologists make reasonable efforts to plan for facilitating services in the event 
that psychological services are interrupted by factors such as the psychologist's illness, death, unavailability, relocation, or 
retirement or by the client's/patient's relocation or financial limitations. (See also Standard 6.02c, Maintenance, 
Dissemination, and Disposal of Confidential Records of Professional and Scientific Work.) 
4. Privacy And Confidentiality 
4,01 Maintaining Confidentiality 
Psychologists have a primary obligation and take reasonable precautions to protect confidential information obtained 
through or stored in any medium, recognizing that the extent and limits of confidentiality may be regulated by law or 
established by institutional rules or professional or scientific relationship. (See also Standard 2.05, Delegation of Work to 
Others.) 
4.02 Discussing the Limits of Confidentiality 
(a) Psychologists discuss with persons (including, to the extent feasible, persons who are legally incapable of giving 
informed consent and their legal representatives) and organizations with whom they establish a scientific or professional 
relationship ( 1) the relevant limits of confidentiality and (2) the foreseeable uses of the information generated through their 
psychological activities. (See also Standard 3.10, Informed Consent.) 
(b) Unless it is not feasible or Is contraindicated, the discussion of confidentiality occurs at the outset of the relationship 
and thereafter as new circumstances may warrant 
(c) Psychologists who offer services, products, or information via electronic transmission inform clients/patients of the 
risks to privacy and limits of confidentiality. 
4.03 Recording 
Before recording the voices or images of individuals to whom they provide services, psychologists obtain permission from 
all such persons or their legal representatives. (See also Standards 8.03, Informed Consent for Recording Voices and 
Images in Research; 8.05, Dispensing With Informed Consent for Research; and 8.07, Deception in Research.) 
4.04 Minimizing Intrusions on Privacy 
(a) Psychologists include in written and oral reports and consultations, only information germane to the purpose for which 
the communication is made. 
(b) Psychologists discuss confidential information obtained in their work only for appropriate scientific or professional 
purposes and only with persons clearly concerned with such matters. 
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4.05 Disclosures 
(a) Psychologists may disclose confidential information with the appropriate consent of the organizational client, the 
individual clienVpatient, or another legally authorized person on behalf of the clienVpatient unless prohibited by law. 
(b) Psychologists disclose confidential information without the consent of the individual only as mandated by law, or where 
permitted by law for a valid purpose such as to (1) provide needed professional services; (2) obtain appropriate 
professional consultations; (3) protect the clienVpatient, psychologist, or others from harm; or (4) obtain payment for 
services from a clienUpatient, in which instance disclosure is limited to the minimum that is necessary to achieve the 
purpose. (See also Standard 6.04e, Fees and Financial Arrangements.) 
4.06 Consultations 
When consulting with colleagues, (1) psychologists do not disclose confidential information that reasonably could lead to 
the identification of a clienUpatient, research participant, or other person or organization with whom they have a 
confidential relationship unless they have obtained the prior consent of the person or organization or the disclosure cannot 
be avoided, and (2) they disclose information only to the extent necessary to achieve the purposes of the consultation. 
(See also Standard 4.01, Maintaining Confidentiality.) 
4.07 Use of Confidential Information for Didactic or Other Purposes 
Psychologists do not disclose in their writings, lectures, or other public media, confidential, personally identifiable 
information concerning their clients/patients, students, research participants, organizational clients, or other recipients of 
their services that they obtained during the course of their work, unless (1) they take reasonable steps to disguise the 
person or organization, (2) the person or organization has consented in writing, or (3) there is legal authorization for doing 
so. 
5. Advertising and Other Public Statements 
5.01 Avoidance of False or Deceptive Statements 
(a) Public statements include but are not limited to paid or unpaid advertising, product endorsements, grant applications, 
licensing applications, other credentialing applications, brochures, printed matter, directory listings, personal resumes or 
curricula vitae, or comments for use in media such as print or electronic transmission, statements in legal proceedings, 
lectures and public oral presentations, and published materials. Psychologists do not knowingly make public statements 
that are false, deceptive, or fraudulent concerning their research, practice, or other work activities or those of persons or 
organizations with which they are affiliated. 
(b) Psychologists do not make false, deceptive, or fraudulent statements concerning (1) their training, experience, or 
competence; (2) their academic degrees; (3) their credentials; (4) their institutional or association affiliations; (5) their 
services; (6) the scientific or clinical basis for, or results or degree of success of, their services; (7) their fees; or (8) their 
publications or research findings. 
(c) Psychologists claim degrees as credentials for their health services only if those degrees (1) were earned from a 
regionally accredited educational institution or (2) were the basis for psychology licensure by the state in which they 
practice. 
5.02 Statements by Others 
(a) Psychologists who engage others to create or place public statements that promote their professional practice, 
products, or activities retain professional responsibility for such statements. 
(b) Psychologists do not compensate employees of press, radio, television, or other communication media in return for 
publicity in a news item. (See also Standard 1.01, Misuse of Psychologists' Work.) 
(c) A paid advertisement relating to psychologists' activities must be identified or clearly recognizable as such. 
5.03 Descriptions of Workshops and Non-Degree-Granting Educational Programs 
To the degree to which they exercise control, psychologists responsible for announcements, catalogs, brochures, or 
advertisements describing workshops, seminars, or other non-degree-granting educational programs ensure that they 
accurately describe the audience for which the program is intended, the educational objectives, the presenters, and the 
fees involved. 
5.04 Media Presentations 
When psychologists provide public advice or comment via print, internet, or other electronic transmission, they take 
precautions to ensure that statements (1) are based on their professional knowledge, training, or experience in accord 
with appropriate psychological literature and practice; (2) are otherwise consistent with this Ethics Code; and (3) do not 
indicate that a professional relationship has been established with the recipient. (See also Standard 2.04, Bases for 
Scientific and Professional Judgments.) 
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5.05 Testimonials 
Psychologists do not solicit testimonials from current therapy clients/patients or other persons who because of their 
particular circumstances are vulnerable to undue influence. 
5.06 In-Person Solicitation 
Psychologists do not engage, directly or through agents, in uninvited in-person solicitation of business from actual or 
potential therapy clients/patients or other persons who because of their particular circumstances are vulnerable to undue 
influence. However, this prohibition does not preclude (1) attempting to implement appropriate collateral contacts for the 
purpose of benefiting an already engaged therapy clienVpatient or (2) providing disaster or community outreach services. 
6. Record Keeping and Fees 
6.01 Documentation of Professional and Scientific Work and Maintenance of Records 
Psychologists create, and to the extent the records are under their control, maintain, disseminate, store, retain, and 
dispose of records and data relating to their professional and scientific work in order to ( 1) facilitate provision of services 
later by them or by other professionals, (2) allow for replication of research design and analyses, (3) meet institutional 
requirements, (4) ensure accuracy of billing and payments, and (5) ensure compliance with law. (See also Standard 4.01, 
Maintaining Confidentiality.) 
6.02 Maintenance, Dissemination, and Disposal of Confidential Records of Professional and Scientific Work 
(a) Psychologists maintain confidentiality in creating, storing, accessing, transferring, and disposing of records under their 
·· control, whether these are written, automated, or in any other medium. (See also Standards 4.01, Maintaining 
Confidentiality, and 6.01, Documentation of Professional and Scientific Work and Maintenance of Records.) 
(b) If confidential information concerning recipients of psychological services is entered into databases or systems of 
records available to persons whose access has not been consented to by the recipient, psychologists use coding or other 
techniques to avoid the inclusion of personal identifiers. 
(c) Psychologists make plans in advance to facilitate the appropriate transfer and to protect the confidentiality of records 
and data in the event of psychologists' withdrawal from positions or practice. (See also Standards 3.12, Interruption of 
Psychological Services, and 10.09, Interruption of Therapy.) 
6.03 Withholding Records for Nonpayment . 
Psychologists may not withhold records under their control that are requested and needed for a client's/patient's 
emergency treatment solely because payment has not been received. 
6.04 Fees and Financial Arrangements 
(a) As early as is feasible in a professional or scientific relationship, psychologists and recipients of psychological services 
reach an agreement specifying compensation and billing arrangements. 
(b) .Psychologists' fee practices are consistent with law. 
( c) Psychologists do not misrepresent their fees. 
(d) If limitations to services can be anticipated because of limitations in financing, this is discussed with the recipient of 
services as early as is feasible. (See also Standards 10.09, Interruption ofTherapy, and 10.10, Terminating Therapy.) 
(e) If the recipient of services does not pay for services as agreed, and if psychologists intend to use collection agencies 
or legal measures to collect the fees, psychologists first inform the person that such measures will be taken and provide 
that person an opportunity to make prompt payment. (See also Standards 4.05, Disclosures; 6.03, Withholding Records 
for Nonpayment; and 10.01, Informed Consent to Therapy.) · 
6.05 Barter With Clients/Patients 
Barter is the acceptance of goods, services, or other nonmonetary remuneration from clients/patients in return for 
psychological services. Psychologists may barter only if (1) it is not clinically contraindicated, and (2) the resulting 
arrangement is not exploitative. (See also Standards 3.05, Multiple Relationships, and 6.04, Fees and Financial 
Arrangements.) 
6.06 Accuracy in Reports to Payors and Funding Sources 
In their reports to payers for services or sources of research funding, psychologists take reasonable steps to ensure the 
accurate reporting of the nature of the service provided or research conducted, the fees, charges, or payments, and 
where applicable, the identity of the provider, the findings, and the diagnosis. (See also Standards 4.01, Maintaining 
Confidentiality; 4.04, Minimizing Intrusions on Privacy; and 4.05, Disclosures.) 
APA Ethics Code 2002 Page 10 
6.07 Referrals and Fees 
When psychologists pay, receive payment from, or divide fees with another professional, other than in an employer-
employee relationship, the payment to each is based on the services provided (clinical, consultative, administrative, or 
other) and is not based on the referral itself. (See also Standard 3.09, Cooperation With Other Professionals.) 
7. Education and Training 
7.01 Design of Education and Training Programs 
Psychologists responsible for education and training programs take reasonable steps to ensure that the programs are 
designed to provide the appropriate knowledge and proper experiences, and to meet the requirements for licensure, 
certification, or other goals for which claims are made by the program. (See also Standard 5.03, Descriptions of 
Workshops and Non-Degree-Granting Educational Programs.) 
7 .02 Descriptions of Education and Training Programs 
Psychologists responsible for education and training programs take reasonable steps to ensure that there is a current and 
accurate description of the program content (including participation in required course- or program-related counseling, 
psychotherapy, experiential groups, consulting projects, or community service), training goals and objectives, stipends 
and benefits, and requirements that must be met for satisfactory .completion of the program. This information must be 
made readily available to all interested parties. 
7.03 Accuracy in Teaching 
(a) Psychologists take reasonable steps to ensure that course syllabi are accurate regarding the subject matter to be 
covered, bases for evaluating progress, and the nature of course experiences. This standard does not preclude an 
instructor from modifying course content or requirements when the instructor considers it pedagogically necessary or 
desirable, so long as students are made aware of these modifications in a manner that enables them to fulfill course 
requirements. (See also Standard 5.01, Avoidance of False or Deceptive Statements.) 
(b) When engaged in teaching or training, psychologists present psychological information accurately. (See also Standard 
2.03, Maintaining Competence.) 
7.04 Student Disclosure of Personal Information 
Psychologists do not require students or supervisees to disclose personal information in course- or program-related 
activities, either orally or in writing, regarding sexual history, history of abuse and neglect, psychological treatment, and 
relationships with parents, peers, and spouses or significant others except if (1) the program or training facility has clearly 
identified this requirement in its admissions and program materials or (2) the information is necessary to evaluate or 
obtain assistance for students whose personal problems could reasonably be judged to be preventing them from 
performing their training- or professionally related activities in a competent manner or posing a threat to the students or 
others. 
7.05 Mandatory Individual or Group Therapy 
(a) When individual or group therapy is a program or course requirement, psychologists responsible for that program allow 
students in undergraduate and graduate programs the option of selecting such therapy from practitioners unaffiliated with 
the program. (See also Standard 7.02, Descriptions of Education and Training Programs.) 
(b) Faculty who are or are likely to be responsible for evaluating students' academic performance do not themselves 
provide that therapy. (See also Standard 3.05, Multiple Relationships.) 
7 .06 Assessing Student and Supervisee Performance 
(a) In academic and supervisory relationships, psychologists establish a timely and specific process for providing 
feedback to students and supervisees. Information regarding the process is provided to the student at the beginning of 
supervision. 
(b) Psychologists evaluate students and supervisees on the basis of their actual performance on relevant and established 
program requirements. 
7.07 Sexual Relationships With Students and Supervisees 
Psychologists do not engage in sexual relationships with students or supervisees who are in their department, agency, or 
training center or over whom psychologists have or are likely to have evaluative authority. (See also Standard 3.05, 
Multiple Relationships.) 
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When institutional approval is required, psychologists provide accurate information about their research proposals and 
obtain approval prior to conducting the research. They conduct the research in accordance with the approved research 
protocol. 
8.02 Informed Consent to Research 
(a) When obtaining informed consent as required in Standard 3.10, Informed Consent, psychologists inform participants 
about (1) the purpose of the research, expected duration, and procedures; (2) their right to decline to participate and to 
withdraw from the research once participation has begun; (3) the foreseeable consequences of declining or withdrawing; 
(4) reasonably foreseeable factors that may be expected to influence their willingness to participate such as potential 
risks, discomfort, or adverse effects; (5) any prospective research benefits; (6) limits of confidentiality; (7) incentives for 
participation; and (8) whom to contact for questions about the research and research participants' rights. They provide 
opportunity for the prospective participants to ask questions and receive answers. (See also Standards 8.03, Informed 
Consent for Recording Voices and Images in Research; 8.05, Dispensing With Informed Consent for Research; and 8.07, 
Deception in Research.) 
(b) Psychologists conducting intervention research involving the use of experimental treatments clarify to participants at 
the outset of the research (1) the experimental nature of the treatment; (2) the services that will or will not be available to 
the control group(s) if appropriate; (3) the means by which assignment to treatment and control groups will be made; (4) 
available treatment alternatives if an individual does not wish to participate in the research or wishes to withdraw once a 
study has begun; and (5) compensation for or monetary costs of participating including, if appropriate, whether 
reimbursement from the participant or a third-party payer will be sought. (See also Standard 8.02a, Informed Consent to 
Research.) 
8.03 Informed Consent for Recording Voices and Images in Research 
Psychologists obtain informed consent from research participants prior to recording their voices or images for data 
collection unless (1) the research consists solely of naturalistic observations in public places, and it is not anticipated that 
the recording will be used in a manner that could cause personal identification or harm, or (2) the research design 
includes deception, and consent for the use of the recording is obtained during debriefing. (See also Standard 8.07, 
Deception in Research.) 
8.04 Client/Patient, Student, and Subordinate Research Participants 
(a) When psychologists conduct research with clients/patients, students, or subordinates as participants, psychologists 
take steps to protect the prospective. participants from adverse consequences of declining or withdrawing from 
participation. 
(b) When research participation is a course requirement or an opportunity for extra credit, the prospective participant is 
given the choice of equitable alternative activities. 
8.05 Dispensing With Informed Consent for Research 
Psychologists may dispense with informed consent only (1) where research would not reasonably be assumed to create 
distress or harm and involves (a) the study of normal educational practices, curricula, or classroom management methods 
conducted in educational settings; (b) only anonymous questionnaires, naturalistic observations, or archival research for 
which disclosure of responses would not place participants at risk of criminal or civil liability or damage their financial 
standing, employability, or reputation, and confidentiality is protected; or (c) the study of factors related to job or 
organization effectiveness conducted in organizational settings for which there is no risk to participants' employability, and 
confidentiality is protected or (2) where otherwise permitted by law or federal or institutional regulations. 
8.06 Offering Inducements for Research Participation 
(a) Psychologists make reasonable efforts to avoid offering excessive or inappropriate financial or other inducements for 
research participation when such inducements are likely to coerce participation. 
(b) When offering professional services as an inducement for research participation, psychologists clarify the nature of the 
services, as well as the risks, obligations, and limitations. (See also Standard 6.05, Barter With Clients/Patients.) · 
8.07 Deception in Research . 
(a) Psychologists do not conduct a study involving deception unless they have determined that the use of deceptive 
techniques is justified by the study's significant prospective scientific, educational, or applied value and that effective 
nondeceptive alternative procedures are not feasible. 
(b) Psychologists do not deceive prospective participants about research that is reasonably expected to cause physical 
pain or severe emotional distress. 
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(c) Psychologists explain any deception that is an integral feature of the design and conduct of an experiment to 
participants as early as is feasible, preferably at the conclusion of their participation, but no later than at the conclusion of 
the data collection, and permit participants to withdraw their data. (See also Standard 8.08, Debriefing.) 
8.08 Debriefing 
(a) Psychologists provide a prompt opportunity for participants to obtain appropriate information about the nature, results, 
and conclusions of the research, and they take reasonable steps to correct any misconceptions that participants may 
have of which the psychologists are aware. 
(b) If scientific or humane values justify delaying or withholding this information, psychologists take reasonable measures 
to reduce the risk of harm. 
(c) When psychologists become aware that research procedures have harmed a participant, they take reasonable steps 
to minimize the harm. 
8.09 Humane Care and Use of Animals in Research 
(a) Psychologists acquire, care for, use, and dispose of animals in compliance with current federal, state, and local laws 
and regulations, and with professional standards. 
(b) Psychologists trained in research methods and experienced in the care of laboratory animals supervise all procedures 
involving animals and are responsible for ensuring appropriate consideration of their comfort, health, and humane 
treatment. 
(c) Psychologists ensure that all individuals under their supervision who are using animals have received Instruction in 
research methods and in the care, maintenance, and handling of the species being used, to the extent appropriate to their 
role. (See also Standard 2.05, Delegation of Work to Others.) 
(d) Psychologists make reasonable efforts to minimize the discomfort, infection, illness, and pain of animal subjects. 
(e)Psychologists use a procedure subjecting animals to pain, stress, or privation only when an alternative procedure is 
unavailable and the goal Is justified by its prospective scientific, educational, or applied value. 
(f) Psychologists perform surgical procedures under appropriate anesthesia and follow techniques to avoid infection and 
minimize pain during and after surgery. 
(g) When it is appropriate that an animal's life be terminated, psychologists proceed rapidly, with an effort to minimize pain 
and in accordance with accepted procedures. 
8.10 Reporting Research Results 
(a) Psychologists do not fabricate data. (See also Standard 5.01a, Avoidance of False or Deceptive Statements.) 
(b) If psychologists discover significant errors in their published data, they take reasonable steps to correct such errors in 
a correction, retraction, erratum, or other appropriate publication means. 
8.11 Plagiarism 
Psychologists do not present portions of another's work or data as their own, even if the other work or data source is cited 
occasionally. 
8.12 Publication Credit 
(a) Psychologists take responsibility and credit, including authorship credit, only for work they have actually performed or 
to which they have substantially contributed. (See also Standard 8.12b, Publication Credit.) 
(b) Principal authorship and other publication credits accurately reflect the relative scientific or professional contributions 
of the individuals involved, regardless of their relative status. Mere possession of an institutional position, such as 
department chair, does not justify authorship credit. Minor contributions to the research or to the writing for publications 
are acknowledged appropriately, such as in footnotes or in an introductory statement. 
(c) Except under exceptional circumstances, a student is listed as principal author on any multiple-authored article that is 
substantially based on the student's doctoral dissertation. Faculty advisors discuss publication credit with students as 
early as feasible and throughout the research and publication process as appropriate. (See also Standard 8.12b, 
Publication Credit.) 
8.13 Duplicate Publication of Data 
Psychologists do not publish, as original data, data that have been previously published. This does not preclude 
republishing data when they are accompanied by proper acknowledgment. 
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8.14 Sharing Research Data for Verification 
(a) After research results are published, psychologists do not withhold the data on which their conclusions are based from 
other competent professionals who seek to verify the substantive claims through reanalysis and who intend to use such 
data only for that purpose, provided that the confidentiality of the participants can be protected and unless legal rights 
concerning proprietary data preclude their release. This does not preclude psychologists from requiring that such 
individuals or groups be responsible for costs associated with the provision of such information. 
(b) Psychologists who request data from other psychologists to verify the substantive claims through reanalysis may use 
shared data only for the declared purpose. Requesting psychologists obtain prtor written agreement for all other uses of 
the data. 
8.15 Reviewers . 
Psychologists who review material submitted for presentation, publication, grant, or research proposal review respect the 
confidentiality of and the proprietary rights in such information of those who submitted it. 
9. Assessment 
9.01 Bases for Assessments 
(a) Psychologists base the opinions contained in their recommendations, reports, and diagnostic or evaluative statements, 
including forensic testimony, on information and techniques sufficient to substantiate their findings. (See also Standard 
2.04, Bases for Scientific and Professional Judgments.) 
(b) Except as noted in 9.01c, psychologists provide opinions of the psychological characteristics of individuals only after 
they have conducted an examination of the individuals adequate to support their statements or conclusions. When, 
despite reasonable efforts, such an examination is not practical, psychologists document the efforts they made and the 
result of those efforts, clarify the probable impact of their limited information on the reliability and validity of their opinions, 
and appropriately limit the nature and extent of their conclusions or recommendations. (See also Standards 2.01, 
Boundaries of Competence, and 9.06, Interpreting Assessment Results.) 
(c) When psychologists conduct a record review or provide consultation or supervision and an individual examination is 
not warranted or necessary for the opinion, psychologists explain this and the sources of information on which they based 
their conclusions and recommendations. 
9.02 Use of Assessments 
(a) Psychologists administer, adapt, score, interpret, or use assessment techniques, interviews, tests, or instruments in a 
manner and for purposes that are appropriate in light of the research on or evidence of the usefulness and proper 
application of the techniques. 
(b) Psychologists use assessment instruments whose validity and reliability have been established for use with members 
of the population tested. When such validity or reliability has not been established, psychologists describe the strengths 
and limitations of test results and interpretation. 
(c) Psychologists use assessment methods that are appropriate to an individual's language preference and competence, 
unless the use of an alternative language is relevant to the assessment issues. 
9.03 Informed Consent in Assessments 
(a) Psychologists obtain informed consent for assessments, evaluations, or diagnostic services, as described in Standard 
3.10, Informed Consent, except when· (1) testing is mandated by law or governmental regulations; (2) informed consent is 
implied because testing is conducted as a routine educational, institutional, or organizational activity (e.g., when 
participants voluntarily agree to assessment when applying for a job); or (3) one purpose of the testing is to evaluate 
decisional capacity. Informed consent includes an explanation of the nature and purpose of the assessment, fees, 
involvement of third parties, and limits of confidentiality and sufficient opportunity for the client/patient to ask questions 
and receive answers. 
(b) Psychologists inform persons with questionable capacity to consent or for whom testing is mandated by law or 
governmental regulations about the nature and purpose of the proposed assessment services, using language that is 
reasonably understandable to the person being assessed. 
(c) Psychologists using the services of an interpreter obtain informed consent from the client/patient to use that 
interpreter, ensure that confidentiality of test results and test security are maintained, and include in their 
recommendations, reports, and diagnostic or evaluative statements, including forensic testimony, discussion of any 
limitations on the data obtained. (See also Standards 2.05, Delegation of Work to Others; 4.01, Maintaining 
Confidentiality; 9.01, Bases for Assessments; 9.06, Interpreting Assessment Results; and 9.07, Assessment by 
Unqualified Persons.) 
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9.04 Release of Test Data 
(a) The term test data refers to raw and scaled scores, client/patient responses to test questions or stimuli, and 
psychologists' notes and recordings concerning client/patient statements and behavior during an examination. Those 
portions of test materials that include client/patient responses are included in the definition of test data. Pursuant to a 
client/patient release, psychologists provide test data to the client/patient or other persons identified in the release. 
Psychologists may refrain from releasing test data to protect a client/patient or others from substantial harm or misuse or 
misrepresentation of the data or the test, recognizing that in many instances release of confidential information under 
these circumstances is regulated by law. (See also Standard 9.11, Maintaining Test Security.) 
(b) In the absence of a client/patient release, psychologists provide test data only as required by law or court order. 
9.05 Test Construction 
Psychologists who develop tests and other assessment techniques use appropriate psychometric procedures and current 
scientific or professional knowledge for test design, standardization, validation, reduction or elimination of bias, and 
recommendations for use. 
9.06 Interpreting Assessment Results 
When interpreting assessment results, including automated interpretations, psychologists take into account the purpose of 
the assessment as well as the various test factors, test-taking abilities, and other characteristics of the person being 
assessed, such as situational, personal, linguistic, and cultural differences, that might affect psychologists' judgments or 
reduce the accuracy of their interpretations. They indicate any significant limitations of their interpretations. (See also 
Standards 2.01b and c, Boundaries of Competence, and 3.01, Unfair Discrimination.) 
9.07 Assessment by Unqualified Persons 
Psychologists do not promote the use of psychological assessment techniques by unqualified persons, except when such 
use is conducted for training purposes with appropriate supervision. (See also Standard 2.05, Delegation of Work to 
Others.) 
9.08 Obsolete Tests and Outdated Test Results 
(a) Psychologists do not base.their assessment or intervention decisions or recommendations on data or test results that 
are outdated for the current purpose. 
(b) Psychologists do not base such decisions or recommendations on tests and measures that are obsolete and not 
useful for the current purpose.· 
9.09 Test Scoring and Interpretation Services 
(a) Psychologists who offer assessment or scoring services to other professionals accurately describe the purpose, 
norms, validity, reliability, and applications of the procedures and any special qualifications applicable to their use. 
(b) Psychologists select scoring and interpretation services (including automated services) on the basis of evidence of the 
validity of the program arid procedures as well as on other appropriate considerations. (See also Standard 2.01b and c, 
Boundaries of Competence.) 
(c) Psychologists retain responsibility for the appropriate application, interpretation, and use of assessment instruments, 
whether they score and interpret such tests themselves or use automated or other services. 
g, 10 Explaining Assessment Results 
Regardless of whether the scoring and interpretation are done by psychologists, by employees or assistants, or by 
automated or other outside services, psychologists take reasonable steps to ensure that explanations of results are given 
to the individual or designated representative unless the nature of the relationship precludes provision of an explanation of 
results (such as in some organizational consulting, preemployment or security screenings, and forensic evaluations), and 
this fact has been clearly explained to the person being assessed In advance. 
9.11. Maintaining Test Security 
The term test materials refers to manuals, instruments, protocols, and test questions or stimuli and does not include test 
data as defined in Standard 9.04, Release of Test Data. Psychologists make reasonable efforts to maintain the integrity 
and security of test materials and other assessment techniques consistent with law and contractual obligations, and in a 
manner that permits adherence to this Ethics Code. · 
10. Therapv 
10.01 Informed Consent to Therapy 
(a) When obtaining informed consent to therapy as required in Standard 3.10, Informed Consent, psychologists inform 
clients/patients as early as is feasible in the therapeutic relationship about the nature and anticipated course of therapy, 
fees, involvement of third parties, and limits of confidentiality and provide sufficient opportunity for the client/patient to ask 
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questions and receive answers. (See also Standards 4.02, Discussing the limits of Confidentiality, and 6.04, Fees and 
Financial Arrangements.) 
(b) When obtaining informed consent for treatment for which generally recognized techniques and procedures have not 
been established, psychologists inform their clients/patients of the developing nature of the treatment, the potential risks 
involved, alternative treatments that may be available, and the voluntary nature of their participation. (See also Standards 
2.01e, Boundaries of Competence, and 3.10, Informed Consent.) 
(c) When the therapist is a trainee and the legal responsibility for the treatment provided resides with the supervisor, the 
clienVpatient, as part of the informed consent procedure, is informed that the therapist is in training and is being 
supervised and is given the name of the supervisor. 
10.02 Therapy. Involving Couples or Families 
(a) When psychologists agree to provide services to several persons who have a relationship (such as spouses, 
significant others, or parents and children), they take reasonable steps to clarify at the outset (1) which of the individuals 
are clients/patients and (2) the relationship the psychologist will have with each person. This clarification includes the 
psychologist's role and the probable uses of the services provided or the information obtained. (See also Standard 4.02, 
Discussing the limits of Confidentiality.) 
(b) If it becomes apparent that psychologists may be called on to perform potentially conflicting roles (such as family 
therapist and then witness for one party in divorce proceedings), psychologists take reasonable steps to clarify and 
modify, or withdraw from, roles appropriately. (See also Standard 3.05c, Multiple Relationships.) 
10.03 Group Therapy 
When psychologists provide services to several persons in a group setting, they describe at the outset the roles and 
responsibilities of all parties and the limits of confidentiality. 
10.04 Providing Therapy to Those Served by Others 
In deciding whether to offer or provide services to those already receiving mental health services elsewhere, 
psychologists carefully consider the treatment issues and the potential client's/patient's welfare. Psychologists discuss 
these issues with the clienVpatient or another legally authorized person on behalf of the clienVpatient in order to minimize 
the risk of confusion and conflict, consult with the other service providers when appropriate, and proceed with caution and 
sensitivity to the therapeutic issues. 
10.05 Sexual Intimacies With Current Therapy Clients/Patients 
Psychologists do not engage in sexual intimacies with current therapy clients/patients. 
10.06 Sexual Intimacies With Relatives or Significant Others of Current Therapy Clients/Patients 
Psychologists do not engage in sexual intimacies with individuals they know to be close relatives, guardians, or significant 
others of current clients/patients. Psychologists do not terminate therapy to circumvent this standard. 
10.07 Therapy With Former Sexual Partners 
Psychologists do not accept as therapy clients/patients persons with whom they have engaged in sexual intimacies. 
10.08 Sexual Intimacies With Former Therapy Clients/Patients 
(a) Psychologists do not engage in sexual intimacies with former clients/patients for at least two years after cessation or 
termination of therapy. 
(b) Psychologists do not engage in sexual intimacies with former clients/patients even after a two-year interval except in 
the most unusual circumstances. Psychologists who engage in such activity after the two years following cessation or 
termination of therapy and of having no sexual contact with the former clienVpatient bear the burden of demonstrating that 
there has been no exploitation, in light of all relevant factors, including (1) the amount of time that has passed since 
therapy terminated; (2) the nature, duration, and intensity of the therapy; (3) the circumstances of termination; (4) the 
client's/patient's personal history; (5) the client's/patient's current mental status; (6) the likelihood of adverse impact on the 
clienVpatient; and (7) any statements or actions made by the therapist during the course of therapy suggesting or inviting 
the possibility of a posttermination sexual or romantic relationship with the client/patient. (See also Standard 3.05, Multiple 
Relationships.) 
10.09 Interruption of Therapy 
When entering into employment or contractual relationships, psychologists make reasonable efforts to provide for orderly 
and appropriate resolution of responsibility for clienVpatient care in the event that the employment or contractual 
relationship ends, with paramount consideration given to the welfare of the clienVpatient. (See also Standard 3.12, 
Interruption of Psychological Services.) 
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10.10 Terminating Therapy 
(a) Psychologists terminate therapy when it becomes reasonably clear that the client/patient no longer needs the service, 
is not likely to benefit, or is being harmed by continued service. 
(b) Psychologists may tenminate therapy when threatened or otherwise endangered by the client/patient or another person 
with whom the client/patient has a relationship. 
(c) Except where precluded by the actions of clients/patients or third-party payers, prior to termination psychologists 
provide pretermination counseling and suggest alternative service providers as appropriate. 
History and Effective Date Footnote 
This version of the APA Ethics Code was adopted by the American Psychological Association's Council of 
Representatives during its meeting, August 21, 2002, and is effective beginning June 1, 2003. Inquiries concerning the 
substance or interpretation of the APA Ethics Code should be addressed to the Director, Office of Ethics, American 
Psychological Association, 750 First Street, NE, Washington, DC 20002-4242. The Ethics Code and information 
regarding the Code can be found on the APA web site, http://www.apa.org/ethics. The standards in this Ethics Code will 
be used to adjudicate complaints brought concerning alleged conduct occurring on or after the effective date. Complaints 
regarding conduct occurring prior to the effective date will be adjudicated on the basis of the version of the Ethics Code 
that was in effect at the time the conduct occurred. 
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750 First Street, NE, Washington, DC 20002-4242, or phone (202) 336-5510. 
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OCCUPATION: Licensed Psychologist 
VITAE 
DEMOGRAPIDC DATA: Office Address: 750 Warm Springs Ave., Suite B 
Boise, ID 83712 
Telephone: (208) 342-3942 
EDUCATIONAL HISTORY 
Institute Degree Date Major/Minor 
Texas Tech University B.A. 1968 Psychology/Sociology 
Texas Tech University M.A. 1970 Clinical Psychology/ 
Special Education 








August 1978 to 
August 1985 
September 1976 to 
August 1979 
September 1977 to 
Private Practice: Adult, adolescent and child psychology, 
individual, family and marltai psychotherapy, hospital consultation 
and group inpatient psychotherapy. Expert witness and legal 
consultant in personal injury, wrongful death. workman's 
compensation, wrongful termination, child custody, child sexual 
abuse, and other criminal and civil forensic cases. Consultation 
with public and private non-profit agencies on child sexual abuse, 
domestic violence, eating disorders treatment programs, treatment 
and evaluation of gender specific disorders. 
Private Practice: Adult and adolescent individual psychotherapy. 
Marital and family therapy and parent couuseling. Individual 
psychological evaluation for children. Divorce and child custody 
mediation, evaluation and counseljng. Consultation with school 
districts in cases of severe behavioral disturbance. (Hal:£.time) 
Associate Professor, Department of Psychology, and 
Department ofTeacher Education, Boise State University, Boise, 
Idaho. Undergraduate courses taught include: Abnormal 
Psychology, Assertiveness Training, Introduction to Exceptional 
Children, and Behavior Management. 
Graduate courses taught include: Childhood Psychopathology, 
Introduction to Counseling and Consulting, Personality 
Development and Analysis of the Individual (testing and 
behavioral observation methods). Duties included chairing 
master's degree thesis, advising students and serving on faculty 
committees. (Full-time, August 1978 -August 1983, Part time 
1983 - 1985). 
Principal Investigator, Project CAST: Teaching Interpersonal 
and Self-Management Skills to Mildly Handicapped Adolescents 
as part of a Career Education Curriculum, Center for Innovation in 
Teaching the Handicapped, Indiana University, Bloomington, 
Indiana, and Psychology Department, Boise State University. 
Activities: Directed research and development activities for 
training high-risk adolescent emotionally disturbed students in 
problem solving and self-management methods in small groups. 
Assistant Professor, Department of Special Education, Indiana 
August 1979 
January 1974 to 
May .1976 




September 1970 to 
May 1971 
January 1970 to 
September 1970 
June 1969 to 
August 1969 
June 1969 to 
August 1969 
University, Bloomington, Indiana. 
Taught undergraduate course: Introduction to Exceptional 
Students. 
Research Assistant, Center for Innovation in Teaching the 
Handicapped, Indiana University, Bloomington, Indiana (part-
time ). 
Staff Psychologist, South Louisville Mental Heahh Center 
River Region Services, Louisville, Kentucky (full-time). 
Activities: Adult and child individual psychotherapy, child and 
adult diagnostics, community liaison for the public schools, 
juvenile courts, child welfare, and public assistance. 
Psychologist, Pediatric Associates, Louisville, Kentucky (part-
time private practice). 
Activities: Child, family and marital psychotherapy, 
psychoeducational diagnostics, school consultation, diagnosis and 
treatment in conjunction with pediatric medicine. 
Staff Psychologist, Child Evaluation Center, Department of 
Pediatrics, University of Louisville Medical Schoo], Louisville, 
Kentucky (half-time). 
Activities: Child psychodiagnostics, school consultation and 
individual interventions, parental counseling including genetic 
counseling. 
Intern in Clinical Psychology, South Plains Guidance Center, 
Lubbock, Texas (full-time). 
Activities: Adult, child, individual, and group psychotherapy, 
adult and child psychodiagnostics, public school consultation, 
conttnunity liaison for juvenile courts. 
Intern in Clinical Psychology, Big Springs State Hospital, Big 
Springs, Texas (part-time). 
Activities: Psychodiagnostics for adults and child new admissions, 
individual and group, adult and child psychotherapy, Ward 
Psychologist for the Adolescent Unit. 
Graduate Assistant, Texas Tech University. Taught graduate 
course in Intelligence and Personality Assessment, Department of 
Clinical Psychology, Texas University, Lubbock, Texas. 
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Staff Psychologist for the Department of Clinical Psychology, 
State School for Retarded Children, Lubbock, Texas (half-time). 
Activities: Outpatient and inpatient psychodiagnostics, parental 
counseling, behavior modification training of profoundly 
retarded inpatient children. educational consultation for children's 
programming. 
Program Coordinator, Learning Disabilities, Experimental 
Clinician. Texas Tech University, Lubbock, Texas. 
Activities: Small group and individual developmental training in 
math and language for kindergarten and primary grades learning 
disabled children. 
PUBLICATIONS 
Project CAST Jnseryice Teacher Training Series Module I: An Introduction to Self-
Managenient and Problem Solving: Supported by U.S.O.E., H.E.W. Grant: Project 
CAST, 1978. 
Project CAST Jnservice Teacher Training Series Module 3: SeJf,.Regulation and Self. 
Management: Support by U.S.O.E., HE.W. Grant: Project CAST, 1978. 
Project CAST Inservice Teacher Training Series Module 4; The Seven SttlJ)S of Problem 
Solvjng: A color cassette videotape series authored by Frederick Kanfer, Ph.D. and 
Cynthia Brownsmith, Pb.D.; Supported by U.S.O.E., HE.W. Grant: Project CAST, 
1977. 
Project CAST Student Intervention Program: A collection of materials including black 
and white videotapes, board games, simulation activities, A Student Handbook and a 
Group Leader's Manual: Supported by U.S.O.E., HE.W. 
Grant: Project CAST, 1977. 
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PROFESSIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 
Idaho Psychological Association 
American Psychological Association 
American Society for Psychology and the Law Society 
Psi Chi National Honorary in Psychology 
PROFESSIONAL LICENSES AND CERTIFICATES 
Certificate of Professional Qualification in Psychology (CPQ): CPQ #2,645, November 
2001 to present 
Idaho State Board of Psychologists: License #130, 1978 to present 
Indiana State Board of Examiners in Psychology: Certificate #1100 133 278, 1978 to 
1982 
Kentucky State Board of Psychology: Certificate #233, 1971 to 1975 
CONSULTATION, AND PROFESSIONAL STAFF TRAINING 
Consulting Psychologist, Women's and Children's Alliance, Boise, Idaho, 2000-Present 
The Treatment of Eating Disorders, staff training for the Warm Springs Center. Boise 
Idaho, April 1999. 
Using the Psychological Expert in Custody and Visitation Issues, a course offered 
to attorneys by the National Business Institute. April 1997. 
Air Force Judge Advocate General School, Adjunct Faculty for the Advanced Trial 
Advocacy Course 96A entitled "Child Victim as Witness", April 29-30, 1996, 
Maxwell Air Force Base, Montgomery, AL. 
Program consultant at Intermountain Hospital, C.P.C., Boise, Idaho, 1990 to 1991. 
Conducted staff training and led an inpatient women's psychotherapy group. Provided 
consultation to the Program Development Committee on the development of a track for 
women's issues to be integrated throughout the general inpatient program. 
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HOSPITAL AFFILIATIONS 
Medical Staff; Associate member, St. Alphonsus Regional Medical Center, Boise, Idaho, 
from Nov. 1987 to present 
Medical Staff; Affiliate member, St. Luke's Regional Medical Center, Boise, Idaho from 
1985 to present 
AWARDS AND OFFICES HELD 
Community Board, YMCA, 1995 
Medical Advisory Committee, Planned Parenthood Association, 1993 to 1994. 
Idaho State Mental Health Advisory Committee to the Crime Victims Compensation 
Fund, 1993. 
Chair, Continuing Education Committee, Idaho Psychological Association, 1992 to 
1996. 
Member of Legislative Committee, Idaho Psychological Association, I 989 to I 994. 
Advisory Board, CARES Program, St. Luke's Regional Medical Center, Boise, Idaho, 
1990 to 1991. 
Mayor's Drug and Alcohol Task Force, Boise, Idaho, 1990 to 1991. 
Board ofDirectors, Women's Life Program, St. Luke's Regional Medical Center, 
Boise, Idaho, 1986 to 1989. 
Chair, Idaho State Board of Psychologist Examiners, 1986 to 1987. 
Vice Chair, Idaho State Board of Psychologist Examiners, I 983 to 1986. 
Secretary, Idaho State Board of Psychologist Examiners, 1982 to 1983. 
Chair, Women's Institute, American Orthopsychiatry Association, 1981 to 1985. 




Forensic Practice Issues in Mental Health, Idaho Psychological Association, Boise, 
Idaho, January 31, 2003 
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Updates in Psychophannacology, Michael J. Gitlin, M.D., Idaho Psychiatric Association, 
Boise, Idaho, January 25, 2003 
Psychopharmacology of Energy and Fatigue, University of California, San Diego School 
of Medicine Department of Psychiatry, San Diego, California, November 7, 2002. 
Ethical Decision Making & Risk Management in Clinical Practice, Idaho Psychological 
Association, Sun Valley, Idaho, April 13, 2002 
Marketing the Value of Psychology to the Workplace & Other Niche Markets, Idaho 
Psychological Association, Sun Valley, Idaho, April 12, 2002. 
A Series on Current Psychiatric Medications, Bipolar, Leslie P. Lundt, MD. & Nancy 
Nadolski, R.N., M.Ed., FNP.C, March 8, 2002, Boise, Idaho. 
A Series on Current Psychiatric Medications, Depression, Leslie P. Lundt, M.D. & Nancy 
Nadolski, R.N., M.Ed., FNP.C, February 15, 2002, Boise, Idaho. 
Assessing Psychopathy with the HARE Psychopathy Checklist- Revised (PCL-R), 
Sinclair Seminars, February 9-10, 2002, San Francisco, California. 
Advanced Psychopharmacology Course: Using Mechanism of Action to Select and 
Combine Antidepressants, Lewis L. Judd, M.D., Steven Stahl, M.D., March 9, 2001, 
Seattle, Washington. 
Couples Therapy Workshop, Multicultural Competency & Ethical Standards, Roundtable 
Discussions, Idaho Psychological Association, May 5, 2001, Sun Valley, Idaho. 
The Complex Multi-Problem Patient Workshop, Michael Tompkins, Ph.D., Idaho 
Psychological Association, May 4, 2001, Sun Valley, Idaho. 
National Psychologist: September/October 2000 by Ohio Publications, Home Study 
. Program, October 21, 2000, Boise, Idaho. 
Legal and Ethical Risks and Risk Management in Professional Psychological Practice. 
Sequence II: Risk Management in Specific High Risk Areas, Eric Harris, Ed.D., JD, 
American Psychological Association, Insurance Trust, May 6, 2000, Boise, Idaho. 
The Cutting Edge of Sexual Harassment, Louise Fitzgerald, Ph.D., Idaho Bar 
Association, February 19, 1998, Boise, Idaho 
Sexual Harassment at Work: What Mental Health Professionals Should Know, Louise 
Fitzgerald, Ph.D., North End Center, February 18, 1998, Boise, Idaho. 
Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale-III, Charles Williams, Ed.D., Idaho Psychological 
Association, February 6, 1998, Boise, Idaho 
Child Custody/Parenting Evaluations: Practice, Ethics and Case Law, Stuart A. 
Greenberg, Ph.D., American Academy ofForensic Psychology, June 27-29, 1996, 
Portland, Oregon. 
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Comprehensive Child Custody Evaluations, Randy K Otto Ph.D, American Academy of 
Forensic Psychology, November 11, 1995, Chicago, Illinois. 
Risk Assessment: Implication for Evaluation, Intervention and Decision-Making, Kirk S. 
Heilbrun, Ph.D., American Academy ofForensic Psychology November 10, 1995, 
Chicago, Illinois. 
Personal Injury Evaluation- Part I: Introduction to Assessment and Testimony, Ronald S. 
Kaiser, Ph.D., American Academy ofForensic Psychology, November 9, 1995, Chicago, 
Illinois. 
Intervention with Battered Women, Treatment of Battering Men, and Courtroom use of 
Battered Woman Syndrome Testimony, Diane R. Follingstad, Ph.D., Idaho Psychological 
Association, September 30, 1995, Coeur d'Alene, Idaho. 
Surviving and Thriving as a Couples Therapist, Ellyn Bader, Ph.D., Idaho Psychological 
Association, May 5-6, 1995, Boise, Idaho. 
Developments and Issues in Psychology, Sol Garfield, Ph.D., Idaho Psychological 
Association, April 7, 1995, Sun Valley, Idaho. 
FORENSIC PSYCHOWGY EXPERIENCE 
CASE NAME 1YPEOFCASE ATTORNEY DATE 
CASE NUMBER 
Ada County v Stacy A Gibson Workers' Compensation Jon M. Bauman 2002 
Case No. CV OC 0107394 D 
Joann Saunders Wire/Mail Fraud Thomas McCabe 2002 
Case No: Fed CR-01-165-SBLW Criminal Defense 
State of idaho v Personal Injury/ David Manweiler 2002 
Dennis G. Shaver Sexual Abuse of Minor 
Case No: H 0100994 Plaintiff 
Kelley Lynn Coffin Ingraham v Divorce/Spousal Abuse Christopher Bray 2002 
Erik Clarke Ingraham Plaintiff 
Case No: CV DR 0201544-D 
Tammi Fairchild v Child Custody James D Holman 2002 
Loren Michael Gardner 
Bonneville County Case 
No: CV-01-4232 
Tom Allegrezza-Bouchard Civil Tort James Underwood 
CaseNumber: 2092 Consulting 2002 
State of Idaho v Murder Ada County Public 
James Lee Morrison Criminal Defense Defender, August Cahill 
Criminal Number: HO l 00736 2002 
State of Idaho v Capital Murder Ada County Public 
David D. Harpt Criminal Defense Defender, Ed Odessey 
Criminal Number: H9901032 2001 
Shubneesh Batra v Monica Batra Child Custody Scot Ludwig 2001 
Case Number: CVDR 96-02582-D Consultation 
Sara Thornock v Micron Sexual Harassment Stephen Andersen 2001 
Technology, Inc Defense 
Case Number: CV OC9705357 D 
Tracy Monti v James Monti Child Custody Susan Corisis Brooks 2001 
Case Number: CV-DR-01-005370 Plaintiff 
Mathew Wells v Notus School 
District 
Case Number: CV 00 06689 
Degen, et al v White, et al 
Case Number: CV-00-00730 
Nancy Dobbins v Gray Arlit 
Case Number: CV99-2142C 
Jacqueline Vaught 







Idaho Human Rights Commission 
Number: E-0699-4 79 
Ondrick v Elliott, et al 
Case Number: CV Pl 9800328 D 
Holt v Bright Beginnings 
Case Number: CV PI 9800225 D 
Buchanan v Georginana Elliott, 
Rick Elliott, Matthew Elliott and 
R & G Enterprises, Inc. 
Case Number: CV PI 9900122 D 
Ehlert v Georginana Elliott, Rick 
Elliott, Matthew Elliott, R & G 
Enterprises, Inc. 
Case Number: CV PI 9900173 D 
McReynolds v Georginana Elliott, 
Rick Elliott, Matthew Elliott and 
R & G Enterprises, Inc. 




























Scott Hess 2001 
Rebecca Broadbent 
2001 
Scot Ludwig 2000 
Breck Seiniger 2000 
Terry Anderson 2000 
Mark Prusynski 2000 
Finch, Cosho 2000 
Scot Ludwig 1999 
Scot Ludwig 1999 
Scot Ludwig 1999 
Taylor v Georginana Elliott, Rick 
Elliott, Matthew Elliott and R & G 
Enterprises, Inc. 
Case Number: CV OC 9902338 D 
Cabbage v Georginana Elliott, 
Rick Elliott, Matthew Elliott and 
R & G Enterprises, Inc. 
Case Number: CV PI 9900649 D 
Nicole Myers v R & G Enterprises 
Case Number: CV PI 9800225 D 
In the Interest of 
Alex Benjamin Castro 
Case Number: SP-99-344 
Smith V Smith 
Case Number: CV95-00638 
Mark Welsh v Susan J Welsh 
Case Number: CVDR 9500359 D 
Unites States of America v 
Patricia Johnson 
















Tracy Fruin v PAM Oil, Inc. Sexual Harassment 
Case Number: CIV98-0375-N-EJL Defense 
Jessica Lawrence v Matt Hanmhan; Personal Injury 
Tim Messuri; and John Does I-X Plaintiff 
Case Number: CIV 99-0485-S-EJL 
Mark Snethen v Teri Hunter Child Custody 
Case Number: CV DR 95-02501 D Court Appointed 
Atwood v Kinney Bros. & 
Keele Hardware Co. & 
Michael Pratt 
Case Number: 97-1189 MA 
Sexual Harassment 
Defense 
Steven Olsen, Joanne Olsen & Wrongful Death & 
Christopher Olsen v State Farm Ins. Personal Injury 
Scot Ludwig 1999 
Scot Ludwig 1999 
John Janis 1999 
Teresa Sturm 1999 
Ronald P Rainey 
Wes Wilhite 1999 
James Bevis 1999 
Audrey Numbers 
1999 
Karl Klein 1999 
Scott Hess 1999 
Ronald P Rainey 1998 
Tamsen Leachman 1998 
Rebecca Broadbent 1999 
(Arbitration) Defense 
Permann v Permann Child Custody Randy Kline 1998 
Riggs & Goad v Psychological Malpractice Charles Lloyd 1997 
Dr. Mark Stephenson: Plaintiff 
Case Number: CV 95 1157 
Noreen v Stephenson: 
Case Number 95 220 
Barnard v Stephenson: 
Case Number: CV 95 222 
Cheever v Lord Child Custody John Connoly 1997 
Case Number: CV DR 9602611 D Court Appointed 
Cripe v Manning Child Custody Jeffrey Christenson 
Case Number: CV 9602611 D Court Appointed 1997 
Jon M. Bauman 
Elam& Burke 
P.O. Box 1539 
Boise, Idaho 83701-1539 
RE: Stacy A Gibson 
VERNON K. SMITH 
ATTOl'INEY AT LAW 
1900 W. MAIN STREET 
BOISE, IOAHO B3702 
20B·!34S· 1 1 25 
20B·!34S· 1 1 zg IF'AXI 
April 21, 2003 
I.C. Case No. 01-015332 
Dear Mr. Bauman: 
Having reviewed further your request to undertake an examination of Ms. 
Gibson through the services provided by Cynthia Brownsmith, as a "forensic 
psychologist", .I made inquiry of others in the field of psychology, psychiatry, and the 
mental health field in order to ascertain a better understanding of her function, in 
light of the context of your letter, that "Dr. Brownsmith's normal practice in cases of 
this kind is to interview third persons who are acquainted with Claimant's situation, 
such as co-workers and the like". 
I am left with concern as to the objective being sought by Dr. Brownsmith, 
especially with your letter of February 24 h, wanting three (3) or more individuals 
acquainted with her prior to July 20, 1999 to the present, to be available for 
interview. The attitude from the Sheriffs Office was co-workers were told not to be 
contacted, and there was a deliberate effort undertaken to prevent any "fallout• or 
"collateral damage• to the other employees, from their supportive reaction from this 
inappropriate action, and their future employment was at risk if they chose to 
preserve their relationship. 
Are we not supposed to be trying to diagnose the nature and extent of her 
PTSD, a behavioral disorder, being the psychological injury she suffered from this 
treatment in her past employment, or are we instead just evaluating behavioral 
characteristics of this individual, and looking for an opportunity to engage that 
analysis in a group setting? If we are trying to determine the presence of a 
behavioral disorder-PTSD-, then it would appear reasonable to conclude we need 
to get a psychiatric evaluation, not a clinical psychologist interview to pursue merely 
psychological behavior. Your approach to this situation may appear to some to be 
rather unconventional, and I must wonder if it is being undertaken as genuine 
clinical analysis of a psychological injury, resulting from a particular environment, or 
is it rather an opportunity to manipulate or modify behavioral character of a troubled 
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and fragile state of psychosis, through use of a fourteen ( 14) hour endeavor to 
break down some existing state of mind, and reconfigure it, in a way that you can 
psychologically declare the person has been brainwashed or has manipulated 
mental perceptions envisioned in a new mind set. 
We are not looking for psychotherapy from Dr. Brownsmith or want her to 
introduce her techniques to an emotionally disturbed individual, as we believe Ms. 
Gibson's state of mind has been traumatized all too significantly already, and is 
rather fragile, and her condition has been described by Dr. Heyrend as being 
potentially viewed as a blubbering mass of protoplasm, when confronted with the 
traumatic disaster she was exposed to and forced to endure. With that being said, 
and her PTSD diagnosis in place, her fragile emotional state of mind is not really 
suited for a "testing field" to unleash more confrontational fear in some 
unconventional, intrusive behavioral modification technique. 
The information I have thus far gathered, from reference to her forensic 
psychology experience, is that Ms. Brownsmith is tough, unrelenting, opinionated, 
tenacious, unshakeable, and recently been engaged in various criminal defense 
strategy settings, including testimony, addressing mental defense aspects, 
including forensic psychology concepts in that aspect of an insanity defense. 
It is not my intention to limit your opportunity to evaluate the nature, extent 
and degree of Ms. Gibson's psychological injury; however, I am left with concern as 
to your selection of a "forensic psychologisr to undertake a clinical analysis to 
validate a PTSD diagnosis and fragile prognosis, where her normal practice, as you 
say, is to interview third persons, such as an investigator would do, as opposed to a 
medical analysis (diagnosis and prognosis) of an injured party. 
Because of my concerns, my uncertainties, and my misgivings on what Dr. 
Brownsmith's objectives or instructions are from Ada County, or what your 
instructions to her may have been on the Industrial Commission case, I must now 
add to the concern the confusion created by the reference in her "experience 
resume", listing the case number from the Ada County case ( overpayment 
collection case) with her reference to you and the Workers' Comp case. If this is 
going to be another interrogation process of renewed fear and helplessness and 
horror, then I see we will have not just a two (2) hour interrogation like took place on 
July 20, 1999, but now there will be a two (2) day marathon ordeal of intensive 
interrogation. I am particularly concerned on Ms. Gibson's fragile state of mind and 
being now advised through various sources that your psychologist is rather 
tenacious, unrelenting, opinionated, strong willed and "tough" in her confrontational 
setting, you leave me concerned with need to consider the presence of another 
professional with her, such as a psychiatrist, or at a minimum, a doctor of medicine, 
who would understand any particular focus or direction undertaken during this 
encounter, so the opportunity exists to alter the interview, and prevent any 
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behavioral modification efforts that could have a detrimental impact upon her 
present psychosis. 
Unless I am to understand the objective and purpose of this encounter 
differently, I am left with the abiding conviction it is nothing more than a fishing 
expedition of providing Ada County another fourteen (14) hours of interrogation, a 
form of cruel and unusual psychological punishment, unorthodox in every sense 
and rather disturbing to her health, and we don't need any more horror experienced 
by this course of conduct. 
PTSD is a psychological disorder (not just an adjustment disorder such as 
divorce, illness, financial collapse, etc.), and in her case it was caused from a 
traumatic event (marked by intense fear and helplessness) that has physical 
manifestations and ramifications, requiring a psychiatrist to diagnose it, a 
psychiatrist to prescribe a treatment regimen, and a dedicated avoidance of the 
event that triggered the psychosis, or a method to better understand and deal with 
the emotional effects of the traumatic stressful situation. 
Ms. Gibson doesn't need a repeat of a bad traumatic experience with new 
horror, more fear or more sleeplessness that invades her emotionally, and seeing 
the Ada County case concerning the salary overpayment listed in Dr. Brownsmith's 
resume', I must wonder if Ms. Brownsmith has been retained by Ada County, in 
pursuit of that collection dispute, as well now by you in this Industrial Commission 
claim. 
I am developing strong reservations about allowing this "interview" to go 
forward, without a better understanding of what it is we (or you) intend to 
accomplish, particularly in light of the fact your client (Ada County) is well aware of 
the fact on November 3, 1999, R. Monte Macconnell, Legal Advisor to the Sheriff, 
made a controlling effort to keep Ms. Gibson from having any contact with all of her 
co-workers, including her friends at the Sheriff's Office. Possibly your client has not 
made you aware of these exacting circumstances, so I have enclosed a copy of Mr. 
MacConnell's fetter for your reference. This attitude of Ada County makes the co-
worker, close contact acquaintance interview approach a new layer of confusion, as 
Ada County deliberately decapitated that available form of "forensic psychological 
analysis" by their effort to destroy the opportunity of contact. 
I reiterate what you suggested in your February 20, 2003 letter "Ms. 
Brownsmith's normal practice in cases of this kind is to interview third persons who 
are acquainted with Claimant's situation, such as co-workers and the like." After 
the Sheriff's commencement of this incident on July 20, 1999, Ms. Gibson has had 
minimal contact with any employees of the Sheriffs Office. The only exceptions 
were isolated events of a few unplanned incidents. The only third party persons 
who are "truly acquainted with Claimant's situation· would be the individuals who 
caused the situation, such as Ada County Sheriff, Vaughn Killeen, Legal Advisor R. 
Page4 
April 21, 2003 
Monte Macconnell, Detective Arvilla Glenn, Detective Scott Johnson, and Budget 
Director Kelli Bolicek. These individuals are aware of the detailed events of the 
infamous nature in which they actively collaborated, pursued and created the 
"situation• that directly caused and developed Claimant's injuries. The "situation• 
(the label used in your letter), was born because of the County's (especially the 
Sheriff's Office) continuing unlawful failure to stabilize and correct their ongoing 
state of non-compliance pursuant to the mandatory provisions of the Fair Labor 
Standards Ad, Title 29 U.S.C., § 201 et seq. as it relates to wage records and 
payroll accounting matters. The County (alone) had the exclusive deposit and debit 
authority under their Direct Deposit Program, just as it was established to give them 
the right to correct errors by account debit entries. 
During the deposition of a former Ada County Commissioner, Sharon M. 
Ullman, undertaken in Gallagher v. Ada County et al, Fourth District Court, Case 
No. CVOC 02020220), Ms. Ullman, a very genuine and sincere County 
Commissioner, confirmed the state of non-compliance, and disclosed 
documentary evidence further indicating not only has Ada County continued its 
non-compliance of the Act, but specified the County's acute bad faith in any 
attempt to rectify their FLSA violations. She identified a February 12, 2001 letter 
(with five (5) options and five (5) attachments) from Theodore E. Argyle, Ada 
County Chief Deputy Attorney, Civil Division, to Ada County Board of 
Commissioners, which I have enclosed for your reference. The Affidavit of Sharon 
Ullman, is also enclosed for your reference, and those communications from 
County officials, concerning this state of ongoing non-compliance identified five (5) 
options to address ~ level of performance with the law, and from the 
documents made available to us, you will note the fifth option proposed was to 
continue on as they had, and simply do nothing, and allow the state of non-
compliance to perpetuate, a clear act of bad faith and a serious concern to any 
federal analyst in light of this County misconduct. 
Also, new documentary evidence may soon include confirmation from a 
former Ada County Payroll Department Technician, who will also substantiate the 
state of ongoing errors and overpayments. She will provide information describing 
her personal knowledge of how administrative errors, causing overpayment of 
wages to employees, were routinely created, throughout her tenured employment 
(approximately five (5) years), until her departure on January 16, 2003. This 
Technician is aware of various memoranda, e-mail, letters and procedure manuals 
concerning the practices to be used to process wage data and information for Ada 
County employees, and this outrageous act of accusations and confrontations, and 
interrogations is not listed as a customary or acceptable practice to employ in a 
County caused payroll overpayment situation. 
It has become an historic fact the Ada County Sheriff's Office has not 
entertained a policy to ensure FLSA compliance of their payroll system, and instead 
the misinformed or ill-advised office has put their agency at risk of liability, and by 
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law, the Ada County Sheriff's Office has no defense to their continuing violations, 
as a matter of Federal law. See Dominici v Board of Education of the City of 
Chicago, 881 F. Supp 315, 320 (N.D. Ill. 1995). Fortunately, this condition of 
ongoing non-compliance is being addressed, and Commissioners are now 
becoming very sensitive to the ramifications that will result if the "fifth" option is ever 
allowed to become more of the County Payroll practice in the future. 
Furthermore, the Ada County Sheriff's Office, has violated elements of 
criminal statutes as well, as in December 1999, Sheriff Killeen ordered Detective 
Scott Johnson to "follow" Stacy on two (2) separate occasions without the existence 
of any lawful purpose. It is our opinion this "following" was intended to frighten her 
into resigning, as the Sheriff wanted to occur, and that form of psychological 
influence was intended to achieve that result. For sure, it was frightening to her, but 
she refused to resign, and instead felt the trauma and fear that was intended to be 
instilled within her. This unlawful conduct is sometimes referred to, and is better 
known by the general public as •stalking", and would constitute a clear violation of§ 
18-7905, Idaho Code, as there was no lawful purpose intended and was simply an 
act of "sophisticated terror", a surgical attempt to separate an employee by a clean 
resignation, rather than a malicious termination of evil purposes. 
If your clients persist in attempting to compel Ms. Gibson to undergo 
further inappropriate "interviews" by Dr. Brownsmith, then I believe we need 
psychological interviews of the Sheriff's Office personnel to analyze their 
disorder and reason for destroying an individual because of a payroll error 
caused solely by the County. It may be best just to refrain from causing Ms. 
Gibson any more trauma or exposure to these evil results, and possibly I will be 
instructed to decline this forensic approach altogether, and if we are later asked 
to review our concerns from the Industrial Commission, we may need to discuss 
the better approach of "why" the County allowed this terror and trauma to occur, 
rather than to expose the success or effects of such "surgical strikes· being 
made against loyal and dedicated employees. Hopefully, a sincere desire to 
negotiate a good faith resolution of this matter will become more of a possible 
solution before it becomes either a Federal focus of oversight enforcement 
concerns or a dispute within the commission anclreviewpro ss. I will await your 
response, and until then, I remain, // 
VKS[jmg 
Enclosures 
Yours v truly, 
. k-"'.¢,t-~;, 
Vernon K. Smith 
April 21, 2003 
Vernon K. Smith 
Attorney at Law 
1900 W. Main Street 
Boise, ID 83702 
Re: Stacy Gibson 
Dear Mr. Smith: 
Behavioral Mgmt Ctr 
F. LaMarr Heyrend, M.D. 
355 N. Allumbaugh 
Boise, Idaho 83704 
(208) 376-2518 
Fax (208) 376-2521 
141001 
I reviewed your letter to John Bowman, attorney at law, at Elam & Burke, regarding Stacy 
Gibson, IC case #01-015332, and as I noticed the structure of the evaluation, I became very 
concerned. I felt that you articulated your position clearly, but failed to mention that PTSD is 
a diagnostic category, which is the result of an overwhehning stressor, which is not one that 
we could anticipate a person experiencing. The trauma is such that it results in behavioral 
changes, which with time improve. Thus, it is not a sick diagnosis. 
Inasmuch as we know historically that patients improve with time, as I looked at the schedule 
for evaluation with Mrs. Brownsmith, I felt that this could smack of being a re-victimization. 
An example would be in cases of sexual abuse, sometimes the process of evaluation can 
become a re-victimization. 
In any event, I felt it was important for me to infonn you that this is something that must be 
considered when you have a person who is as grossly upset as this woman has been. 
It is important to note that when I work with people with PTSD, I point out to them that it is 
the result of overwhelming stress, and is not a disorder of character or behavior, but really 
represents destabilization of the neural centers controlling the flow of noradrenaline and 
affective responsiveness. In any event, the flattening of her affect, poor affective 




F. LaMarr Heyrend, M.D. 
Clinical Psychiatrist 
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ADA COUNTY 
PROSECUTING ATTORNEY 
GREG H. BOWER 
65D Maln Strut 
'
0
'"· '•''t'5°NFIDENTIAL ATTORNEY-CLIENT COiVIMUNICATION 
February 12, 2001 
ADVICE NO. \V-8712 
Board of Ada County Commissioners 
650 Main Street 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
RE: FLSA Compliance and Payroll Change 
Dear Commissioners: 
Attached to this letter is a table listing five different options and the material 
consequences of each for· our discussion about FLSA compliance and payroll 
periods tomorrow morning. 
The workgroup that has been studying the issue recommends Option #2 be 
implemented, either at the commencement of the new fiscal year or at the 
commencement of the new calendar year concurrent with move in at the new 
· courthouse. 
I believe that Dave Navarro and Terry Johnson will be present to provide further 
information on payroll, accounting, and personnel consequences for use in your 
deliberations on the matter. 
We will also discuss the implications of FLSA compliance as it relates to each of 
these options. These particular discussions involve liability and should be done in 
executive session. 
Very truly yours, 
GREG H. BOWER 
Ada County Bros~uting Attorney 
By:~lrgyle 
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employees rum in 
time and are paid 
an hourly wage for 
the number of 
hours worked. 
Overtime, 





forty hours per 
week, 
Pay Period. 
26 pay periods per 
year lagging time 




draw 1/26"' of 
their annual salary 
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Full Compliance and Standardization 
(The Perfect Legal World) 
Advantages Disadvantages Potential Costs 
to Imolement 
Solves all Every department and Payroll progra,nming 
current FLSA division will have to and a timekeeping 
compliance keep track of hours system. 
issues. Always worked. Approximately I 
pay the right month to reprogram 
amount and sick to add time and 
and vacation arc attendance. 









Simple, easy to Disrupts law Additional pay for 
use rule that all enforcement and detention overtime. 
departments and other security Probably no extra for 
divisions can cultures. the Sheriff since he 
follow. Training pays OT after 10 
is easy. hours each day. 
Helps retain Some additional Additional 
lowecwnge expense to process. processing cost 
entry level . absorbed by the 
employees Clerk. One time 
where turnover payroll. cost to covert 
is highest in the amount of 
$256,000,00. Annual 
loss of intei-est 
eamin°0 of $50,000, 
Neutral Neutral Additional 
processing cast? 
Dovetails nicely Continuing potential 
into the exposure to FLSA 
personnel reform liability until 
currently being implemented. 
examined by the 
elected officials 
and move to the 
new courthouse. 
Comments 
We should be 
doing this 
anyway, We 





Oaly two rules 







employees tum in 
time nnd are paid 
an hourly wage for 





forry hours per 
week. Leave a 14 




26 pay periods per 
year lagging time 




draw !/261h of 
their annWll salary 







Full Compliance w/ partial 7K for Security Services 
(The Perfect Practical World) 
Advantages Disadvantages Potential Costs Comments 
to Imolement 
Solves all Every department Payroll We should be 
ct1trent FLSA and division will programming and • doing this anyway. 
compliance have to keep track timekeeping system. We are not in 
issues. Always of hours worked. Approximately l complete tecboicnl 
pay the right month to reprogram compliance with 
amount and sick to add time and FLSA. · 
and vacation are attendance. 
accurate. Can be 
automated. 
Still reasonably Some, more modest Less than Option # l. 3 rules to learn and 
simple? easy to amount of program 
use rule that all disruption to Jaw 
dcpactments and enforcement. More 
divisions can scheduling 
follow. flexibility for law 
enforcement than 
Option 111, but less 
than Ootion #3. 
Helps retain Some additional Sanw as above. 





Neutral Neutral Same as above. 
Dovetails aicely Continuing 
into the potential exposure -
personnel refonn to FLSA liability 
currently being until implemented. 
examined by the 
elected officials 
and move to the 
hew courthouse. 
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OPTION#3 
Full Compliance with full 7K for Security Services 
Proposal Advantages Disadvantages Potential Costs Comments 
to lmnlement 
Hourly Solves all Every department Payroll We should be 
Employees. cunentFLSA and division will programming and a doing this anyway. 
All hourly compliance have to keep track timekeeping system. We are not in 
employees turn in issues. Always of hours worked. Approximately l complete technical 
rime and are paid pay the right month to reprogram compliance with 
an hourly wage for amount and sick to add time and FLSA. 
ti1e number of and vacation are attendance. 
hours worked. accurate. Can be 
automated. 
Overtime. Simple, easy to Disrupts law Nono. 
Overtime is use rule that all enforcement and 
computed after departments and other security 
forty hours per divisions can cultures. 
week for all but follow, More 
security services. flexibility in 
scheduling for 
law enforcement 
than with Option 
#2. 
Pay Poriod. Helps retnin Some additional Same as above. 4 rules to learn and 
26 pay periods per lower wage expense to process program. 
yenr for all but 7K entry level and some 
employees, employees additional expenses 
tagging time. where turnover for two time 
earned by 2 weeks. is highest systems. 
7K would hnve 13 
oav ocriods. 
Exempt Same as above. 
Employees. 
Ex.empt employCes 
draw 1/26" of 
their annual salary 
each oav oeriod 
rmplementatlon Dovetails nicely Continuing 
Date. into the potential exposure 
Commence: personnel reform to FLSA liability. 
l/1/2002 currently being 
examined by the 
elected officials 




Full Compliance with Monthly Pay Periods 
Proposal Advantages Disadvantages Potential Costs Comments 
to lmolement 
Hourly Solves all Every deparnnent Payroll We should be 
Employees. current FLSA aod division will programming and a doing this anyway. 
All hourly compliance have to keep track timekeeping system. We are not in 
employees tum in issues, Can be of hours worked. Approximately I complete technical 
time and are paid automated. Overtime, sick and month to reprogram compliance with 
an hourly wage for Does not solve vacation must be to add time and FLSA. 
the number of month end time adjusted attendance. 
hours worked. and attendance retroactively, 
problems. 
Overtime. Simple, easy to Disrupts law Additional pay for 
Elimfoate the 7K use rule that all enforcement and detention ov~rtime. 
e:temptiou departments and other security Probably no extra for 
Countywide. divisions can cultures. the Sheriff since he 
Overtime is follow. Does pays OT after I 0 
computed after require a cutoff hours each day 
forty hours per for overtime 
week. which doesn't 
get picked up for 
a month. 
Pay Period, Helps retain Some additional 





Exempt Neutral Neutral 
Employees, 
Same as current 
Practice:: 
Implemeotlltlon Dovetails nicely Continuing Costs oflitlgation, 
Dnte. into the potential exposure back pay, and fines 
Commence personnel reform to FLSA liability, when FLSA is not 
1/1/2002 currently being complied with. 
examined by the 
elected officials . 
and move to the 
. 
new courthouse. 
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OPTION#5 
Do Nothing Except Address Issues as They Arise 
Proposal Advantages Disadvantages Potential Costs Comments 
to Imnlement 
Hourly Solves all Every department Payroll We should be 
Employees. cuxrentl'LSA and division will programming and a doing this anyway. 
Ail hourly compliance have to keep track timekeeping system. We are not in 
employees tum in issues for regular · of hours worked. Additional cost to complete technical 
time and are paid employees if Paychecks will correct time entries compliance with 
an hourly wage for continual fluctuate from retroactively. FLSA. 
the number of training is done. month to month. 
hours worked, 7K pay p~riods Overtime, sick and 
are almost vacation must be 
impossible to adjusted 
match with a retroactively. 
monthly pay 
oeriod. 
Overtime. No Change from The 7K. exemption . None~ except for 
Same as current cunent practice. is extremely current problem 
practice except difficult to learn areas and the 
correct problems. and keep track of ongoing potential for 
on a monthly pay further 
system resulting in noncompliance 
constant problem ¢0St5. 
solvimr. 
Pay Period. Does not require Does not address None. 




Exempt. Neutral Neutral None 
Employees. 
Same as current 
, oractice. 
Implementation Can commence Continuing Costs of litigation, 
Date, ad hoc solutions potential exposure back pay, and fines 
As soon as promptly. to FLSA liability when FLSA is not 





differing pay and 
compliance 
oeriods, 
AFFIDAVIT OF SHARON M. ULLMAN 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
:ss 
COUNTY OF Ada ) 
COMES NOW Sharon M. Ullman, former Ada County Commissioner, 
District I, and being first duly sworn upon oath, deposes and says as follows: 
1. That Affiant was duly elected to the Board of Commissioners (Board), 
District I seat, Ada County, Idaho in November 2000; that Affiant took office on 
January 8, 2001; that Affiant's last full day in office was January 12, 2003. 
2. That Affiant presents this Affidavit upon her own knowledge, direct 
conversations and personal participation with Ada County officials, and in 
conjunction with her official duties as an Ada County Commissioner, District I seat, 
Ada County, Idaho. 
3. That Affiant has personal knowledge of Idaho Code,§ 31-801 et seq., 
which defines the Powers and Duties of the Board of Ada County Commissioners; 
that Affiant was a member of that Board; that in accordance with that statute, § 31-
816, Idaho Code, the Board is required, "To fix the compensation of all county 
officers and employees, and provide for the payment of the same". 
4. That Affiant has personal knowledge of Idaho Code, § 31-809, which 
requires the Board "To examine and audit the accounts of all officers having the 
care, management, collection or disbursement of moneys belonging to the county, 
or appropriated by law, or otherwise, for its use and benefit." 
5. Affiant has personal knowledge of Idaho Code,§ 31-810, wherein the 
Board is required to pay claims against the County, and those claims do include 
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compensation for all County employees for wages, salaries, overtime, 
compensatory time, flexible time, and all other disbursements relating to Ada 
County employment. 
6. That Affiant would state that to the best of Affiant's knowledge, and 
based upon controlling Federal and State law, Ada County is an employer pursuant 
to and controlled by the provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA). 
7. That Affiant was informed by Theodore Argyle, Chief Civil Deputy 
Prosecuting Attorney for Ada County, in early 2001 that Ada County was out of 
compliance with various provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act including such 
items as record-keeping requirements and overtime computation and 
disbursements. It was duly determined that Ada County officials were going to 
attempt to bring all County Departments into compliance with the Act. 
8. Affiant did attend a seminar, along with other Ada County employees, 
department heads and other elected officials; this seminar was presented by 
Theodore Argyle and another Ada County Deputy Civil Attorney concerning the Fair 
Labor Standards Act, held at Western Town on the grounds of the Western Idaho 
Fair, on the 18th day of May, 2001. It was deemed to be quite important at that time 
to educate the County officials (including Affiant) about the need to understand and 
perform Ada County's FLSA obligations and responsibilities to Ada County 
employees. Ada County was required to discharge its duty as an FLSA employer, 
or face legal consequences. During this seminar, Mr. Argyle emphasized to us 
repeatedly there is no defense for an FLSA violation, and for that reason he 
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stressed the need for all Ada County Departments to act in accordance with the 
Fair Labor Standards Act. 
9. Affiant first became aware that Ada County, as an employer, was 
possibly committing FLSA violations when an Ada County employee brought the 
subject to my attention, approximately six or eight months prior to my taking office 
in January 2001. At the time the possible FLSA violations were first brought to 
Affiant's attention by the Ada County employee, Affiant informed the employee 
there was nothing I could do until I took office as an elected commissioner. Shortly 
after taking office, I began to question our legal staff in the Civil Division about the 
concern and possibility of County FLSA violations. Affiant's questions, along with 
the subsequent events of filing an FLSA complaint by another employee, led to the 
internal examination of the County's payroll practices by the legal staff. 
10. Affiant cannot confirm the exact duration of time during which Ada 
County had been out of compliance with the Fair Labor Standards Act, but the 
County did officially recognize all Departments were in an ongoing state of FLSA 
non-compliance, and it was for that reason, effective no later than January 10, 
2002, the County made major changes in the method and means by which the 
Departments would process their employee wage records, record keeping and 
disbursements, and how that was to be accomplished. The changes included the 
long overdue removal of the mandatory signature required on a "pay voucher", or 
"claim form", from all of the County employees. That change made it no longer 
required to sign "pay vouchers" or "claim forms" since the effective date of the 
changes, being no later than January 10, 2002. 
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Dated this30~ day of January 2003. 
Notary Public for Ida 
Residing at Boise, Idaho 
My Commission Expires: 12/20 6 
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' NOVO 5 1999 
ADA CC)UNTY SHERIFF'S OFFICE 
VAU~HN Kl.LEtM llh""'1 
l"2CI DAAAI.IY?R ~! 
aoiu, lOAliO UTM,,,n 
Vernon K. Smith, ES{J. 
1900 W. Main Street 
'Boise, Idaho 83702 
Re: Stacy Gibson 
Dear Mr. Smith: 
BOISE, IDAHO 
November 3, 1999 
I have received a letter from Stacy Gibson mailed certified to Dr. Steuart. Ms. Gibson requests 
that Dr. Steuart send the records of the October j, J 999 examination to Dr. Spencer. !'lease he 
advised that 1 have asked all members of the Sheriff's staff to deal with Ms. Gibso1t only through 
me. I previously told.Dr. Spencer that I would 1101: reve~I this infonnation. TI1e examination on 
October 5 was done for the benefit of this department, not to treat Ms. Gibson. As such she is 
not entitled to see any report that may exist, or any other docwnentation concerning the 
examination. 
By copy of this letter I am also informing Ms. Gibson that no member of this department will 
rnspond to her except through your ot11cc. As you are awari:, ! am under an ethical obligation 
not to deal directly with Ms, Gibson as long as she is represe11te<l by counsel in this matter. 1 
hope yon will instruct your client accordingly. 
Thank you for your considemtion in this matter. 




By: R. Monte Mac.Connell 
Legal Advisor to !he Sheriff 
6-Z.lt~t,£B0Z :'ON Xl:I~ 
Cynthia Brownsmith, Ph.D. 
Licensed Psychologist 
750 Warm Springs Avenue 
Boise, Idaho 83712 
VERNON K, SMITH 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
1900 W, MAIN STREET 
90/SE, IDAHD 83702 
208·~4S•l 1 2S 
209·345· l l 29 ffAX) 
October 29, 2003 
RE: Independent Medical Evaluation of Stacy A. Gibson 
Dear Dr, Brownsmith: 
On August 29, 2003, a copy of your report was received in my office, I 
appreciate the opportunity to view your analysis, but having now done so, I must 
share our concerns raised frorn our thorough review of the contents of that report. 
Your report has re-victimized Ms. Gibson by the "findings" you made, and she 
perceives your conclusions to have impugned her character, in part because your 
report suggests Ms.' Gibson was cognizant of, and a willing recipient of, the 
"mistaken receipt of monies" that Ada County deposited into her joint checking 
account, and in part because you introduced nonexistent facts, incidents, and 
events that she contends never occurred, 
Also, your report attempts to deflect culpability from the County, and instead, 
suggest Ms. Gibson is the source of blame, because she (purportedly) was a willing 
recipient of funds (unknowingly) deposited under the Direct Deposit Program, Your 
impressions are not supported by anything in her personnel file, the investigation 
report, court pleadings, medical history files, or in any documents submitted to the 
Idaho Industrial Commission. She had no knowledge of the deposits, and not a 
knowing recipient of the receipt of any funds, and we would respectfully encourage 
you to revisit the facts and correct that misperception you have chosen to generate 
in your report. 
Your report has heightened her level of trauma, just as though she had been 
put into another session as she was originally victimized, The event is somewhat 
like when a rape victim is chastised in a courtroom. The victim is blamed for what 
happened because she was wearing a mini-skirt or a low-cut blouse, allowing her 
breast cleavage to !De exposed. She is consequently chastised, and left to feel at 
fault, and she is seen as a willing recipient of the wrongfulness. This form of 
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suggestion is a misperception of blame, and the similarity is drawn to this situation, 
in that Ms. Gibson consented to work under a Direct Deposit Program (DDP); she 
signed a voucher always regarded as incorrect, and the practice within the 
employment expected. her to sign the voucher because she had to, as that form 
was used by Payroll to activate the pay system to disburse wages under the DDP. 
What the voucher said was irrelevant to what the Payroll Department paid under 
the program, as the pay was already programmed into the system. Now, just as a 
woman may wear the "style of clothing" in vogue and later be chastised for catching 
a wandering eye, Ms. Gibson assented to the "style of payment" in vogue dictated 
by the County, and is now being chastised for not doing her own accounting, and 
failing to gather the knowledge to bring the error to the attention of some caring 
County official. 
With the report you crafted, and your evaluation of Ms. Gibson, you have 
essentially given the "appearance" that her form of payment, like the form of 
clothing, is the focus of blame, and she chose it, or allowed it, so consequently Ms. 
Gibson committed some impropriety, or unlawful action. As we see your analysis, 
just because the funds were deposited into the joint account, you conclude the 
County will be assigned no blame for their wrongful conduct. Such a perception 
suggests Ms. Gibson is the only one to blame for allowing the form of deposit. 
Apparently you conclude that even though the deposits were wrongfully made, she 
had "constructive" access to the account, and despite the fact she did not review it 
or access the incorrect deposits, you rather blame her than assign any blame to the 
County, though I trust you realize Ada County alone has caused the accounting 
error. 
It is apparent your level of awareness has not involved the actual events and 
true facts as it should to form your report. You have not capitalized upon the fact 
the entire error was created by the County Sheriff and County Payroll Department, 
and there was the result of a violation of the Ada County Code, State law, Federal 
law, and the United States Constitution. 
It is important for you to understand what truly happened here. The Fair 
Labor Standards Act, Title 29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq. (FLSA) provides that an 
employer under the Act is solely responsible for keeping accurate payroll records of 
its employees, and an employer such as Ada County, is not. as a matter of law, 
allowed to transfer or delegate the record-keeping responsibility to any employee at 
any time and if an employer violates the Act, the employer can be charged with civil 
and criminal violations of the Act. Furthermore, once an employee, such as Ms. 
Gibson, asserts her rights and protection under the Act, or those rights ·as were 
prov,ded to her through a merit system, such as found in the Ada County Code, 
County Personnel System,§ 1-7-1 through§ 1-?L-10, any abuse or denial of those 
rights, or any confrontational accusation and discrimination of that employee is 
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considered to be a form of retaliation. The employer can be criminally charged for 
such violations of the Act. 
You need to be familiar with these true underlying facts and circumstances, 
so you can correct your report as you deem needed. Here is the correct sequence 
of facts you need to become quite familiar, as it is essential in the formation of any 
"forensic" report. 
Over four (4) years ago, on July 19, 1999, Merrily Wilfong, Payroll 
Technician, Ada County Payroll Department, sent a facsimile transmission to the 
Budget Director of the Ada County Sheriff's Office, Kelli Bolicek, therein providing a 
detailed accounting of nine (9) Sheriff's Office employees who she believed were 
shorted pay from October 1998 through June 1999. See Exhibit 1. Deputy Gibson 
was one (1) of those nine (9) employees Payroll thought was owed back pay for 
overtime wages. That event confirmed there was a record-keeping problem in the 
payroll system of Ada County. The County then determined their own Payroll 
Department had in fact created and perpetuated an administrative error of Ms. 
Gibson's wage and benefit records (a further acknowledgement of ongoing County 
FLSA violations), which error had in fact resulted in the County's disbursing 
overpayments to Ms. Gibson's joint bank account with her husband, through Ada 
County's Direct Deposit Program, causing a mistaken receipt of funds into the joint 
account from the County's negligence and violations of the Fair Labor Standards 
Act (FLSA), 29 U.S.C. § 211 (c). This combination of misfortunate events caused 
by the Payroll Department personnel was then escalated by Ada County Sheriff, 
Vaughn Killeen, by his inappropriate and unlawful basis to discriminate, retaliate 
and wrongfully terminate Deputy Gibson, a deputy who had never been written up 
or ever disciplined, and had always been a loyal County employee. 
This action of the Sheriff occurred solely because of the erroneous wage 
and record-keeping process of the governmental agency and their Ada County 
Payroll Department. The underlying cause of this error was the flawed accounting 
process known to be in use back in 1998, and that flawed system was kept in effect 
by the County until January 10, 2002, when the events of this ongoing state of non-
compliance was made a major issue and became of concern, and that caused 
administrative efforts to be taken to address need for some "level of" compliance 
with the Federal mandates. 
It has become well known that prior to January 10, 2002, Ada County, as 
an FLSA employer, had not been in compliance with the mandatory 
provisions and conditions of FLSA in a variety of ways. That fact was also 
pronounced in the Affidavit of Sharon M. Ullman, former Ada County 
Commissioner, (Exhibit 2, attached hereto) and the letter of February 12, 
2001, containing five (5) options and five (5) attachments submitted by 
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Theodore E. Argyle, Ada County Chief Deputy Attorney, Civil Division, to the 
Ada County Board of Commissioners (Exhibit 3, attached hereto). The 
Affidavit of Sharon Ullman, former Ada County Commissioner, and the 
communications from County officials, address the ongoing state of non-
compliance and Mr. Argyle's list of five (5) options to pursue some level of 
performance with the law. These factors and documents have been made 
available to Ms. Gibson and myself, and are presented to you to verify the history of 
these errors, and to reiterate to you it was no fault of any employee. You will note 
the fifth option proposed by the County Legal Department was to do nothing, the 
effect of which was to allow the state of non-compliance to continue, demonstrating 
the questionable behevior and ongoing County misconduct in the manner in which 
their obligation and duty is perceived as to the mandatory compliance standards 
with the Federal law. This disregard has added much to the concern over the 
arbitrary and capricious behavior of various officials in Ada County with the power 
to exercise certain authority, as it becomes difficult to disrupt the established 
practices of a long standing regime. 
As further confirmation Ada County has been in violation of FLSA, on March 
15, 2002, Mr. Ralph Gallagher did initiate litigation against Ada County by filing suit 
for ongoing and continual FLSA violations (Gallagher v. Ada County et al, Fourth 
District Court, Case No. CVOC 02020220), and former Ada County Commissioner, 
Sharon Ullman, was deposed on February 12, 2003 regarding her knowledge of 
Ada County's violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act. A copy of Ms. Ullman's 
deposition concerning the County's ongoing FLSA violations will be made available 
to you upon request. 
Whether it's the South with its Civil Rights efforts in the '60's, or the North 
and its labor disputes in the '?O's or in more recent times, the global efforts at world 
trade regulations, terrorism, and Middle-East peace initiatives, change does not 
come easily when confronting established practices and entrenched regimes, even 
with a clear violation of what is right and just. 
The Sheriff well knew someone in the Payroll Department was responsible 
for creating and perpetuating this administrative error that caused Deputy Gibson's 
overpayments, and well knowing Ada County was an FLSA employer, required to 
comply with all provisions of the Act, Sheriff Killeen nonetheless, in his regime 
attitude, chose to accuse Deputy Gibson of some element of misconduct, and did 
then take action by his effort to capriciously discriminate and retaliate against 
Deputy Gibson by i11structing two (2) detectives to sequester and interrogate her on 
July 20, i 999, as he wanted to remove her from her position. 
On that July 20, 1999, in mid-afternoon, the day after the error was 
discovered by the County, Ms. Gibson received the phone call from Detective 
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Arville Glenn, requesting she report to the Sheriff's Office, She had been 
recovering from surgery, and she thought they had another special assignment for 
her, as they did with her on a regular basis, creating much of her overtime benefits. 
When she arrived at the Ada County Sheriff's Office, these two (2) detectives of the 
Ada County Sheriffs Office subjected Ms. Gibson to two and one-half (2 ½) hours 
of confrontational and improper interrogation. 
During that interrogation process, those detectives accused Ms. Gibson of 
unlawful activities, and acted as though they thought she was involved in the 
creation of the erroneous direct deposit, and threatened her with felony criminal 
charges and jail time, and called her a liar as she invoked her innocence and 
invoked her rights. They knew the substance of the issue involved was an 
administrative error in County Payroll, not a criminal issue, and also knew the error 
was created solely by the Payroll Department. Furthermore, they should have 
known the mistaken receipt of monies by Ms. Gibson in that joint account was a 
record-keeping payroll issue, and the employer was solely responsible for the 
disbursements, not the employee, and was controlled solely by the Federal Fair 
Labor Standards Act (FLSA), Title 29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq, As previously 
emphasized, under FLSA, the employer is not allowed to transfer any record-
keeping responsibilities to an employee. If the employer ever chooses to do so, he 
does so at his own risk and accounting peril. 
The Sheriff, in the furtherance of his capricious conduct, placed Ms. Gibson 
on administrative leave, and in August 1999, placed her on administrative leave 
without pay, done in a manner that constituted a violation of the County Personnel 
System, as well as FLSA Sheriff Killeen knew Payroll personnel created the error, 
not Ms. Gibson; and knew (or is charged with such knowledge) no one, could 
transfer any of the record-keeping requirements of an FLSA employer to any 
employee. Despite that fact, the Sheriff blamed this employee for what happened 
and tried to transfer the consequential effects of those FLSA record-keeping 
responsibilities to Ms. Gibson, and used that figment of transfer as his basis to 
accuse Ms. Gibson of wrongdoing, and claimed she had committed a wrongful act 
to justify termination, such as grand theft, and disgrace to the office, and used that 
flawed logic to constitute cause to fire her under Ada County Code,§ 1-7G-3A (5) 
and § 1 "7G-3A (20), and § 9 04 of the Ada County Sheriff's Office Policy Manual. 
(See attached definitions of those sections). When these prcactive events occurred 
and his course of action taken against Ms. Gibson, it resulted in an exploitation of 
her protected employment and property rights, and did cause a discriminatory 
retaliation against Ms. Gibson, another violation of 29 U.S.C. § 215 (a)(3). 
Of interest, the only criterion used against Ms. Gibson by the Sheriff was her 
endorsement of the County pay voucher, which has since been discontinued by the 
County, because that form was intended as a form of waiver, and precluded from 
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use by the Fair Labor Standards Act. Deputy Gibson, like all County employees 
back then, was required to sign the County pay voucher. When Ms. Gibson signed 
the pay voucher(s), she thought she was authorizing the County to pay her base 
salary of $1,550.00. i"hat specific amount is disclosed and shown directly within 
the script on the pay ·voucher. You need to review these vouchers, and place 
yourself in the position of an employee who has no choice but to sign the document 
if you expect to receive your wage. It was her belief she was authorizing Payroll to 
pay whatever was their accounting of her accumulating overtime as well. Ms. 
Gibson understood the voucher had been inaccurate from the beginning of her very 
first pay period of her employment and she expressed concern about her first wage 
payment, but she was told she needed to sign anyway; they could determine the 
wage or salary to be paid in any pay period. She was soon made to understand it 
was her signature they wanted, regardless of the voucher content, as it would be 
needed to authorize Payroll to pay the wages due her. 
Ada County Payroll Department disbursed the only wages to any and all 
County employees. The Sheriff's Office does not pay any Count)' employees. The 
Ada County payroll Department had programmed their payroll system (computer 
system) to determine what wage disbursement was to be made to any given 
County employee through the County's Direct Deposit Program. Approximately 
one (1) week prior to any monthly wage disbursement, the Payroll Department 
printed out a pay voucher and delivered them to any given County Department, 
including the Sheriff's Office. Whether the amounts indicated on a pay voucher 
were correct or incorrect, before any employee, such as Ms, Gibson, could receive 
any disbursement of any wages, the employee had to sign the voucher, as a verbal 
notification was given by their supe1visor (and Payroll Department personnel), that if 
they wanted to get paid, they shall sign a pay voucher, regardless whether the pay 
voucher was incorrect, or the subsequent disbursement of wages was correct. If 
the pay voucher (correct or incorrect) was not signed by the County employee, 
County Payroll Department would not disburse any wage payment to that employee 
in any amount. 
The Sheriffs Office was not set up in the system to handle payroll, and could 
not disburse any wage or sala1y to any employee. Therefore, the Ada County 
Payroll Department had the exclusive, statutory duty to maintain Fair Labor 
Standards Act (FLSA) compliance and keep records and pay out all wages justly 
due to the County employees, which included each of the employees with the 
Sheriffs Office. 
Both Kelli Bolicek, Budget Director for the Ada County Sheriffs Office, and 
Marshia Eiguren, Ada County Payroll Department Technician, have confirmed in 
their sworn statements the Payroll Department did in fact create and perpetuate the 
administrative payroll error (because of the record"keeping system), and that event 
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they also confirmed was the sole cause for Stacy Gibson's overpayment and 
mistaken receipt of money. Federal law would classify that event to be the result of 
an FLSA violation. Their acknowledgement described how their Payroll Technician 
incorrectly programmed the County payroll system (computer) to disburse an 
incorrect amount of wage to Ms. Gibson's bank account because of the inaccurate 
wage information entered by the Technician into the computer, essentially 
commanding the computer payroll system to automatically and monthly, disburse 
an incorrect wage calculated on Ms., Gibson's old position, and also a wage 
calculated on her employment position at the Jail Facility. Once the County 
determined the error, Payroll Department personnel manually went into the County 
computer payroll system and deleted the incorrect wage information and halted the 
incorrect disbursements. These County personnel addressed the specific steps 
and precautions then taken to prevent any future administrative errors (and FLSA 
violations) of this natu1e. 
It has not yet been accurately disclosed how long Ada County has been out-
of-comp/iance with the Fair Labor Standards Act, but according to public records, 
the County has officially recognized its ongoing state of FLSA non-compliance, and 
for that reason, actior was taken, effective circa January 10, 2002, to bring it into a 
level of compliance, and the County did make major changes in the method and 
means by which the County Departments maintained employee wage records, and 
how record-keeping and disbursements are to be accomplished, including the long 
overdue removal of the mandatory signature on the "pay voucher" or "claim form". 
You need to be fully aware of the fact that effective circa January 10, 2002, County 
employees are no longer required to sign any "pay voucher'' or "claim form", as that 
element of wage is an accounting function and not something for an employee to 
be concerned with or address, as it is not the duty of the employee to account for 
the wage, and the signature was only being used to activate the system anyway, 
not validate the content of the form It was initially designed to limit an employee's 
right to claim underpayments, and that is a violation of FLSA, as an employee 
cannot waive his right to his expectations of being paid a wage and overtime pay 
due to him. The form has never complied with the provisions of FLSA. 
The Sheriff was misguided in his efforts to blame Ms. Gibson for the 
County's use of an illegal and unlawful form, a form also that was never seen by 
paymll as an accurate accounting tool, but used only to access the pay system, and 
originally designed to create a waiver of an employee's right to claim past overtime 
pay, and designed to limit a right of grievance. 
Shortly after this mistreatment began on July 20, 1999, I was contacted by 
Mr. Gibson, and requested to be Ms. Gibson's legal representative concerning 
these fictitious allegations, and any false charges that might cause to be filed 
against her, as was being threatened. 
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On Wednesday, July 28, 1999, I received a phone call from Mr. R. Monte 
Macconnell, acting for the Sheriff as the Sheriff's Legal Advisor. Mr. Macconnell 
stated to me the Sheriff simply wanted Deputy Gibson terminated, that was now 
the bottom line, and lf Ms. Gibson would not resign from the Sheriff's Office, 
she would be processed with felony charges for grand theft and then she would 
still be terminated. 
Of concern to. us at the time, according to Idaho law, in Quiring v. 
Quiring, 130 Idaho 560, 944 P 2d 695 (1997), the Idaho Supreme Court 
expressly stated that: 
"Obtaining the transfer of property by a threat of arrest or 
exposure to hatred, contempt or ridicule is theft by extortion and 
violates I.C. § 18-2403"; 
"A person obtains property by extortion when he compels or 
induces another person to deliver such property to himself or lo a 
third pe,rson by means of instilling in him a fear that, if the property 
is not so delivered, the actor or another will: ... (4) Accuse some 
person of a crime or cause criminal charges to be instituted 
against him; or (5) Expose a secret or publicize an asserted fact, 
whether true or false, tending to subject some person to hatred, 
contempt or ridicule. 
I.C. § 18-2403 (2)(e). 
Additionally, the Supreme Court has stated: 
"It makes no difference whether the threat of arrest was a lawful or 
unlawful arrest. Wilbur v. Blanchard, 22 Idaho 517, 519, 126 P 
1069, 1071 (1912).". 
Mr. Macconnell conveyed his threat as perceived, so!ely for the purpose of 
appropriating Ms. Gibson's property right of tenured employment, as that was the 
substance of his communication when he called my office on July 28, 1999. I was 
required to be very 
1
specific as to what Mr. MacConnell's statement and proposal 
was, and later was told by Ms. Gibson to incorporate the substance of what 
happened into an Affidavit, to preserve the account of that communication. I 
believed it was my duty to convey the message to Ms. Gibson just as it was 
specifically presented to me, with the details of that conversation and the 
consequences if she refused to resign, and the agony and consequences to be 
avoided if she cooperated with the Sheriff's demands. Attached as Exhibit 4 is a 
copy of my Affidavit for your convenient reference. 
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My communication to her was a very frightening ordeal, and it clearly 
traumatized her with the fear of the consequences if she declined to surrender her 
properly right and instea.d attempt to keep her right of employment. 
Shortly after that communication, and his threat being conveyed to Ms. 
Gibson, the proposal was unconditionally rejected, and Ms. Gibson became 
informed thereafter that on August 9, 1999, Greg H. Bower, the Ada County 
Prosecutor, at Mr. MacConnell's request, did send a letter to Mr. John 
Christensen, Chief Criminal Prosecutor in Canyon County, Idaho, giving him 
authorization "to file charges in this case ... ", and therein stating "I will have you 
appointed as special prosecutor". As an attachment to my Affidavit (Exhibit 4), 
is the August 20, 1999 letter from Mr. Christensen to Greg Bower, confirming 
criminal charges against Ms. Gibson were not justified, and in fact stated it 
would be "inappropriate". That statement was made because Mr. Christensen 
had seen the investigative report, and he was politely explaining and 
acknowledging to Mr. Bower, that in effect Ms. Gibson had done nothing wrong. 
Ada County wouldn't give up, and continued instead to "construct" the 
employment termina\ion and elect to deliberately destroy an exemplary 
employee. Sheriff Killeen pursued Ms. Gibson as if he were on a safari, 
inexorably pursuing the career she so much desired to have, and denying her 
the inalienable rights bestowed upon her under the United States Constitution 
and as preserved and protected by the County merit system. 
This communication from Greg Bower was without legal cause or 
statutory basis, and was issued contrary to statute. Mr. Bower, at Mr, 
MacConnell's request, was seeking the prosecution of Ms. Gibson without any 
factual basis. Furth'ermore, prosecutorial appointment was not authorized by 
ldahg, Code §31-2603 (a). His letter suggesting "authorization", was 
undertaken solely for the benefit of the Sheriff, designed to carry forward the 
ramifications of the threat communicated by Mr. Macconnell, as it was his 
intent to instill a fear of criminal charges to frighten Ms. Gibson into resigning, 
which was perceived by her to be more of their arbitrary and discriminatory 
behavior, pursued solely for their vengeful and reactionary purpose. Criminal 
allegations in the end would be unsuccessful, but nonetheless was viewed by 
Ms. Gibson as a frightening experience, and such action would serve to impugn 
her character, and create need to incur substantial expense to actively defend 
against any malicio1;1s and unfounded charges. 
You need to appreciate how this conspiracy and pursuit was now re-
traumatizing Ms. Gibson, as the events would be revealed to her as I became 
familiar with the ongoir:g saga, and she would be frightened over and over, as I 
would communicate the events of wrongfulness to her, 
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As the heat of the pursuit was building, on October 5, 1999, Mr. 
Macconnell contacted my office, spoke to me and told me the Sheriff was now 
"ordering" Ms. Gibson to report to the County Jail Facility, at 1 :OD p.m., to be 
diagnosed by County Physician Dr. Charles Steuart. Ms. Gibson was actually 
at her appointment with Dr. Spencer when this command was received and 
communicated by me to her. At 1 :OD p.m., Ms. Gibson did, while accompanied 
by her husband, go to the Jail Facility as "ordered", and met Dr. Steuart. She 
was paraded past other employees in the Jail before Dr. Steuart examined her, 
at which time Mr. Gibson told Dr. Steuart to call Dr. Spencer to confirm what 
then had already been diagnosed and what her likely prognosis was. Dr. 
Steuart said he would not do that, and instead underwent his own diagnosis, 
and generated notes addressing his assessment of Ms. Gibson, but later 
destroyed those notes and refused to produce any documentary confirmation of 
any diagnosis or prognosis. He realized she was then so traumatized that he 
told the Sheriff to stop insisting on a confrontational setting for at least thirty 
(30) days. 
When Dr. Steuart's examination was complete, Ms. Gibson approached 
Lieutenant Dale Woodcook, who was then standing in the hallway, and 
requested she be aflowed to remove some personal property from her 'inbox' 
located in the mailroom. It was discovered at that time by Ms. Gibson that her 
'inbox' had been removed, and all indic1a of her employment had also been 
removed. Bear in mind, at that time, there had been no official termination, but 
she was again traumatized by the physical appearance she was no longer 
allowed or wanted there, another threat or extortion affecting her property right 
of employment. 
The County continued their arrogant style of extortion as though they 
were above the law. by refusing to deliver a copy of the notes (patient medical 
records) Dr. Steuart generated during his medical examination of Ms. Gibson. 
Mr. Gibson made ,request to Dr. Steuart, but was also denied access; Dr, 
Spencer's nurse, Kristin Carle, made another lawful request, but received a 
similar response. My office, as well as Dr. Spencer requested the medical 
records and received nothing. Mr Macconnell identified his participation in this 
process of withholding Ms. Gibson's medical records by his November 3, 1999 
letter to my office. Ada County continued to violate Ms. Gibson's rights, rights 
that were envisioned by IDAPA 22.01 .01, and on November 15, 1999, with the 
assistance of her husband, Ms. Gibson filed a complaint against Dr. Steuart with 
the Idaho State Mepical Board. The Soard of Medicine received a response from 
both Dr. Steuart and Mr. Macconnell, confirming their denial and destruction of 
medical records. See Exhibit 5. 
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Once Ada County had determined they created and perpetuated the record-
keeping violation over N~s. Gibson's wages, any attempt to investigate, interrogate, 
prosecute, and terminate Ms. Gibson, became a distinct and separate retaliatory 
violation of FLSA. Had the County officials been honorable, they would have 
simply admitted responsibility for the error and overpayment disbursements, allow 
her to continue with her exemplary employment, and then request Ms. Gibson to 
repay the funds to the County, as provided for by Ada County Code. Instead, the 
Sheriff elaborately constructed efforts to criminally charge her, threaten her and 
terminate her, and now fighting this liability. 
Further abuse bf Ms. Gibson's rights under Federal law (FLSA) occurred 
during the. proceedings before the Ada County Personnel Hearing Officer, G. Lance 
Salladay. On January 13, 2000, Mr. Salladay determined in his 'Second Pre-
hearing Order" (page 3, lines 2-4) that "The Hearing Officer does not believe that 
this request falls within the scope of the Hearing Officer's jurisdiction and no 
production is required." With that ruling, the County Hearing Officer allowed Ada 
County to escape their sole FLSA obligation and responsibility for providing the 
Hearing Officer with accurate Payroll Department records concerning the actual 
regular time, 'comp' time and overtime actually accrued by Ms. Gibson. This action 
of the Hearing Officer further violated Ms. Gibson's prior assertion to her 
employment rights pwsuant to FLSA, by limiting her protection under the Act, a 
violation under Federal law. 
On February 15, 2000, the Hearing Officer again ignored Ms. Gibson's rights 
under Federal law (FLSA) when he stated in his "Findings of Fact, Conclusions of 
Law and Decision" (page 12, paragraph 31), "While the error in question was not 
the result of any action on the part of Appellant, the continuation of the error, for a 
period of some eight months, was clearly the result of inaction on the part of the 
Appellant when the Appellant could and should have taken action. In effect, the 
error and thus the conduct for which the Appellant has been disciplined is not one 
of commission, but is rather one of omission, (ie) falling to act in a reasonable 
manner when one has not only the opportunity and ability to act, but also a duty or 
responsibility to act, <in this case, to review and approve the status of one's payroll 
check or call to the attention of others the fact that an error has been made." With 
those comments, the Hearing Officer, effectively transferred or delegated the FLSA 
record-keeping responsibility to Ms. Gibson, all of which was contrary to Federal 
law. 
Mr. Gibson hired Larry Stewart, a Licensed Public Accountant, to review all 
wages, and pay records available to Ms. Gibson, in her effort to confirm the 
numerous discrepahcies as found to exist in wages and compensation due her, 
including what was reported on her W-2 Form, compared to pay vouchers, records 
and pay documents, See Exhibit 6. 
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Numerous Federal courts have ruled on the issue of employment rights 
under the Fair Labor Standard Act and have consistently held the Act cannot be 
thwarted, abridged or )Naived; that the' Act cannot be construed in any narrowing 
manner; that the employer is responsible for "knowledge" and "management" of the 
Act; that the Act compels the employer (solely) to make, keep and preserve 
accurate employee wage records; that under no circumstance or condition, and at 
no time, or for any reason, may the employer transfer or attempt to transfer any 
responsibility under the Act to the employee; that any failure of the employer to 
comply with any provision of the Act will be at the employer's own peril, and it does 
make the employer subject to ramifications and sanctions. 
It is a question. of law under the facts of this case (not just some decision of 
a Hearing Officer or sbmeone in the Ada County Leflel Department) that the courts 
have previously and consistently determined any attempt to impose a restrictive 
interpretation of the Act is contrary to Congressional intent. See Lamon v. City of 
Shawnee, Kan., 754 F.Supp. 1518 (D.Kan 1991). All employment subject to the 
Fair Labor Standards Act must be construed to include all rights and all terms of the 
Act. See Manseau v United States, 52 F Supp 395(DC Mich., 1943); Walling v 
McKay, 70 F Supp 160 (DC Neb., 1946), affd (CAS Neb) 164 F2d 40; Orminski v 
Hyland Electrical Supply Co., 326 Ill App 392, 62 NE2d 14 (1945), No party can 
attempt to limit the scope of the Fair Labor Standards Act. See Kappler v Republic 
Pictures Corp., 59 F Supp 112 (DC Iowa, 1945), affd (CA8 Iowa) 151 F2d 543, 162 
ALR 228, affd 327 U$ 757, 90 L Ed 991, 66 S Ct 523, reh den 327 US 817, 90 L Ed 
1040, 66 S Ct 804. The Federal courts have remained firm on the content of the 
entire enactment to protect the employee against abuse of process that could affect 
ariy of the rights and duration of employmerit. 
An employee is protected even when he communicates to the employer of 
the failure to perform their mandatory duty (e.g. accurate record-keeping) under the 
Act. Because the employee is protected at all times, under§ 215 (a)(3) of the Act, 
the employer will be considered in violation of the Act if any adverse action is taken 
against the employee, such as termination over wage overpayments caused from 
inadequate record-keeping procedures, as that would result in the potential of 
discriminatory misconduct. In short, an employee who "complains" to their 
employer about the employer's violations of FLSA, such as administrative errors 
due to improper, incorrect or inaccurate wage and salary record-keeping, is 
protected from discriminatory treatment, retaliatory treatment, punishment or 
termination under§ 215 (a)(3) of the Fair Labor Standards Act. That is the situation 
we have here. as Ms. Gibson had complained about the errors each pay period, 
during her early tenure with Ada County, and ultimately decided to live with their 
errors, only to thereafter become subject to discipline from their administrative 
errors, as they fir1d her ovei a subsequent series of events where the County 
caused excessive v,age deposits to her account, and said it was then somehow her 
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fault for not being aware of it or reacting to it, apparently despite the fact Ada 
County controls all aspects of payroll, records, deposits and debits to any direct 
deposit account with any employee, and they generated the pay voucher and put 
their own figures on it, including her described base salary of $1,550.00 (should 
have been (1,575.00)., 
In Hageman v. Park West Gardens, 480 N.W.2d 223 (N.D. 1992, citing the 
Federal District Court decision in Brennan v. Maxey's Yamaha, Inc., 513 F.2d 179, 
180 (81h Cir. 1975), the North Dakota Supreme Court made \he following relevant 
discussion: 
"The Fair Labor Standards Act "prohibits discrimination against an 
employee who asserts or threatens to assert his or her FLSA rights." 
"Where the immediate cause or motivating factor of a discharge is the 
employee's assertion of statutory rights, the discharge is 
discriminatory under [29 U.S.C.) § 216 (a)(3) whether or not other 
grounds for discharge exist. Goldberg v, Barna Manufacturing Corp., 
302 F.2d 162 (5th Cir, 1962); Mitchell v, Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co , 
278 F.2d 562 (81h Cir. 1960)." 
The North Dakota Supreme Court stated "Thus, where an employee is fired and the 
termination is motivated in any part by the employee's assertion of rights under the 
Act, such termination is deemed discriminatory." See also Martin v. Gingerbread 
House, Inc., 977 F.2d 1405, 1408 N. 4 (10th Cir. 1992) and Love v. RE/MAX of 
America, Inc., 738 F.2d 383, 387 (101h Cir. 1984). 
The Fair Labor Standards Act is deliberate and specific, and requires the 
employer to keep accurate records showing whether the employer (Ada County) is 
being compliant with FLSA, and this record-keeping activity is an appropriate 
means to a legitimate end, especially since these records are considered to be 
quasi-public in character. In one of the earliest case assessments involving FLSA 
record-keeping, Walling v, De Soto Creamery & Produce Co,, 51 F. Supp. 938 (DC 
Minn. 1943), the court made the following conclusion of law: 
"By failing to keep true records of the hours worked each work day 
and e,ach workweek by each of its employees, and by making or 
causing to be made arbitrary, fictitious and false entries, purporting to 
reflect the hours worked each day and each workweek by each of its 
employees, the regular rate of pay, the regular straight time earnings, 
and the additional ove1iime earnings of many of its employees as 
above stated, the defendant has violated the provisions of Sections 
11 (c) anq 15 (a)(S) of the Act." 
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When Ms. Gibson denied the contentions and allegations of any misconduct, 
as was alleged by agents of Sheriff Killeen, on July 20, 1999 (during two 
interrogations), and thereafter on two more separate occasions, August 6, 1999 
and September 27, 1999, Ms. Gibson again expressed her concerns, and in doing 
so, asserted her rights over these administrative errors, and the resulting actions 
taken against her from complaints about the record-keeping errors came in the form 
of wrongful threats to ,her employment. In accordance with the 91h Circuit Court's 
decision in Lambert v, Ackerley, supra and E.E.O.C. v. Romeo Community 
Schools, supra, Ms. Gibson formally and repeatedly asserted her employment 
rights under all provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act, including the fact Ada 
County personnel had created and perpetuated the administrative error (incorrect 
and/or inaccurate FLSA record-keeping), which was the only basis for the threat of 
prosecution and threat of discipline, and basis for retaliatory conduct and Stacy's 
resulting termination .. Ms. Gibson had no participation or involvement in any of the 
County's mandatory FLSA record-keeping process, she knew nothing of the error, 
and she was not a participant in the disbursement, receipt or acceptance of any 
overpayment of wages that resulted in the mistaken direct deposit of money into the 
joint checking account with her husband. The County had the exclusive right to 
debit the account at any time it was in error, as agreed by the terms of the voluntary 
direct deposit pay program. 
There was no basis for any "criminal investigation" as Ms, Gibson had no 
say in Ada County violating their mandatory record-keeping duty and obligation 
under the terms and provisions of FLSA (late October 1998 through July 1999). 
The County ascertained their administrative error on July 19, 1999, and thereafter 
proceeded to interrogate Ms. Gibson, at which time, and several times thereafter 
(while still an Ada Cbunty employee), she expressed her attitude over their errors, 
and abuse of her rights. and voiced her concerns, and did assert her employment 
rights and the statutory protection provided to her by the terms and conditions of 
FLSA. Any action taken by the County, beginning July 20, 1999, and all times 
thereafter, must be viewed as retaliatory FLSA violations, as addressed by Lambert 
v. Ackerley, 180 F.3d 997 at 1007-1008 (9th Cir. 1998), E.E.O.C. v. Romeo 
Community Schools, 976 F.2d 985 at 989 (6th Cir. 1992), Hageman v. Park West 
Gardens, Brennan, v. Maxey's Yamaha, Inc., supra, and Walling v. De Soto 
Creamery & Produce Co., supra. 
Of interest, the concept of a County created error has been addressed in the 
case of Jones v. Ada County, Fourth District Court, Ada County, Case No. CV OC 
9800935D (1999). In that case, District Judge Deborah A. Bail ruled on August 4, 
1999, that it was "shear caprice" and "bad faith" to accuse an individual of 
misconduct when ah administrative (clerical) error was created by the County's own 
personnel. 
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The Ada County Sheriff and his agents had no lawful right to threaten Ms. 
Gibson as was done and allowed to occur here, including their unacceptable 
behavior of calling her a liar, threatening her with felony charges and jail time and 
termination of her tenured and protected rights to employment. 
Our attention remains focused upon the belief the Sheriffs Office, and 
various County agents, have violated nine (9) different Idaho criminal statutes, as 
well as provisions of Federal law, in addition to the Fair Labor Standards Act 
(FLSA). In particular, Sheriff Killeen, R. Monte Macconnell, Detective Glenn, 
Detective Johnson and Greg Bower have inappropriately conducted themselves 
and displayed a poor choice of political behavior, and their abuse of their "badge 
power" was at the expense of Ms. Gibson and her protected rights of employment. 
Another behavioral misdeed occurred in December 1999, when Sheriff 
Killeen ordered Detective Scott Johnson to "follow" Ms. Gibson on two separate 
occasions without the existence of any lawful purpose. This "following" had no 
intended purpose but to again frighten her into resigning from her position as Ada 
County Jail Technician, as the statement was made she would be prosecuted if she 
did not resign, and ir addition, she would be terminated if she did not resign, and 
she would not be able to find another job (or to that effect) This act of intentionally 
following her, with no lawful purpose, just to carry out threats, is better known as 
"stalking", a criminal act and violation of§ 18-7905, Idaho Code. 
The effects of these cumulative traumatic and intensely personal events can 
cause, will cause, and did cause her PTSD condition, and that is precisely what has 
been diagnosed here. Like the administrative error created by the County Payroll 
Department, causing Ms. Gibson to have a "mistaken receipt of monies", you now 
have created a report without pursuing adequately the actual facts that created her 
PTSD, and instead' you give us a report with misstatements, and even false 
creation of the nonexistent reference to Christmas Tree nightmares, including 
erroneous information about the actions of County "officials" against Ms. Gibson. 
Your "selective use of data" in pursuing a desired result is causing furtherance of 
trauma, re-experienced by your efforts. The report is an inaccurate and a non-
scientific way of having others accept your concepts. The State Insurance Fund, 
or Mr. Bauman and Ada County were able to provide you with the documentary 
evidence of the true facts behind her trauma, and reveal the elements and abuses 
created by Ada County against Ms. Gibson. Apparently, you will need to rely on 
our disclosure of facts, and we will supply any documents you may now seek to 
review. 
If you had requested the information you need to base your report, we would 
have supplied you with the documents, and avoid need for you to visit the facts 
later, to prepare a supplemental report and response We provide you the factual 
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information as discussed above to assist you in correcting these errors, and allow 
the report to show the true involvement of the County and their wrongful treatment 
of Ms. Gibson. If you want the documents, please so advise, and we will provide 
what you need. We have prepared an inventory of other 1nteresting aspects in your 
report of August 27, 2003 and address that in the addendum attached hereto. 
As stated above, as previously ruled, when Ada County personnel make an 
administrative error, it is "shear caprice" and "bad faith" for the County to take 
proactive steps to accuse an individual of misconduct. Several comments in your 
report possibly condone such conduct of these Ada County agents in this matter. 
Ms. Gibson sustained injuries because the County was violating Federal law 
(FLSA) to which there. is no defense. Had the County been in compliance with the 
Fair Labor Standards Act, and had acted properly in accordance with their implied 
duties of good faith and fair dealing during their employment of Ms. Gibson, none of 
these capricious events would have occurred. 
This past June 6, 2003, Judge Ronald J. Wilper, in Case No. CV OC 
01073940, ruled Ms. Gibson has a cause of action against Ada County for their 
FLSA violations, including the FLSA record-keeping and retaliatory issues. Of 
interest, however, oh July 11, 2003, Ms. Gibson requested you read a court 
document (called a counterclaim) developed to file with the court in that case, as 
the document chronplogically provided the historical series of events concerning 
the Payroll Department administrative error, the unlawful violations of FLSA, and 
the action taken against Ms. Gibson by Sheriff Killeen, his Legal Advisor, R. Monte 
Macconnell, and other County agents, going back to July 20, 1999. You told Ms. 
Gibson you would not read the document because you did not want to "bias" the 
outcome of your "forensic evaluation". Of significant interest, this is the ~ you 
cited in your report on page #3, and having conducted an extensive review of 
documents, which you called the "Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial in the 
matter of Ms. Gibson's wrongful termination suit against Ada County Sheriff's 
Office." I appreciate you acknowledge Ms. Gibson was wrongfully terminated, but 
there was no Complaint created in that case (CV OC 0001849D) that involved Ms. 
Gibson's wrongful employment termination. The document, to which you referred, 
was the County's suit for reimbursement of this "mistaken receipt of monies" and 
that document was prepared by the Ada County Attorney, Ms. Kelli Ketlinski 
(Brauner). Of interest, this is the same case you have also incorrectly identified as 
the Worker's Compensation case on your inventory of "forensic psychology 
experience" contained in your curriculum vitae my office received as an enclosure 
with the February 2b, 2003 letter from Mr. Bauman. 
It was never our desire to consider the course of action taken in other recent 
governmental dispNtes, such as the latest focus that has resulted in claims under 
the RICO and Hobbs Act and the co11sequential allegations of corruption violations. 
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County organizations have now been held subject to enforcement of those 
violations including 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-68 and§ 18-1951 et seq. The Racketeer 
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) was originally designed to target 
organized crime families, but in recent years has become a tool used by civil 
lawyers to fight corruption in both corporations and government regimes, being the 
enterprise in which the individual officials are pursuing unlawful conduct and 
systemic corruption that, among other matters, might impact property rights, job 
security, promotion, classified employment, equal protection, and due process 
guaranteed under the Constitution, pursued in the name of arbitrary policy and 
under color of law. See for example: Pelfresne v, Village of Rosemont, 22 F. 
Supp. 2d 756 (NO. 111. 1998), and 35 F, Supp. 2d 1064 (N.D. Ill. 1999). See also 
Citizen-Times.Com, concerning the RICO lawsuit initiated by Pete Bradley, filed 
against North Carolina Division of Motor Vehicles, concerning a culture of 
corruption within that state agency that has required gifts, donations and services to 
receive or preserve employment rights, benefits and merit promotions. The Hobbs 
Act,§ 18 U.S.C, 1951 el seq., has found its way into government conduct, and has 
been used in connection with cases involving a perceived appearance of public 
corruption involving corrupt practices, like threatening to fire an employee if she 
won't resign. These corruption-oriented laws are being applied to indiscretions and 
violations surrounding due process issues. It now appears a violation of the Hobbs 
Act may be considered part of a "pattern of racketeering activity" for purposes of 
prosecution under the Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) 
Act. See for example United States v. Culbert, 435 U.S. 371, 98 S,Ct. 1112 (1978). 
In the recent 9th Circuit Decision, U.S. v, Freeman, 6 F.3d 586 (1993), the 9th Circuit 
Court concluded: 
"a governmental entity may constitute an "enterprise" within the 
meaning of RICO"; and 
"the Hobbs Act reaches anyone who actually exercises official 
powers, regardless of whether those powers were conferred by 
election, appointment, or some other method," 
Throughout your report, we have identified statements employing the use of 
"non-behavioral thought phrases". You have utilized those phrases to generate 
perceptions concerning Ms. Gibson's participation in this ongoing saga, like a 
director who may choose to lead the viewing audience in the direction of a chosen 
end result. ' 
It appears the approach you took was to work with limited facts, create some 
non-existent situation, undermine the significant cause of her PTSD condition, 
focus your prognosis in a different direction, and impugn Ms. Gibson's character in 
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an effort to complicate her right to obtain justly due Worker's Compensation 
benefits. 
This dream fantasy you attribute to Ms. Gibson is undoubtedly from 
someone else. You state or relate to her: "In one particularly poignant and 
disturbing dream, she sees a Christmas tree and "all of the sudden the Christmas 
tree turns into a monster"'. Your conclusion "Her description of a Christmas tree 
that turns into a monster is evidence that some of her nightmares may well be 
associated with earlier abuse, rather than her interrogations in the Sheriff's Office." 
Is this part of your end result objective? We need to hear more about this fantasy, 
as it wasn't Ms. Gibson's dream at all. Ms. Gibson states she never in her life 
experienced a nightmare dream as you have described in your report, nor did she 
tell you of any such occurrence during her appointments with you. We must 
wonder if this "nightmare" in your report was an accident, a case mix up, or 
something done to d~flect culpability from County officials for their misconduct that 
caused her PTSD injury. 
The emotional battering Ms. Gibson has endured has now included an 
assault on her ego, her code of ethics, her self-identity, self-respect and challenges 
to her character, and to her honor and regard for honesty and truth. That has now 
caused Ms. Gibson to experience fear, pain and helplessness, and had the County 
"constructed" a malicious prosecution against her, as they at first attempted, and 
had they succeeded, as they did with her malicious termination, she would have to 
deal also with overcoming a "rap" sheet that is created with NCIC whenever one is 
arrested, regardless of their innocence and a jury verdict of not guilty. This would 
have caused more stress and possibly more components for her PTSD condition. 
I realize your evaluation of Ms. Gibson occurred after her major symptoms 
were winding down, not at the beginning of her trauma when the predominate 
symptoms were visible and easily recognized. But still, you must provide us an 
accurate and truthful assessment of the known facts, not just an overview of a 
generalized concept of a dispute. 
Nowhere in your report do you address the "daily diary" Mr. Gibson kept 
concerning his observations of the trauma and suffering his wife experienced from 
the County's misconduct. Those diaries confer sequential events of relevant timing, 
and should be of some relevant interest to you. 
In our opinio'1, as your ''forensic psychological" evaluation now stands, it was 
done in an attempt to have Ms. Gibson accept culpability for a situation she never 
created nor was ever aware of, a situation in which the fault truly and only belongs 
to the County. This psychological maneuver has resulted in the re-victimization of 
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Ms. Gibson, and we question the motive of such a . tactic, where the true 
consequence is the County has foolishly allowed an exemplary employee to be 
destroyed. 
Our understanding of the American Psychological Association's (APA) 
requirements of a "forensic psychologist" is "specialized knowledge of the area 
under legal scrutiny, and also of the iudicial system, relevant statutory and case 
law, and rules, procedure, and evidence." (Emphasis added). 
"Forensically", it does suggest your report is not in accordance with the 
APA's guidelines. Once you address the importance of the concerns raised by this 
letter and the attached addendum, we trust you will reconsider your conclusion and 
redefine your objectives, and make a genuine assessment of the actual events and 
facts in this case, using the material necessary to make a true "forensic" analysis of 
the facts and events that affected Ms. Gibson by the actions of Ada County in this 
matter. 
Because you did not consipe,r-m.,-racts--&Ad_J.he behavior taken by the 
County officials against Ms. Gi~, n, we ask you to prep~9n amended report, 
based on the facts, so you ca be satisfied as to your efforts nd leave us the 
belief you were hired not just to deflect the true fa way from A . County and 
avoid their responsibil'ties to her fo the injuries c sed. I await your re ponse, and 
until then, I remain, 
VKS/jmg 
Enclosures 




• C ~e.t\ts: 
EXHIBIT 
I __ _,__ _ 
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\0 'd s.:v:or 66, or u~c 

To: Kelll Bolicek 
Dete: July 19, 1999 
From: Payroll 
RE: OT Hours 
Kelli, 
$heel1 
Here is a copy cf \he OT sheets for the ernploy,;,es that were shorted pay from October 
i996 through June 1999, The difference column is the amount that will be Included In 
t~eir July pay. If you have any questions please give me a call. Because we will be 
calling for vouchers on July 22M, I will nee<:J the Personnel Actlon forms for these 
employees, turned in ASAP. Please let Doris know so we can get this cleared up 
tMis pay period, · 
Thanks for your help, 
Merr!ly Wilfong (xt 2203) 
Pa(l'J 1 







WRIGHT, JUSTIN R. 
df;J:J5 . 
. I !:MP #54476 
DATE l j 01' EARNED\ 
November•98 15.0()..10.00 


















I PAIP l ! SIB PAID l IP1FFER!:.HCE. I 
$140. 76 $203.40 $62,84 
$5{5,30 ,/ $81.36 $25.06 
$161.85 / $233.91 $72.06 
TOTALCW!oO ~ r6q.71c, 
---·----~-----
EMP #54244 
! PAltl l ! SJB ?AlO I itllFFER!:t,lCE I 
$151.71 °&'()~303.60 $151.89 
'; :,,0 
-;l.! 1 0 $527.70:;,, $ ,05€ 0 $528.30 
$474,93 1.}'i;l,'\~50.40 $475.47 
n'½i 
$686.01~'1' $1,372.80 $686.79 
t;;'~ 
$156.31 \\;Q, ¥$316,80 $158.49 --) ~93.&l, Jo31 .&J. 
~ TorAL OW!iD ~~ 
'° 3;?. q lo ------
/ f, too 
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KOOPMAN, EDWARD 6. EMP #54473 
DATJ: / OT EARNED) l PAID I I :s1a PAJD I \DIFFER.ENCE. I 
Novernber-98 11.50-7.$7 $110.30 $159.28 $48.98 
December-98 16.00,10.67 $153.41 $221.60 $68.19 
January-99 3.00-2.00 $28.76 $41.55 $12.79 
March,99 1.50-1.00 $14.43 $20.78 $6.35 
A;lril,99 3.00,2.00 $28.76 $41.55 $12.79 
May,99 3.00•2.00 $28.76 $41.55 $12.79 
T01'ALOWEO ~jfnl \l.:\ ::3'\ 
WEBB, DENISE A. eMP #01417 
DATE jOTEARNEDl I PAID I I SIB PAID l \DlFFEREHCI:! I 
Febmary-99 9.00-6.00 $118.29 $189.27 $70JlS 
Marc/1,99 9.00-6.00 $\ 18.29 $189.27 $70.98 
Aoril-99 7.60-5,00 $98.63 $157.73 $59.10 




SEARCY, ANTONIO E.MP #52286 
DAie \OT EARNao\ ?AlD I S/i:IPAlD I [OIFFERENC!.'. I 
March-9$ 4.S0-3,00 $58,78 $93.96 $35.18 
Aprii-99 10.50-7.00 $137,08 $219.24 $82,16 
,OTA). OWED ~ 117.3~ 
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NANCE, MIKE Ft EMP #54474 
DATI! ) I OT !!ARNru51 I PAlP I SIB PA!D I IOIFFERENCE I 
Oclober-98 4.50-3.00 S62.33 $62.33 $0.00 
November-98 19.50-13;00 $187.01 $270.08 $83,07 
December-98 42.00-28,00 $402.69 $581.70 $H9.01 
JMuary-99 65.25-43.50 $668.91 $903.71 $234.80 
F ebruary-99 34.50-23.00 $330.83 $477,83 $147,00 
March-99 14.25-9.50 $138,69 $197 .36 $60.67 
Aj)ril-99 28.50·19,00 $273.30 $394.73 $121.43 
Ju[le-99 3.00-2,00 $31.14 $45.00 $13.86 
1"07At. OWED ~\iifilii '339.8~ 
RASMUSSEN, $HELLIE EM? #53606 
DATS l I OT EA!sNE'!l l PAlD I SJS PAlO ! \OIFFERENCt: I 
November-98 12.00-8.00 $124.60 $180.00 $55.40 
January-99 4,50-3,00 $45.35· $B7.50 $22.15 
February-SB 17.13-11.42 $177.90 $2~6.95 $79,05 
March-99 4.50-3.00 $45.n $67.50 $20.73 
April-99 30.38-20.25 $315.45 $455,70 $140.25 
May-99 26.25-17.50 $272.53 $393.75 $121.22 
TOTAL OWED ~Mft Y3'3 ,'80 
Pago 1 
.. ,.. ........ ,..,__...,, v,...,' 
1 1 n 1ho i , ,n, 1 nn.J 
ausros, JAVJER EMP lf53781 
DATE IOT!!AANED/ I PAJD I I S/SFAiO ! /DIFFERENCE I 
November-98 12.00-8.00 $124.60 ~180.00 $55.40 
May-99 10.50-7.00 $109.07 $157.50 $48.43 
June-99 3.00-2.00 $31.14 $45.00 $13.86 
' 
TOTAL OWED ~™ii I \l-/, lJ1 
KlNZEL, MICHAEL. A EMP #54074 
DATE I OT EARNl::0 I PAJD [ S/B PAID/ !DIFFERENCE I 
October-98 5.25-31,50 $75. 71 $75.71 S0.00 
Nov,;mber.913 12.00-8.00 $119.78 $173.04 $53.26 
January-99 35.55-23.70 $383.44 $553.87 $170.43 
February-99 2.25-1.50 $24,24 $35.00 $10.82 
April-99 2.25--1.50 $24.24 · $35.06 $10.82 
June-SS 19.75-13. 17 $213.02 $307.71 $94.89 
TOTALOWEO -~ ,3~0 .0:2-
Page 1 
7t'l170CK': xe1 I \OJOEd/J011Pf1;:I 
's 
STATE OF iDAHO 
COUNTY OF Ada 
AFFIDAVIT OF SHARON M. ULLMAN 
:ss 
COMES NOW Sharon M. Ullman, former Ada County Commissioner, 
District I, and being first duly sworn upon oath, deposes and says as follows: 
1. That Affiant was duly elected to the Board of Commissioners (Board), 
District I seat, Ada County, Idaho in November 2000; that Affiant took office on 
January 8, 2001; that Affiant's last full day in office was January 12, 2003. 
2, That Affiant presents this Affidavit upon her own knowledge, direct 
conversations and personal participation with Ada County officials, and in 
coniunction with her official duties as an Ada County Commissioner, District I seat, 
Ada County, Idaho, 
3, That AffIant has personal knowledge of Idaho Code,§ 31-801 et seq., 
which defines the Powers and Duties of the Board of Ada County Commissioners; 
that Affiant was a member of that Board; that in accordance with that statute,§ 31-
816, Idaho Code, the Board is required, "To fix the compensation of all county 
officers and employees, and provide for the payment of the same": 
4. That Affiant has personal knowledge of Idaho Code,§ 31-809, which 
requires the Board "Jo examine and audit the accounts of all officers having the 
care, management, oollection or disbursement of moneys belonging to the county, 
or appropriated by law, or otherv,ise, for its use and benefit" 
5, Affiant has personal knowledge of Idaho Code,§ 31-810, wherein the 
Board is required toi pay claims against the County, and those claims do include 
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compensation for !lli! County employees for wages, salaries, overtime, 
compensatory time, flexible time, and all other disbursements relating to Ada 
County employment. 
6. That Affiant would state that to the best of Affiant's knowledge, and 
based upon controlling Federal and State law, Ada County is an employer pursuant 
to and controlled by the provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA). 
7, That Affiant was informed by Theodore Argyle, Chief Civil Deputy 
Prosecuting Attorney for Ada County, in early 2001 that Ada County was out of 
compliance with variqus provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act including such 
items as record-keeping requirements and overtime computation and 
disbursements. It was duly determined that Ada County officials were going to 
attempt to bring all County Departments into compliance with the Act. 
8. Affiant did attend a seminar, along with other Ada County employees, 
department heads and other elected officials; this seminar was presented by 
' 
Theodore Argyle and another Ada County Deputy Civil Attorney concerning the Fair 
Labor Standards Act; held at \Nestern Town on the grounds of the Western Idaho 
Fair, on the 181h day of May, 2001. It was deemed to be quite important at that time 
to educate the County officials (including Affiant) about the need to understand and 
perform Ad<! County's FLSA obfigations and responsibilities to Ada County 
employees, Ada County was required to discharge its duiy as an FLSA employer, 
or face legal consequences. During this seminar, Mr. Argyle emphasized to us 
repeatedly there is no defense for an FLSA violation, and for that reason he 
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stressed the need for all Ada County Departments to act in accordance with the 
Fair Labor Standards Act 
9. Affiant first became aware that Ada County, as an employer, was 
possibly committing FLSA violations when an Ada County employee brought the 
subject to my attention, approximately six or eight months prior to my taking office 
in January 2001. At the time the possible FLSA violations were first brought to 
Affiant's attention by the Ada County employee, Affiant informed the employee 
there was nothing I could do until I took office as an elected commissioner Shortly 
after taking office, I began to question our legal staff in tlie Civil Division about the 
concern and possibility of County FLSA violations. Affiant's questions, along with 
the subsequent events of filing an FLSA complaint by another employee, led to the 
internal examination of the County's payroll practices by the legal staff. 
10. Affiant cannot confirm the exact duration of time during which Ada 
County had been out of compliance with the Fair Labor Standards Act, but the 
County did officially recognize all Departments were in an ongoing state of FLSA 
' 
non-compliance, and, it was for that reason, effective no later than January 10, 
2002, the County made major changes in the method and means by which the 
Departments would process their employee wage records, record keeping and 
disbursements, and how that was to be accomplished. The changes included the 
long overdue removi/11 of the mandatory signature required on a "pay voucher", or 
"claim form", from a\1 of the County employees, That change made it no longer 
reqciired to sign "pay vouchers" or "claim forms" since the effective date of the 
changes, being no later than January 10, 2002 
AFFIDAVIT OF SHARON M. ULLMAN P 3 
Dated this 30~ day of January 2003. 
Notary Public for Ida 
Residing at Boise, Idaho 
My Commission Expires: 12/20 6 
Ai=r=1nAVIT OF SHARON M. ULLMAN P. 4 4.1) 
CIV!l. 
C!Y\S!ON 






GREG fi, BOW'ER 
6SC .\.\iln S1rut 
HUNTLEY ?ARJ\ {@002 
'""· "''c:!5"NFIDENT1A.L ATTOR.l'iEY-CLIENT COi\ilMUNICATION 
February 12, 2001 
Board of Ada County Commissioners 
650 Main Street 
Boise, Idaho 83 702 
RE: FLSA Compliance and Payroll Change 
Dear Commissioners: 
ADVJCE NO. W-8712 
Attached to this letter is a table listing five different options and the material 
consequences of e:ach for cur discussion about FLSA compliance and payroll 
periods tomorrow morning. 
The workgroup that has been studying the issue recommends Option #2 be 
implemented, eith,:r at the commencement of the new fiscal year or at the 
commencement o:f the new calendar year concurrent with move in at the new 
· courthouse. 
I believe that Dave Navarro and Terry Johnson will be present to provide further 
information on payroll, accounting, and personnel consequences for use in your 
deliberntions on the: matter. 
We will also discu:;s the implications of FLSA compliance as it relates to each of 
these options. The::1e particular discussions involve liability and should be done in 
executive session. 
Very truly yours, 
GREG H. BO\\TER 
Ada Coun~lr~sc1ting Attorney 
By: ~E. A.rgy\e 
Chief Ci vi! Deputy 
TEA:k.ks 
Enclosure 
. i;::J,. No. 7' . 
"'" -z.-11:.·b) 










employees cum in 
ti.me. and nre paid 
an hourly wage for 
the number of 
hours worked, 
Overtime, 





for.y hoUIS per 
wec:k, 
Pay Period. 
26 pny periods per 
yenr tagging ti..""'Oe 
eo.med by 2 weeks. 
Exe mp I 
Emp)oy,,s, 
Exempt employees 
drnw \/26"' of 
their annual sn!Ary 
each oav oeriod 
lrnplemen(ndon 
Dote. 
~~=;ce __ ·; 
.... 
Full Compli2nce and Staodardi2ation 
(The Perfect Legal World) 
AdYantages Disadvantages Potential Costs 
to Irnolement 
Solves all Every department and Payroll programirJag 
current Ft.~:A division will have to and a timekeeping 
ccrnp!iance keep track of hours system. 
issues, Always. worked. Approximately I 
pay the righ month to reprogram 
a.mount aod sick to add rune and 
and vacatfon are atteodaoce, 










Sirnple, •eru1y to Disrupts law Additional pay for 
u.se rJ!c th111 all enforcement and detentton overtime. 
departrn.mi·s and other security Probably no extra for 
divisions c111:1. cultures. the Sheri.ff slllce be 
follow. Tr;icning pays OT after 10 
is easy, houn encb day, 
Helps retrii..11 Some additional Additional 
lower woge expense to process. processlng cost 
entry !erel absorbed by tbe 
employees Clerk. One time 
where turnc1ver payroll, cost to ~overt 
is highest in the amount of 
$256,000:00, Annual 
loss of inte're.st 
- eornin~s of Sl0,000, Neutral Neutrai Addiilonnl 
processing cost'? 
Dover.:dls nic~!y Con1it.uing potential 
into the exposure tc FLSA 
personnel re form liability until 
currently befit& implemeotl!d. 
e;-(am.ined. by the 
ek'ctcd offo:ia!s 
nnd move to lhe 
new courthous~-
Comments 
We should be 
doing this 
anywri.y, We 
are not in 
complete 
11::r:hnical 
cornp Hance \vi~b 
FLSA, 
Ooly two rules 
to program and 
learn. 
iJ! 003 
HUNTLEY PM1K {4Joo4 
OPTION #2 
Full Compliance W/ partial 7K for Security Services 
, (The Perfect Practical World) 
Proposal j Advant:llges D!sndvantages j Potentiul Costs Comments 
. to Implement 
Hourly Solves au Ev,ry deparmient Payroll We should be 
Employees, <:urrt:HnSA and division wm programming and n doir.g iltis ,nyway, 
All hourly ccrnplianc!i h,ve to keep track ri.mekeep,ng system, We are not in 
employees rorn in. issU/!s, Always of hou.--s worked. Appro:<lmateiy l CQtnplete :echnlco l 
time zrid are paid pay the right month to reprogram comp!ianci:: with 
an hou.rly wage for amount bd sick I to add t,m, and FLSA, · 
the number or and vaca!icrt are attendance. 
hours worked.. accurate. C:,m be 
automated. 
Overtime, StiU reason<bly Some more oodcst Less than Option#\, :1 rulu to \,earn a:nd 
Ovcrtl:ne ls ,impte, el\.1y to r.u:r.-ount of program. 
computed after use rule that all disruption to iaw 
! Corry hours per de~ar1n'.,n~, and enforcement, More 
week, Leave a 14 di~lsioru can scheduling 
doy 1K. provision foUow, fltxibiHty for law 
for see\l.llty enforcement t'm1 
servkes, Option #1, but,.,, 
than Ontion #J, 
Pny Period. B.<ips retain, Somo •dditional Same as above. 
26 pay periods per lower wage exptr...se to process. 
yeil! lagging time entry Jevd 
tamed by 2 weeks employees 
wl-,ere ru.rtlo1ver 
is hi,hest 
Ex<mpt Neutral Neutrol Sa.me as above. 
Employees. 
Exempt employees 
draw i/2611. of 
foeir an.r.wd saltiry 
each pay period 
lmplementatlon Dovetails nie"oly Continuing I 
Date, ioto d·,e' _potential ex.posure I . I 
Corn.mer1ce persorm:t! refbnn to FtSA liability 
ll li2002 currentJ,y being until lmp!emented, 










employees tuJn in 
ti.me and are paid 
an hourly wage lot 





forty hours per 
week for nu but 
secUiiry ser,,ices. 
Poy Period. 
26 pay periods per 
year for all but 7K 
employees, 
lugging time. 
earned by 2 weeks. 





draw 1/26" of 
their onnull'l snlary 







Full Comp!lnnce with full 7K for Security Services 
Advantages Disadvantages Potential Costs Comments 
to Imolement 
Solves all Every di:iiartment Payroll We should be 
current FLSA and division will progroruning and • doing th.is anyvray. 
comp!ianc1: have to keep track timekeeping system. We are not in 
iss~es. Always of hours worked. Approximmly l complete technical 
pay the rish, month to reprogram compliance w\th 
amount and sick to add time and FLSA. 
and vacatim.i are attendance, 
accurate. Con be 
automated. 
Simple, erul)' to Disrupts taw Nono, 
use rule that atI enforcement and 
depa.rtmeots and other security 





1han. with Option 
#2. . 
Help, retnin Somo addlrional Same D..5 above. 4 ru.ks to learn and 
lower wage expense to proccs~ program. 
entry level nnd some 
employees additional expenses 
where turneiver fer two ti.me 
is highest syslcms. 
Same as above. 
Dovernilf nJcely Continuing 
into the 1 potential exposure: 
personnel refonn to FLSA liab(li_ty, 
ctur~ntJy belug 
ex.am.ined by the 
elected 0£:fki:1.!s 






\) ,\ 'y q / u :.i' us:~,, FAX 2083457894 HUNTLEY PARK 
OPTION #4 
Full Compliance with Monthly Pay Periods 
Proposnl Advant:ages Disadvantages Potential Costs Comments 
to Implement 
Hourly Solve, all Every department PayroU We should be 
Employees, current FLSA and division will programming and a doing this anyway, 
All hourly compliandi: have to keep track timekeeping systern. We are not in 
employees turn ln issues, Ca:a be of hours worked, Approximotely I complete technical 
time and nrc paid automated. Overtirne1 !ick aad month to reprogram compliance with 
on hourly wage for Does not si,Ive vacation must be lo add lime nnd FLSA. 
the number of month end time adjusted attendance, 
hours worked. and attend.wee rettoactively, 
problem,, 
Overtime, Simple, eaiiy to Disrupts law Additional pay for 
Ellminate the 7K u.se rule that all enforcement and det1:ntion overtime. 
exemption department, and other security Probably no extrn for 
Countywide. divisioos t1u1 cultures. the Sheriff since he 
Overtime (s, foUow, Does pays OT after l 0 
computed after require a. cmoff hours each day 
forry hours per for overtime 
week. wbich doesn 1 t 
gel picked np for 
, month, 
Poy Period, Helps retain Some additional 





E>empl Neutral Neutral 
Employees, 
Some as current 
Puctice 
lmplementntion Dovetails nicely Continuing Costs ofutigotion, 
Dnte. into the potentinl exposure back pay, and fines 
Commence personnel reform 10 FLSA liablllty. when FLSA is not 
1/1/2002 currently bdng compl/ed with. 
exami.,ed by the 
elected officinls -
and move to rh, 
new courthouso. 
,)/0,4/M ''09: 20· f-AX 208345i894 HUNTLEY PARK @)OOi 
OPTION #5 
Do Nothing Except Address Issues as They Arise 
Proposnl Advaotnges Disadvantages Potential Costs Comments 
to Imnlement 
Hourly Solves all Every depanment PayroU We should be 
Employees. current FL.SA and division will progmnrning and a doing this onywny. 
A:\ hourly compUanci: have to keep crack timekeeping system. We are not U1 
tmploycts iurn in issues for ,regular of hours worked. Additional cost 10 complete technicnl 
time and ore pa.id emJ)loyces if Paychecks wilt correct time entries compliance with 
an hourly wage for conti.nu.al fluctuate: from retroactively. FLSA. 
the number of tralnlng is done. month to month. 
hours worked. 7K P•Y?e,ti<ld.s Overtime 1 sick and 
are almost vacation rnusr be 
impossible to adjusted 
mat.oh with.;\ retroactively. 
monthly p>.y 
netiod. 
Overtime, No Chan~ from Th• 7!{ exemption. None1 ex.cep·t for 
Same as eun~o.t current p ctice, is extremely current problem 
practice except difficult 10 learn areas and the 
correct problems. and keep track of ongoing potenti>l for 
on a monthly pay further 
system resulting in noo.compli.anc.e 
constant problem cosu. 
solvino. 
Foy Period. Does not rt.quire Does not add.res, None, 
l 2 per y.ear, crumge. turnover and atd in. 
recruitm¢nt of 
entry-level 
cmolovecs. -Exempt. Neutral Neutral None 
Employees. 
Same as current 
oractice, ' 
ImpJemento.don Con commimcc Continuing Co~ts of Utigation1 
D:::ite, ad hoc solutions potential exposure back pny, ,nd fines 
As soon a$ promptly, to FLSA liabWry when FLSA is not 





differing pny and 
l compliance 
oeriods, -
VERNON K SMITH 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
1900 W. Main Street 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
Idaho State Bar No. 1365 
Telephone: (208) 345-1125 
Fax: (208) 345-1129 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 










Case No. CV OC 01073940 
AFFIDAVIT OF VERNON K SMITH 
STACY A GIBSON, 
Defendant/Counterclaimant. 
STATE OF IDAHO 
:ss 






COMES NOW Vernon K. Smith, Attorney At Law; and counsel for 
Defendant, and being first duly sworn upon oath, deposes and says as follows: 
1. That Affiant is licensed to practice law in the State of Idaho since 
1971, and is counsel for Defendant in this matter. 
2. Affiant presents this Affidavit upon his own knowledge and direct 
conversation with an official of Ada County, Idaho, R. Monte Macconnell. 
3. Affiant does affirm that on Wednesday, July 28, 1999, he had a 
telephone conversation_ with Mr. Macconnell, who was acting as Legal Advisor for 
EXHIBl1' 
AFFIDAVIT OF VERNON K. SMITH P. 1 
the Ada County Sheriffs Office, and during that conversation he began by stating 
he did want to secure a resolution of the employment issue then before him 
concerning the series of overpayments made by Ada County to the account of 
Stacy and John Gibson under the Direct Deposit Program in effect in conjunction 
with Stacy Gibson1s employment w1th the Ada County Sheriff's Office. Mr. 
Macconnell forthrightfully stated to Affiant "the Sheriff (Vaughn Kllleen), wanted 
Deputy Gibson terminated, and if Ms. Gibson would voluntarily resign from the 
Ada County Sheriff's Office, that would resolve the matter. If she refused to 
resign, she would imrr\ediately be processed with felony charges for concerning 
those funds deposited to that account. Affiant had a duty to convey that 
message to Stacy Gibson, as Affiant was then representing her interests in the 
overpayment issue, and pursuant to the Idaho State Bar Rules of Professional 
Conduct, Affiant did belii:ive he had the affirmative duty to communicate this 
message just as it was made to him, as Affiant did not want his client to later 
become surprised or unfamiliar with Ada County Sheriffs intended course of 
action, if she chose to retain her employment with Ada County. Affiant wanted 
to clearly convey the rne!Ssage to her that if she would not give the Shariff her 
resignation, she needed to understand the full impact of the message, and by 
refusing to resign, then potentially she would incur legal defense costs over 
criminal charges that ~actually would go no where, but the process would cost 
her the legal fees of representation, that otherwise could be avoided if she were 
just inclined to submit her resignatlon as requested, quit h~H employment, as 
the Sheriff was out to accomplish that intended result of taking her out of her 
AFFIDAVIT OF VERNON K. SMITH P, 2 
current employment as a Jail Technician with the Sheriff's Office. Defendant 
determined this threat of prosecution was an affront to her dignity and self 
respect, and having fully understood the message and potential ramifications 
and consequences of that course of action, she refused to accept that proposed 
resolution presented b,y Mr. Macconnell, over her employment. Thereafter, on 
August 2, 1999, Vaughn l<illeen, the Ada County Sheriff, did serve his Notice of 
Intent to Impose Discipline upon Defendant, a copy of which was mailed to or 
related to Affiant. 
4. That on August 9, 1999, Ada County Prosecutor, Greg H. Bower, 
did then send a letter to the Canyon County Prosecutor's Office in Caldwell, 
Idaho, a copy of which is attached hereto. That letter did appear to be an 
attempt to authorize the Chief Criminal Deputy Canyon County Prosecutor to 
file Felony Grand Theft charges against Defendan . The Prosecutor · olved, 
John Christensen, refused to prosecute or proceed ith any such authorization, 
thereafter in his letter to Ada County, a copy of which i att hed hereto. 
/ U-
Dated thisCO ____ day of May 2002. 
AFFIDAVIT OF VERNON K. SMITH P. 3 
Vernon K. Smith 
Attorney for Defendant 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
J..-1- tv\ °'1' 
I HEREBY CERTIFY That on the 1 L-;.t. day of Apfil2002, I caused a true 
and correct copy of the above and foregoing to be delivered to the following 
persons at the following addresses as follows: 
Clerk of the Court 
Fourth Judicial District 
Ada County Courthouse 
200 West Front Street 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
Ms. Kelli 8. Ketlinski 
Ada County Deputy Prosecutor 
200 West Front Street 
3rd Floor, Room 366 
Boise, Idaho 83702 








( ) U.S. Mail 
( ) Fax 
( ,_--· _,_lj~nd Delivered 
CR1M!NA.L 
D!VTSION 
Phon• (208) 364-2121 
Fax (208) 364-2132 
MAGISTRATE 
DMSION 
Phon< (208) 377-7300 




602 Wut Idaho 
Bo\16, ldaM $370:l 
August 9, 1999 
John Christenson 
Canyon County Prosecutor 
1115 Albany Street 
Caldwell, ID 83605 
Re: Stacy Gibson DR ffl8613 
Dear John: 
Please consider· this letter youi;- allthoi;-ity to file 
charges in this case if they ai;-e considei;-ed 
appropriate. Upon receipt of a letter· stating your 
acceptance of this case and the case numbei;- 1 I will 
~ave you appointed as special pi;-osecutor by the 
Honorable Judge Eismann. If you choose to decline, 
please respond in writing so that we can notify 
victims and fficers. 
GRE B. l¼;)Wlm 




.C-IJG 1 1 1999. 
CCPA 
··----··----···------~-----.....-·-• .. , ...... , ,,., . ., .... ,.~ .••• •.• -,~, ... , .... ,-,~,. .,.,_,,,t;:w:» ... -Aa;:; 
CJdtf. Crlmlrul D 1,P<JC)' 
Qirl1w1j..(i1 
\,,<Id O,,.l! 0 (l>'Jl°y 
Owio \, l;.,,i 
CJnyon C411nq 0:ivrth0111t 
l ! ! S AJPJny 
CJld-wtll, !d.Jho 8HOS 
TtltpJ'l,on~: (208) H~·7Hl 
f,x, (l0a) <H·H74 
Mr. Greg Bower 
Ada County Prosecu 
602 W. Idaho Street 
Boise, 1D 83702 
LIJ-\.VILJ L. !UUN<J 
Canyo,. i:ounty Prosecuting Atcorney 
STATE OF IDAHO 
I :i~raf ~Wf {D) 
August 20, l 999 
AUG 2 .3 1999 
·,·,, ''·"'•ng Attorney's Office 
.lrJ,1 r,()1/nty 
Re: Stacy Gibson/ DRJ/186\3 
De:u Greg: 
Ccpv{/q 
Gw14 L Wom 
'111 t)nli aond 
Gntory N. $wlfl\011 
Thom)J X, V JVih,i 
illl/\ A. Dodi! 
Nron N, lvcoff 
CoMnl( T v(\:.u 
llw 0. No1d1von1 
C~ld W. Cvhvon, 
Wud ?ll\!01.:in 
W!l:!im M. loom!\ 
Nicole l .. Sch)/tr 
On·!4 ). Hol,w 
Y1{1imMi11111.J G.xl141n11or1 
Drnh, R. Hlmo 
li!U~Hh "ti!'' 01¥\i 
Al11ho ll11d 
After reviewing the above case, it is ow- determination that criminal charges would be 
in"ppropriate. There does appear lo be a pretty solid civil action available. 
iei Crimtna\ Deputy 
JC\so 
'l 
Ms, Mary Leonard 
Quality Assurance Specialist 
· Idaho State Board of Medicine 
P.O. Box 83720 
. Boise, Idaho 83720-0058 
I 
January 28, 2000 
Re: John Gibson's complaint re Dr. Charles Steuart 
Dear lv!s. Leonard: 
This is the second time I have received a copy of a complaint letter sent b); Mr, Gibson 
on behalf of his wife, Stacy. This time I could not nisist the urge to try to set the record 
straight regarding Mr. Gibson. 
Stacy Gibson was recently terminated from employment at the Ada County Sheriffs 
Office and has appealed her dismissal through the county's p,::rsonnel system, During the 
process leading up to her dismissal, Ms, Gibson presented Dr. Spencer's letters ,vritten on 
her behalf in an effort to avoid attending a meeting with the sheriff that the law requires 
the sheriff to convene, Our department physician, Dr. Steuart, was asked to examine Ms. 
Gibson for the li2nited purpose of advising the sheriff \vhether she \Vas well enough to 
attend the meeting with the sheriff. 
After interviewing Ms. f}ibson in the presence of her husband, Dr. Steuart advised me 
that she was not capable of participating in the meeting effectively at that time and 
recommended that the date be extended for another month. We followed this advice, Dr. 
Steuart was not asked to submit a written report or any other analysis of Ms, Gibson's 
condition. 
I was subsequently asked to pro,·ide Dr. Steuart's reports and other writings resulting 
from that interview with Ms, Gibson. I denied the request on two grounds: 1) there was 
no written product of the meeting and 2) any writings coming from the meeting were not 
discoverable because they were produced at the specific requ,ist of legal counsel. 
Mr. Gibson has chosen to take exception to my decision and has twice written you with a 
fanciful interpretation of events that have little basis in fact. Mr. Gibson has tried to cast 
a shadow on Dr. Steuart's reputation, as well as my own. His allegations are groundless 
and are for the most piirt figments of Mr. Gibson's over-active imagination, 
If you need any information from me in support of Dr, Steuart I will gladly make myself 
available at your convenience, 
Cc: Sheriff Killeen · 





Ada County She,riff 
by: R. Monte Macconnell 
















Idaho Stau Boa:d of MulJCi11e 
P.O. Box 83720 
Boise, 10 83720-0058 
R.,: ComplaL..t of Stt.ey a.id loh.n Gibson 
Dear Ms, Mary Leona rd: 
b rcsporue to your inquiry of Nov~m'ocr l 7, 1999, lot 1110 help you with thQ foUowi.og facts: 
I have a contrnct with the A~ Cowicy Sh~:i.ff to provid, his dep.irtm•nt witli a medical iervice 
:i..-.d med.iCJl ndvice, Apparently hfrs, Gibson had b~un.~~ut doubl~ paych:cks for llpproxlmatoiy eight 
months, which ,be r~coiwd tmd cashed. I w..s told t.h;,t tHs amounted to over $ll,OOO, She was to attend 
~, admizli.tra\lve he31fog co resolve this matter, but pr~sented a llltler from b.ur Physician Wt rt.lted sh~ 
was, fu: emotion.al reasons, Wlablc to do this. Tho Shoriffasked me to provide him advice en this matter, 
wd I agreed to intervii:w Mrs, Gibson. Therefore, my cUont'was Sberiff Vaughn Killeen, not Mrs. 
Gibso.,. Sh, was interviewed in the pre.euca of Olona Forrest, R.N., and hor husband. 1 took notes 
during t>tu s=loP, IUld preseoted my £bd.L~ss orally 1o Mr. Monte McC01well, the Shoriff's attorney, I 
then ducuded these no1c.s . 
My oplnJollJ' reg:arding this matter are prot~cted by nttomey-client privileg~. However, 1 am sure they 
can b<I cbt.lined by deposhion or at t:ial_, 
I-bopo thet this aii!Yleri MY questions that t\ie Board m.;y have. 
Char!~ D, Steuart, M.D. , 
EX!-IIBIT 
2084655668 STEWART ACCCIUNHNG 
MEM!SER 
HI\TIQNAI. SOCIETY OF 
PUIJU¢ •ccoUNTANTS 
SlewaJd_Clcc.aunting,_ . 
LICENSED PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS 
124 1,?Ul Ave. F\d. 
Nampa, l<lahO ll:l6e6 
PHon• (208) 461>-12114 or ~IHl439 
Fax (201!) 465-sGOII 
February 18, 2000 
John Gibson 
550 I Tinker Street 
Bois¢. Idaho 83709 
FAX: 362-6959 
RE: ADA County Auditor W-2 Fonns 
Dear John. 
McC~L~ BRANCH 
Box 110g • McCall. ldeho ll!lro8 




I.DAHO A$SOCfAT1C,N OF 
PUBUC ACCOUNTANTS 
Mer reviewing lpe p .. y stub vouche111, I lllll unable to comi, up with some of the 
figures on the W-2 to match the pay vouchers. There seems to be romc diBCl'epancy in 
wages, tips and other compensation, arid Social Security wages vs the pay vouch~rs. 




E. A permanent employee who is dissatisfied with a disciplinary action, 
other than discipline in the torm ot dismisiial, suspension, demotion 
and/or ingrade reduction in pay, shall utilize the grievance and 
appeal procedures contained in Article Hof this Chapter. (Ord. 141, 
8-29-85; amd. Ord. 163, 12-17-86; amd. Ord. 179, 8-24-87; amd. 
Ord. 219, 5-3-9!0) 
1-7G-3: DISMISSALS, SUSPENSIONS, DEMOTIONS AND INGRADE 
REDUCTIONS IN PAY: Provisions of Section 1·7G-2 are not 
a prerequisite to action under this Section. (Ord. 141, 8-29-85; amd. Ord. 
179, 8·24-87; amd. Ord. 180, 9-10-87; amd. Ord. 219, 5-3-90) 
A. Employees in classified service with probationary status may be 
dismissed, suspended, demoted and/or administered an lngrade 
reduction in pay in accordance with Article E of this Chapter. Any 
employee in classified service with permanent status may be 
dismissed, suspended, demoted and/or administered an ingrade 
reduction in pay for good cause, which shall include but not be 
limited to any one or a combination of the following acts or 
omissions which occur during the period of the employee's 
employment with Ada County: 
1. Failure to perform the duties and carry out the obligations 
imposed by the Federal or State Constitutions; Federal or State 
statutes, rule~ or regulations; County ordinances; or rules and 
policies and procedures of his or her department or office. 
2. Inefficiency, incompetency or negligence in the performance of his 
or her duties which interferes with the proper operation of his or her 
department or office, or failure to meet work standards for his or her 
job. (Ord. 141, 8-29-85; amd. Ord. 179, 8-24-87; amd. Ord. 180, 
9-10-87; amd. Ord. 219, 5-3-90; amd. Ord. 278, 9-13-94) 
3. Failure to perform the essential functions of his or her employment 
position for any reason after the County has made reasonable 
accommodations as required by law. (Ord. 141, 8·29-85; amd. Ord. 
179, 8-24-87; amd. Ord. 180, 9-10-87; amd. Ord. 219, 5-3-90; amd . 
. Ord. 278, 9-13-94; amd .. Ord. 288, 3-2-95) 
4. Refusal to accept a reasonable and proper assignment from an 
authorized supervisor, or failure to perform assigned tasks within 
required time limits. 
1195 
Ada County 
1 • 7G-3 1-7G·3 
1195 
5. Insubordination or· conduct detrimental to good order and 
discipline in the department or office, or conduct unbecoming of a 
County employee. 
6. Being Under the Influence of any form of drug, alcohol or 
controlled substance, without a prescription or as authorized by law, 
while on duty. 
7. Careless, negligent or improper use of, or unlawful conversion of, 
County property, equipment or funds, 
8. Conviction of misconduct in office, or conviction of a felony. 
9, Acceptance of gifts in exchange for influence or favors given in an 
official capacity, 
10. Abuse' or improper use of sick leave privileges. 
11. Failure to report for duty at the assigned time and place. 
12. Unauthorized disclosure of information from official, nonpublic 
records or nonpublic information otherwise obtained in the course 
and scope of the employee's job. 
13. Absence without proper authorization of leave. 
14. Misstl!tement or deception In application for employment. 
15. Failure to obtain or maintain a current license or certificate 
lawfully required as a condition of performance of duties. 
16. Political activity which Is disruptive of the employee's mission 
and duties or that of his or her department or office. 
17. Use of any influence which violates the principle of this merit 
system in an attempt to secure a promotion or other privileges for 
individual, advantage or gain. 
18. Violations of the standards of conduct as set forth in Article L of 
this Chapter. 
19. Violation of Ada County's sexual harassment policy or retaliation 








20, Knowingly making a material misstatement or a materially 
misleading statement in an official report. 
21. Making or repeating a material misstatement or materially 
misleading statement about a County employee or official with 
knowledge that the statement is untrue or misleading or making or 
repeating a material misstatement or materially misleading statement 
about a County employee or official with reckless disregard as to 
whether the statement is untrue or misleading. (Ord. 141, 8-29-85; 
amd. Ord. 179, 8-24-87; amd. Ord. 180, 9-10-87; amd. Ord. 219, 
5-3-90; amd. Ord. 278, 9-13-94) 
22. Violating t~e Family and Medical Leave Act with respect to 
interference, discrimination and retaliation as outlined in Article K, 
herein. (Ord. 273, 3-24-94; amd. Ord. 278, 9·13·94) 
23. Violation of Federal or State copyright laws regulating, but not 
limited to, the unauthorized copying or distribution ("pirating") of' 
personal computer (PC) software or data, and/or violation of any 
personal computer (PC) software licensing agreement. (Ord. 278, 
9-13-94) 
B. Whenever an e,lected official or an executive employee delegated the 
responsibility for personnel actions determines it necessary to 
dismiss, suspend, demote and/or administer an ingrade reduction in 
pay to a permanent employee in the classified system for one or 
more of the reasons set forth in subsection A, above, or other reason 
deemed sufficient by the elected official, he or she shall provide 
written notification of the contsmplated action to the employee, the 
Counti Personnel Director and the County Prosecuting Attorney. 
Such written notification of contemplated action shall include: 
I 
1. A detailed statement setting forth the charges, allegations of 
wrongdoing or alleged inadequacies of the employee. 
2. A description of the employer's evidence. 
3. A detailed statement of the disciplinary action to be taken 
(dismissal, suppension, demotion and/or ingrade reduction in pay) 
and the effective date thereof. 
4. Notice to the employee that, except in cases of demotion, 
suspension for under thirty (30) days in duration, and/or ingrade 
reduction in pay, he or she shall be placed on administrative leave 
with pay effective upon receipt of the written notification of 
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No weapons or fueanns may be carried by any person riding with patrol m1der this 
policy unless they are a sworn Idaho peace officer. Precautimu will be taken by 
the <nHluty Patrol Shift Supervisor and the designated Patrol Officer to ensure that 
this policy is adhered to. 
Nothing hercin shall be construed as requiring any off-duty ACSO personnel to 
ride with Patrol Section Officers as a condition of employment, advancement in 
employment, or for any othcr reason. The purpose of this policy is to provide 
guidance for those who wish to vobmtarily ride along with patrol Officers and does 
not create any entitlement to overtime compensation. Toe privilege of riding 
along with Patrol Officers is solely for the benefit of those wishing to do so, unless 
otherwise directed by a supervisor. 
SECTION 9.03 OFF DUTY OFFICER ACTION 
In cases where an off-duty commissioned officer witnesses a criminal violation. 
the officer should either take enforcement action, or act as a trained observer and 
comrmmicator. 
To detemrine the ilppropriateness of any action taken, the member should 
consider. 
l) whe.ther the crime is a serious crime involving the need for immediate 
intervention to protect life or property {off duty enforcement of minor 
violations is discouraged.). 
2} whether the officer can reasonably ex:pcct to exercise control of the situation, 
acting as a lone officer without benefit of police radio communication~ 
. 3) whethcr the officer is aimed and 1Il possession of police identification, and 
4) whether the officer is within lns jurisdiction. 
1be test is met when the member can reasonably expect to exercise the same high 
degree of professionaitsm as could''k cxpecied in 'an oii4iy capacity. An off-
duty noncommissioned officer would be expected to act as a trained observer and 
communicator only. 
SECTION 9.04 GF,NERAL PERFORMANCE 
Employees shall conduct themselves at all times in such a manner as to reflect 
favorably on the department and upon themselves. Conduct unbecoming an 
officer may include that which brings the department into disrepute, or reflects 
discrCdit upon the employee as a member of the departmen~ or that which impairs 
the operation or efficiency of the department or any member. A member shall not 
49 
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criticize the department., i~ members~ employees or its policies in a manner which 
is defamatory, obscene or un1awfu1> or when the criticism is false or malicious. 
Employees are expected to discharge their duties in an objective and firm manner 
and act together to assist and protect the citizens and each other in the 
maintenance of law and order. Satisfactory performance and competence are 
demonstrate<l by: 
1. adequate knowledge of the application of laws, policies, and standards of the 
dcpartmait; 
2. willingness and ability to properly perform assigned tasks in a timely rnatu1er; 
J. taking appr_opriate and timely action when a crime, disorder or other condition 
requiring police action occurs; 
4. not being absent without leave; 
s. not receiving repeated poor evaluations; 
6. not violating chapter 7 of the Ada County Code, commonly known as the 
personnel ordinance; 
Failure to adhere to the above standards will be deemed unsatisfactory 
performance. 
Insubordination - The following constitute insubordination. 
l) Refusal to promptly obey a lawful order of a ranking officer. 
2) The use of derogatory remarks or criticism directed toward OT about a ranking 
officer. 
3) Bypassing a ranking officer in the chain of command without good cause. 
4) Being untruthful to a superior officer. 
Abuse· Of _.P'osltion. - Members .. shall- not use theit_official.. position. official 
identification cards or badges for personal or financial gain. for obtaining 
privileges not otherwise available to them except in the performance of duty. or 
for avoiding the consequences of illegal acts. Members shall not lend to any 
person their shcrift's identification card or department issued badge. However~ the 
member may lend another Ada County Sheriffs deputy a personally owned badge. 
Members may not authorize the use of their name~ photo or official title that 
identifies them as a member of the department to any commodity or enterprise 
without approval of the Sheriff. 
Evidence Procedures. - Members shall handle all items of evidence consistent 










01• . , .. 
••• • •• 8,10 
e:• 













loss of evidentiary value. Evidence must be booked into property/evidence as 
soon as practical and always prior to the end of the shift unless specifically 
authorized by that member's supervisor. 
Public Monies - It is the policy of this department that whenever employees 
dealing with public funds encmmter a shortage or any irregularity, this fuct will be 
immediately brought to the attention of the employee1s immediate supervisor. A 
complete Administrative Report from the employee through the chain of 
command regarding the circumstances surrounding all unresolved shortages or 
irregularities of public monies shall be submitted to the Sheriff .
Judicial Orden Or Process - The only persons authorized by the deparnncnt to 
accept service of court process and documents naming the Ada County Sheriff"s 
Office or Ada County as defendant or requesting records or information from 
departmental files are the Sheriff, the Sherill's designce, or the Legal Advisor. 
This applies only to those situations other than the normal subpoena process used 
by the County Prosecutor's Office. The areas of concern, although not exclusive, 
arc civil suits filed against the Ada County Sherifrs Office or its employees, 
subpoenas for records or dispatch information, and subpoenas and civil matters in 
which the department is not a party. The rationale for this order is to ensure 
compliance with procedural and meritorious is.sues whenever the department is 
involved in legal matters. 
Request For Legal Opinion - Department members seeking a formal legal 
opinion in the performance of their duties must direct such request in writing 
through the chain of command to the Sheriff's Legal Advisor. The Legal Advisor 
will either render the opinion or be -responsible for drafting a request for an 
opinion to the Ada County Prosecuting Attorney's Office. This policy is not to 
preclude the day to day verbal communication between the Sheriff's Office and 
the Prosecutor's Office. All written legal opinions, whether from the Legal 
Advisor or from -the Prosecutor's. Offia;. shall be consiQered qmfidentialy 
attorney/client correspondence and are not subject to disclosure outside the 
department unless directed by the Sheriff 
SECTION 9.05 REPORTS 
It is the duty of every employee to properly and expeditiously report or act on any 
information given to them in good faith by any person regarding matters which 
indicate the need for action by the department. 
1) Employees shall immediately report to their superior officer any information 








October 29, 2003 
Addendum: 
Errors and Rebuttal to Dr. Cynthia Brownsmith's 
Independent "Medical" Evaluation of Stacy A. Gibson 
Page #1 
You have identified "approximately July 23, 1997", as the date 
Ms. Gibson was hired by the Ada County Sheriff's Office for the 
position of Records Technician II. 
Ms. Gibson was hired by Sheriff Vaughn Killeen, as a Police 
Records Clerk I, assigned to the Boise State University (BSU) 
Substation of the Sheriff's Office, at a base monthly wage of 
$1,215.00, effective July 10, 1997, as approved by the Ada County 
Board of County Commissioners and the Ada County Human 
Resources Director, Terry Johnson, and identified in the Notice of 
Personnel Action. See Exhibit A. Ms. Gibson was granted 
permanent status as a "classified employee", effective July 1, 1998, 
pursuant to County merit system contained in the Ada County Code, 
§ 1-7E-2A & B, and identified on the Notice of Personnel Action, 
approved and recommended by Sheriff Killeen, and approved by the 
County Commissioners and Human Resources Director, Terry 
Johnson, identified in the Notice of Personnel Action. See Exhibit B. 
You state, "Ms. Gibson began to receive and sign payroll 
checks of over double the amount of her usual monthly salary", and 
"Ms. Gibson's payroll checks were directly deposited into a checking 
account she shared with her husband, John Gibson." 
i 
Ms. Gibson never received or signed any "payroll checks", 
since none were ever issued to her after she signed the Automatic 
Paycheck Deposit Authorization form on May 6, 1998. The County 
was authorized to automatically deposit monthly pay into her joint 
bank 'account. Wages were directly deposited by the County Payroll 
Department, but no payroll checks were signed or deposited by Ms. 
Gibson anywhere, at any time. Furthermore, the mistaken deposits 
to her account were not "over double" the amount of her usual 
monthly salary. The administrative error created by the County (an 
FLSf\ violation) added her old (BSU) monthly wage of $1,500.00 to 
her new Jail Technician monthly wage of $1,550.00 for a gross 
mistaken overpayment of $3,050.00, not quite double her wage as a 
Jail Technician. Furthermore, a second administrative error was 
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Notably, Ms. Gibson should have received $1,575.00 in wages, not 
$1,550.00 as indicated on Exhibit 8. 
You state, "Ms. Gibson acknowledges receiving these monthly 
overpayments for a period beginning in November 1998 through June 
1999" and "she was questioned thoroughly, directly and intensively 
regarding her knowledge of and acceptance of this overpayment." 
Ms. Gibson never had any knowledge of the administrative 
error. created by the County Payroll Department until she was 
informed of the County error during the questioning on July 20, 1999. 
She then, and now, emphatically denies she ever knew of the funds 
or "accepted" any overpayments at any time. Due to this 
adrhinistrative error created and perpetuated by the Ada County 
Payroll Department Technician, Ada County direct deposited the 
overpayment into her joint checking account, without Ms. Gibson's 
consent or knowledge. Ms. Gibson and her husband never 
reconciled or balanced their checking account, and they had no 
accounting whether an overpayment or underpayment ever occurred, 
and no third-party accounting and reconciliation of the error has ever 
been processed, despite Ms. Gibson's effort to accomplish that. 
You state, "During these interviews Ms. Gibson was 
confronted with the discrepancies between her known salary level 
and her payroll vouchers for this eight-month period of time. She was 
questioned thoroughly, directly and intensively regarding her 
knowledge of and acceptance of this overpayment. She was also 
advised of possible criminal, civil and personnel actions, which might 
be pursued against her in this matter." 
Had you reviewed the questioning, you would know she said 
she had no knowledge of it at all. Throughout your report you made 
the attempt to minimize the "context" of the interrogations by both 
Detectives. If you have an expertise in "forensic psychology, your 
assessment of the interrogations should be more perceptive of its 
sole intent. The Sheriff's Policy Manual, § 7.05 (effective October 
1998, and approved by Sheriff Killeen), was to have provided Ms. 
Gibson with specific rights during an internal investigation. Either 
those detectives were not aware of Ms. Gibson rights, or they didn't 
protect her according to those rights. Subsection (4) prohibited the 
detec:tive(s) from threatening Ms. Gibson with punitive action such as 
they, threatened felony charges, jail time, and termination, and 
subsection (7) prohibited the detectives, Sheriff Killeen, Mr. 
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subjecting Ms. Gibson "to punitive action because of the exercise of 
privileges granted (to her) under this order or the exercise of any 
rights under the U.S. Constitution, Idaho Constitution, or applicable 
law. See Exhibit C. Furthermore, once an employee has their rights 
and protection under the Fair Labor Standards Act, as were provided 
to her through the merit system, found in the Ada County Code, 
County Personnel System, § 1-7-1 through§ 1-7L-10, any denial of 
those rights, such as any confrontational accusation and 
discrimination of that employee, is a form of retaliation under FLSA, 
and the employer may be criminally charged for such violation of the 
Act. 
As previously addressed in the letter that accompanies this 
addendum, when Stacy signed the pay voucher(s), she thought she 
wa$ authorizing the County to pay her base salary of $1,550.00. That 
specific amount is disclosed and specifically shown directly within the 
script on the pay voucher. It was her belief she was authorizing 
Payroll to pay whatever was their accounting of her accumulating 
overtime and wages. Ms. Gibson understood the voucher had been 
inaccurate from the first pay period of her employment. She was 
soo11 made to understand her signature, regardless of the voucher 
content, would be needed to authorize Payroll to pay the wages due 
her under their form of pay system. 
Page #2 
You state, "Ms. Gibson specifically denied having been injured 
during these interviews." 
This conceptual suggestion is quite misleading. Ms. Gibson 
was not beaten or kicked during the interviews, but obviously 
psychologically attacked, and the damage is permanent. She was 
psye;l,ological\y injured, and physically injured by the resulting 
physical complications due to the ongoing outrageous and 
misconduct of County agents. The foundation of Ms. Gibson's 
Worker's Compensation Claim for injuries is based upon the 
confrontational and inappropriate interrogations by Arville Glenn and 
Scott Johnson, and the violations of County Code, the Sheriff's Policy 
Manual and FLSA; also, R. Monte MacConnell's extortious attempt 
against Ms. Gibson's property right and Sheriff Killeen's termination 
of her employment, which were violations of the United States 
Constitution, Federal and State law. As previously disclosed to Mr. 
Bauman, and as you should be aware, PTSD is not only a 
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physical manifestations. It results in illness and injuries that affect a 
person's health and fitness. 
You state, "The purpose of the psychological assessment was 
to evaluate the nature, extent and proximate cause of Ms. Gibson's 
psychological symptoms and to make recommendations regarding 
possible treatment strategies." 
The only purpose Ms. Gibson was seen by you was because 
Ada County agents convinced their surety, State Insurance Fund, 
they had not meant any harm when their actions injured Ms. Gibson. 
Ada County and State Insurance Fund are compensating you to 
provide a diagnosis concerning Ms. Gibson that refute the findings of 
F. LaMarr Heyrend, M.D., that confirm Ms. Gibson is suffering from 
Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder caused by the trauma inflicted by 
those Ada County officials. 
You stated: "due to Ms. Gibson's claim that she was unable to 
be released from her work duties with her employer." (Mr. Rakozy). 
Your choice of the words make it appear Ms. Gibson was 
creating an excuse to cancel her appointment with you. It is regretful 
Mr. Bauman did not provide you with how this event transpired, or 
provided a courtesy copy of Mr. Bernie Rakozy's letter to you, 
addressing his reasons for keeping Ms. Gibson at the work site on 
Friday, March 21, 2003. See Exhibit D. Mr. Bauman not only sought 
to contact Ms. Gibson directly at work, but he unilaterally scheduled 
the 'appointment with your office, without consulting Ms. Gibson's 
work schedule or her availability through my office. Ms. Gibson 
believes this attitude was just another attempt to harass her. 
You state, "An initial interview was conducted for 
approximately 30 minutes in which she was given informed consent 
for the IME." 
Ms. Gibson recalls this event took only 1 0 minutes 
(maximum), not 30 minutes to complete. 
You state, "A second in depth interview was conducted with 
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On July 11, 2003, you instructed, Ms. Gibson arrived for her 
appointment with you at 8:30 a.m., and she did not leave your office 
until 4:15 p.m. Your interview with Ms. Gibson lasted almost 8 hours. 
You state, "She was apparently able to do this without any 
great difficulty." 
, Ms. Gibson told you she would stay at your office until 
discharged by you, Ms. Gibson agreed to a short break so she could 
call her employer to inform him she was still at your office, and she 
would not be able to return to work. We ask you to further elucidate 
on your comments the task indicates difficulty or should be difficult for 
Ms. Gibson. 
Page #2-Page #3 
You state, "An extensive review of records was also 
conducted including the medical records of Stephen E. Spencer, 
M.D. and John L. Hendricks, M.D., as well as a letter from Lamarr 
Heyrend, M.D. Also review were Ms. Gibson's Idaho Workers 
Compensation Complaint, Answers to Interrogatories, employment 
records at the Ada County Sheriff's Office, a Complaint and Demand 
for Jury Trial in the matter of Ms. Gibson's wrongful termination suit 
against Ada County Sheriff's office, and various correspondence. 
Audio tape recordings and transcripts of the interrogations by 
Detective Arville Glenn and Detective Scott Johnson of Stacy Gibson 
occurring on July 20, 1999 were also reviewed." 
We do wish you had received records. There is not a 
document entitled "Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial" concerning 
Ms. Gibson's wrongful termination suit against Ada County or 
addressing the Ada County Sheriff's wrongful termination of Ms. 
Gibson's employment. The document referred to in your report is the 
suit ~repared by the Ada County Deputy Prosecuting Attorney, Ms. 
Kelli Ketlinski (Brauner), Case No. CV OC 0107394D, reflecting the 
County's effort to pursue a reimbursement for the overpayments. Of 
interest, this is the same case you have recorded (incorrectly 
identified as a Worker's Compensation case) on your inventory of 
"forensic psychology experience" contained in the copy of your 
curriculum vitae my office received as an enclosure with the February 
20, 2003 letter from Mr. Bauman. You have never reviewed the 
allegations or facts of her wrongful termination, as you told Ms. 
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l 
Page #3 - Page #8 (Review of Medical Records) 
Dr. Stephen E. Spencer and Dr. F. LaMarr Heyrend will share 
their opinion with you as to the information you included in your report 
concerning their medical assessment of Ms. Gibson. 
Page #6 (Review of Medical Records) 
On Page 6 (February 3, 2000 and April 16, 2000), you state, 
"Dr Gibson" as being involved in the medical evaluations of Ms. 
Gibson. 
Ms. Gibson has never been evaluated by a Dr. Gibson. 
Page #7 (Review of Medical Records) 
You state, "Dr. Spencer wrote a letter to Mr. R.M. Macconnell, 
attorney for the Ada County Sheriff's Office apologizing "if there has 
beeh a distortion of the truth contained in my letters supporting the 
position of Stacy A. Gibson." 
Mr. Macconnell wrote a letter to Dr. Spencer on August 2, 
200i, therein questioning Dr. Spencer's qualifications as a medical 
professional. Dr. Spencer was responding to that letter (See Exhibit 
E). Dr. Spencer was attempting to be above the foolish arrogance of 
the Sheriff's Office, and demonstrated a professional attempt to 
communicate with what has been a rogue County approach. 
Page #8 
You state, "In summary, Dr. Spencer's records review a 
longstanding history of "Clinical Depression with suicidal thoughts, 
Seasonal Affective Disorder and possible Attention Deficit Disorder" 
which began before his initial consult with her in October 1994." 
i Ms. Gibson merely asked Dr. Spencer if it was possible she 
might have Attention Deficit Disorder, as two of her children have 
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Page #9 
You state," ... exemplary performance with the exception of her 
admitted acceptance of overpayment on her payroll checks." 
This has been a focal error in your report. Ms. Gibson never 
knew of, nor ever knowingly "accepted" or admitted to "accepting" any 
overpayment of any payroll check, or any other type of disbursement 
from Ada County. Ms. Gibson never signed or received any "payroll 
checks", since none were ever issued to her after she signed the 
Automatic Paycheck Deposit Authorization form on May 6, 1998, 
authorizing the County to automatically deposit monthly pay into her 
bank account. Wages were directly deposited, no payroll checks 
were ever issued to or signed by or deposited by Ms. Gibson 
anywhere, at any time, during the period of June1998 through July 
1999. Ms. Gibson never had any knowledge of the County's 
administrative error until July 20, 1999. She emphatically denies ever 
having "accepted" any overpayments at any time. Due to an 
administrative error created and perpetuated by an Ada County 
Payroll Department Technician, Ada County direct deposited the 
overpayment into her joint checking account, without Ms. Gibson's 
con~ent or knowledge. Ms. Gibson and her husband never 
reconciled or balanced their checking account, and had no way to 
know if an overpayment or underpayment occurred. 
You state, "Various correspondence between attorney's, Ms. 
Gibson and the Sheriff's office were also reviewed. Case log 
summaries, pay voucher and overtime records were also reviewed. 
Further, the report of the "Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and 
Decision" made by the Ada County Personnel Hearing Officer. .. " 
. When you identified the Worker's Compensation case on your 
"inventory" of "forensic psychology experience" in your curriculum 
vitae received at my office as an enclosure with the February 20, 
2003 letter from Mr. Bauman, we became curious of your 
involvement before you had ever become involved. We wanted to 
give you the benefit of a likely error, but we must wonder how that 
erron occurred. Were there motives for your involvement in this 
dispute? You told Ms. Gibson, and state in your report, "I assured 
her that I had no role regarding the other lawsuits filed in this matter 
and I also assured her that I had had no contact with any other 
attorneys about her several legal cases and assured her that I had 
not reviewed any legal or medical documents related to the other 
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your report. This ongoing confusion requires caution and concern as 
to your role and purpose in this dispute, given the reference in you 
resume' and reference to documents received. 
Your efforts to analyze Ms. Gibson's psychological condition 
and injuries, has you reviewing three (3) different cases of legal 
disputes. A psychologist is to perform an unbiased "scientific" study 
of a person's behavior, resulting from the conduct of agency 
personnel. You need to understand the County requirement for an 
employee to sign pay vouchers is a violation of Federal law, and the 
action of Ada County officials mandating employees sign vouchers is 
also a violation of FLSA. Sheriff Killeen never had any lawful need or 
excuse to interrogate, investigate, threaten or take any form of action 
against Ms. Gibson, let alone the termination of her employment. 
Until you understand and accept that fact, you might continue in your 
belief her injury was somehow justified, and you might wish to 
continue your efforts to help a political agency and their surety, as a 
way to minimize the effects of their misguided conduct. 
You have read the June 2, 2003 letter of Mr. Bauman where 
he states the position of the County and the State Insurance Fund is 
that the claim is entirely without merit. He suggests in that letter that 
Federal law, State law, and the County employee merit system are of 
no importance or consequence when it comes to evaluating the 
entitlements of an individual who has been injured as a result of the 
County's violation of those laws and codes. We sincerely hope you 
don't accept that flawed logic. 
You misspelled the name of the Hearing Officer, "G. Lance 
Sallady." 
The correct spelling is Salladay. 
You state, "She had been ordered to appear for this evaluation 
by the Idaho Industrial Commission and was obviously quite 
emotional about her participation in the evaluation. Her emotional 
display was quite dramatic and she appeared upset." (Emphasis 
added). 
' In the next sentence you state she only appeared to be upset. 
In forensic evaluations, is it appropriate to mix up "behavioral" terms, 
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Page #10 
You state, "psychological testing was monitored and 
conducted using standardized procedures." 
Over eighty percent (80%) of the time during which Ms. 
Gibson was involved completing the test materials, she was never 
monitored by you or your office staff. 
You state, 'I assured her that I had no role regarding the other 
lawsuits filed in this matter. I also assured her that I had no contact 
with any other attorneys about her several legal cases and assured 
her that I had not reviewed any legal or medical documents related to 
the other pending cases." 
On July 11, 2003, Ms. Gibson requested you read a document 
(called a counterclaim) my office was preparing to file with the court in 
that case, as the document chronologically provided the historical 
series of events. It addressed the manner in which Ada County 
Payroll Department created and perpetuated the administrative error, 
the unlawful violations of FLSA, the action taken against Ms. Gibson 
by Sheriff Killeen, Legal Advisor to the Sheriff, R. Monte Macconnell, 
andiCounty agents, beginning on July 20, 1999. You told Ms. Gibson 
you would not read the document because you did not want to "bias" 
the outcome of your "forensic evaluation" of Ms. Gibson. Of 
significant interest, this was the precise case you forthrightly cited in 
your report on page #3, as having conducted an "extensive review" of 
a "Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial", but you incorrectly referred 
to it as Ms. Gibson's wrongful termination suit against Ada County 
She1'iff's Office. I appreciate you acknowledge Ms. Gibson was 
wrongfully terminated, but there was no Complaint created in that 
case that involved Ms. Gibson's wrongful employment termination. 
The document referred to in your report was prepared by the Ada 
Cou11ty Deputy Prosecuting Attorney, Ms. Kelli Ketlinski (Brauner), 
Case No. CV OC 01073940, which Ada County filed, seeking a claim 
for reimbursement for this "mistaken receipt of monies." (See page 3, 
line 17). Consequently, from your report, I must conclude you have 
reviewed some legal documentation that does relate to some of Ms. 
Gibson's other pending legal issues (not the Worker's Comp case). 
This case your refer to incorrectly is also identified to be the Worker's 
Compensation case on your inventory of "forensic psychology 
experience" contained in the copy of your curriculum vitae my office 
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Ms. Gibson says she never told you that her husband and her 
attorney are "running the case" and "they do not tell her anything 
about the cases because she can't understand it and gets too upset 
about the information." Mr. Gibson has assisted with the facts and 
events of the case, and to that possible extent, the facts do lend 
pulpose to the direction and outcome of her case, but doesn't run it. 
She also told you at times she is confused by legal terminology and 
the various court documents and pleadings prepared concerning her 
different cases. 
It is true Ms. Gibson does become emotional and upset about 
her cases (currently four (4), including the Worker's Compensation 
case). You state, "She said they do not tell her anything about the 
cases because she can't understand it and gets too upset about the 
information", yet you then state, "She said John talks about the 
different cases but she is unable to remember which one is which." 
Mr. Gibson is compassionate toward his wife's sensitivity to the 
issues involved, but does discuss the cases with Ms. Gibson on all 
important issues involved. Ms. Gibson (and Mr. Gibson) have each 
proofread this addendum and the contemporaneous letter to you. 
You state, "She said she had panic attacks when she saw an 
Ada County Sheriff's car and claimed that at those times she couldn't 
recognize where she was." 
You failed to incorporate the experience and details of the 
specific event Ms. Gibson told you she experienced on July 8, 2003, 
three (3) days before her evaluation with you. It was discussed with 
Dr. Heyrend on August 13, 2003. See Exhibit F. 
You state, Ms. Gibson "claims" she was "extorted" by Monte 
Macconnell, the legal counsel for the Ada County Sheriff's Office. 
Your report should better identify the unlawful event, as it was 
not a mere "claim". For a detailed description of Mr. MacConnell's 
extortious attempt, you need to refer to Exhibit 4. 
You state, "She said that she, her husband and her attorney 
are also considering filing a federal suit under the RICO Act 
(Racketeering and Influenced, Corrupt Organizations Act) against the 
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See comments in attached letter. 
Page #1 O - Page #11 
You state, "She reported Sheriff Vaughn Killeen has called her 
boss twice during the time she has been employed there" and "She 
bel/eves he is trying to unnerve her and to get her fired from her job, 
though she admitted she doesn't have any information as to why the 
Sheriff placed these calls." 
Ms. Gibson explained to you she was indeed emotional when 
she became aware Sheriff Killeen telephoned Mr. Rakozy, but 
learned (as she explained to you) the reason Sheriff Killeen claimed 
for the call was to solicit campaign contributions for his mayoral race. 
The conclusions you report are contrary to what she thought. 
You state, " ... though she didn't appear to understand the legal 
issues underlying Mr. Bower's decision to turn the investigation over 
to another county." 
Your report, through inferences, suggests Ms. Gibson should 
have an extensive knowledge concerning legal issues and her 
dispute with Ada County. Ms. Gibson is not confused about the 
unlawful actions County officials pursued against her. She does not 
undllrstand all terminology and processes utilized by the legal 
system, but she knows she was wrongfully treated by the County. 
You did express her concerns when you said she stated, "They 
threatened me that I would lose my career and be a felon and they 
have taken that from me. I feel like a victim." She knows they have 
done that to her, with no lawful cause, only regime efforts to achieve 
their wrongful end. For a detailed description of the action taken by 
Greg Bower, refer to the letter sent to you with this addendum. 
You state, "Her confusion, lack of information and lack of 
participation in her own legal matters have perhaps resulted in her 
som~times misunderstanding and misperceiving the actions and 
behaviors of others. She appeared variously anxious, sad, fearful 
and resentful when discussing the process of her termination from the 
Sheriff's Office, as well as her present life." 
We understand Ms. Gibson has been psychologically injured. 
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Gibson could not drive an automobile due to the emotional trauma 
she had experienced, and prescribed medications she had to use. 
Due to her injuries, Ms. Gibson did experience a lapse of memory 
(which still exists) and continuing fear and frustration why Sheriff 
Killeen would attempt to construct false charges against her and take 
away employment she earned and entitled to have. The event of this 
misconduct was triggered because of an administrative error caused 
by County Payroll Department personnel, and he assumed Ms. 
Gibson should share the blame. Ms. Gibson has no 
misunderstanding how her law enforcement career has been 
wrdngfully taken away from her. What she does not understand is 
why the behavior of the County agents was allowed to transpire into 
such a vindictive pursuit over the County's own error, at her expense, 
especially since the County Code, State law and Federal law are 
intended to protect her rights. 
Page #11 
You state, "She said her parents were going to separate at 
one point when she was in grade school because, "My father beat the 
crap out of me" and "She said she was out of school for one week 
beqrnse of severe bruising from this beating." 
You quote Ms. Gibson as having made these statements. 
What she \old you was she does not remember her father beating the 
crap out of her, being out of school because of severe bruising from 
this beating, or that her parents were going to separate. She also 
told you this information was hearsay told to her by her brother and 
sister. Hopefully, you have a recording of your interview, so this error 
can be addressed to your assured acceptance. 
Page #12 
You state, "It was through her first boyfriend that she was 
introduced to her first husband, Alan at age 14." 
Ms. Gibson told you it was a previous boyfriend (not her first 
boyfriend) who introduced her to her first husband, Allen (not Alan). 
You state, "Ms. Gibson stated she gained 100 pounds during 
the pregnancy." 
Ms. Gibson told you she gained approximately 60 pounds 
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Page #13 
You state, "He worked for Fed-Ex." 
Ms. Gibson told you her son is currently employed by Fed-Ex. 
You state, "He had been married and divorced four times and 
was physically abusive to her." 
Ms. Gibson told you the individual involved had physically 
abused her one time, and one time only. 
You state, "They offered mutual support to each other and 
carried on a long distance relationship talking on the phone and 
seeing each other occasionally for dinner in Boise." 
Ms. Gibson told you that during their relationship, she and 
John Gibson had dinner together one time when she came to Boise 
on company business. 
Page #13- Page #14 
You state, "In reviewing this history, Ms. Gibson admitted she 
has been too na'1've, too trusting and easily manipulated. She 
acknowledged having high dependency needs and admitted to being 
in denial about exploitive interpersonal relationships" and When Ms. 
Gibson became involved with John she felt she had found someone 
who would take care of her." 
' Ms. Gibson did not tell you she found someone "who would 
take care of her." She told you he loved her for the person she was, 
not that she needed someone to take care of her. 
It may be fair to characterize Ms. Gibson was too trusting in 
her relationship with agents of Ada County and the Sheriff's Office, as 
they did violate her dignity and rights of employment. As you 
acknowledged in your report, Ms. Gibson was an exemplary 
employee, yet she neglected to "keep constant guard" against County 
agents who would maliciously harm her (and her career) because 
those agents had not complied with their job duties and descriptions. 
Thos,e agents conspired to violate Ms, Gibson's rights, knowing she 
had hot violated the Sheriff's Office Policy Manual, nor had she 
violated the Ada County Code, Idaho State law or Federal law. 
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and Greg Bower undertook unlawful actions against Ms. Gibson, and 
she feels she is a victim of this abuse of power. No Ada County 
Payroll Technician was disciplined because of the creation of the 
administrative error. 
Page #14 
You state. "He had had a longstanding job in food biology with 
Ciba-Geigy." 
Mr. Gibson was employed for eighteen (18) years as a Senior 
Marketing Specialist in Ciba-Geigy's Crop Protection Division, selling 
and marketing crop protection products (agricultural chemicals), not 
"food biology." 
You state, "During the first year of their marriage, John was 
traveling a lot on business in Nevada. She said, "He has always 
loved gambling; It's an addiction." He made a large amount of money 
on gambling during this time period and did not withhold taxes from 
his gambling income", and "She took money out of her IRA to pay the 
Internal Revenue Service." 
John and Stacy Gibson were married in April 1996. Mr. 
Gibson took early retirement from Ciba-Geigy effective September 1, 
1996, only three (3) months after they were married. Nevada was 
part of Mr. Gibson's sale's territory, but over 95% of his monthly travel 
occurred across Southern Idaho. Eastern Idaho and Eastern Oregon 
(Malheur County). During that period following their marriage, Mr. 
Gibson did not travel to Nevada. 
. Mr. Gibson has been educated in the context of "calculated 
risk", as his training and skills with chemicals, pests, weeds and crop 
mortality concerns, and has calculated risks understanding and 
familiar with alternative crop planning and methodology. 
Consequently, calculated risk ventures have been a natural and 
normal state of analysis for him, so he has come to enjoy recreational 
gambling at calculated risk games at times while he traveled in 
Nevada. Ms. Gibson denies she ever characterized his enjoyment as 
an "addiction". The essence of any tax issue over his gambling 
revenue did not come from "failing to withhold taxes" at all. Whatever 
your conversation was with her, you did not glean the facts correctly 
from her. The tax dispute he experienced arose from the Federal 
1099s generated at the resort facility, creating a tax assessment for 
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gambler's luck in Nevada, and he replenished the entertainment 
machines, which consumed those short-term winnings. He was left 
with a fake 1099 income, which was later clarified by the resorts. 
Ms. Gibson never told you, "She took money out of her IRA to 
pay the Internal Revenue Service." What she told you was she took 
money out of her IRA to help pay off some of the debt each of them 
hatl carried over from their past relationships. When Mr. Gibson took 
early retirement in September 1996, he closed out his 401 k for 
approximately $35,000.00, expecting to roll the funds into a new 
account when he found a new job. Because of their existing debt 
load combined, the money was instead utilized to pay off debt, and 
did not roll over, and consequently, tax penalties accrued because of 
early withdrawal and not re-vested. In 1997, Ms. Gibson utilized her 
$2,,876.21 from her own IRA to pay off debt they had. 
You state, "In September 1996, Ms. Gibson said her husband 
decided to take an early retirement from his longstanding job with 
Ciba-Geigy because he was tired of having to travel for work", 
"However, she said he could not find a job for approximately 2 ½ 
years", "Some time in 1999 Mr. Gibson became employed again", 
"She named at least four jobs that he has held since 1999", and "She 
did· not acknowledge that he had actually been terminated or laid off 
from these positions. This is at odds with statements made in her 
deposition and Dr. Spencer's medical records indicating that her 
husband had in fact lost jobs or been laid off rather than voluntarily 
quitting." 
Mr. Gibson's employment with Ciba-Geigy was for eighteen 
(18) years and required him to drive approximately 40,000 miles per 
year, and be away from home 12-15 nights per month. When he 
became eligible for early retirement, he wanted employment that 
would allow him to be with his family, not because "he was tired of 
having to travel for work." Mr. Gibson became reemployed in 
January 1997. 
Ms. Gibson would have told to you whether Mr. Gibson "had 
actually been terminated or laid off from these positions", but you 
never asked her during your "interview". Therefore, your conclusion 
or suggestion inferring Ms. Gibson was trying to· hide details 
concerning Mr. Gibson's employment history is frustrating, since Ms. 
Gibson gave the information contained in Dr. Spencer's reports and 
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Is your attempt to say Mr. Gibson's employment history relates 
to Ms. Gibson's emotional health? Your focus should be her 
employment related injuries that began on and after July 20, 1999, 
while she was employed with the Ada County Sheriff's Office. Mr. 
Gibson took unilateral action to resign from his employment with one 
company because of their unscrupulous business practices. Of the 
other past employment positions Mr. Gibson has held, Mr. Gibson 
was either terminated as an employee "at will" and with no reason 
given, or by mutual agreement with the employer. 
Stated throughout your report, i.e. on page #8 (Personnel 
Records of the Ada County Sheriff's Office), "Both Probationary 
Employee's Monthly Evaluation Reports and Employee Performance 
Review Reports indicate that Ms. Gibson was a good to excellent 
employee throughout her employment at the Sheriff's Office. She 
was repeatedly found satisfactory in such areas as iQQ knowledge, 
acduracy, attendance, rate of work, judgment, responsibility, initiative 
and interest, cooperation, sociability, personality and departmental 
values. Notations by Gary Rouse for example on June 11, 1998 
indicate that Stacy Gibson had a very good working relationship with 
her co-workers. She was considered a team player and was always 
willing to pitch in. She was described as a quick learner doing an 
excellent job. "The jail will be getting the type of employee we all 
waqj." She was repeatedly recognized for her hard work and values 
as an employee". On page #9 you state, "Following her transfer to 
the Ada County Jail, Sergeant Wellman noted on February 13, 1999 
that Stacy had "a great outlook on the type of work she does in the 
@lj and the Sheriff's Department as a whole." She reportedly always 
had a positive attitude, got along well with other employees and the 
general public and treated inmates in a professional manner. She 
was described as "self-motivated" and "an asset to the Sheriff's 
Department." During her time of employment she successfully 
completed five i§jj correspondence courses and was working on two 
additional courses at the time the payroll investigation began. She 
successfully completed 16 employee training courses between March 
199§ and June 1999. Her tenure at the Ada County Sheriff's Office 
was punctuated by voluntary overtime, efforts toward continuing 
education and exemplary performance ... " On page #15 you state, 
" ... and in fact, her record indicates a history of long, stable 
employment with good i.QQ performance" and "(she) frequently 
volunteered for new projects, overtime work and continuing 
education." (Emphasis added). ' 
Through your "forensic" evaluation and assessment of Ms. 
Gib$on's injuries, including the review of three (3) of Ms. Gibson's 
legal cases, her medical records, her personnel records concerning 
16 
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hei· employment history and behavior while employed with the Ada 
County Sheriffs Office, you then conclude in your report that on or 
after July 20, 1999, the injuries received by Ms. Gibson's from the 
unlawful misconduct of Ada County agents "do no constitute the 
predominate cause of her symptoms as compared to all other causes 
co07bined in her life ... ". If you believe that, then how do you intend to 
explain how you described Ms. Gibson's performance on pages # 8, 
9 & 15, as there you say: 
"gQod to excellent employee throughout her employment." . 
"found satisfactory in such areas as jQQ knowledge, accuracy, 
attendance, rate of work, judgment, responsibility, initiative and 
interest, cooperation, sociability, personality and departmental 
values." 
"good working relationship with her co-workers." 
"a tkam player and was always willing to pitch in." 
"quick learner doing an excellent job." 
"The jail will be getting the type of employee we all want" 
"repeatedly recognized for her hard work and values as an 
employee." 
"Stacy had "a great outlook on the type of work she does in the @! 
and the Sheriffs Department as a whole." 
"positive attitude, got along well with other employees and the 
general public and treated inmates in a professional manner." 
"self-motivated" and "an asset to the Sheriff's Department" 
"she successfully completed five @! correspondence courses and 
was working on two additional courses at the time the payroll 
inve'stigation began." 
"Sh~ successfully completed 1§ employee training courses between 
Maroh1998andJune1999." 
"Her tenure at the Ada County Sheriff's Office was punctuated by 
voluntary overtime, efforts toward continuing education and 
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" ... and in fact, her record indicates a history of long, stable 
employment with good jQ)2 performance." 
"(she) frequently volunteered for new proiects, overtime work and 
continuing education." 
These positive comments concerning Ms. Gibson's mental 
state and attitude about her work and behavior at work, i.e. job 
performance, values, integrity, initiative, a job she loved, is seen as a 
contradiction to your conclusion about what caused Ms. Gibson's 
injuries. Your conclusion is not supported by logic of a prior enduring 
trauma. 
After Ms. Gibson enjoyed a stable environment with her 
husband in 1996, and until Ms. Gibson was confrontationally 
interrogated on July 20, 1999, she experienced no traumatic 
disruption in her life. She had two (2) things she had always wanted. 
A person that loved her for who she was, and a career in law 
enforcement she had always dreamed of being part of her life. 
During that time period, Ms. Gibson was without emotional stress, 
qui6kly advancing within the career she desired to have. Your report 
leads one to wonder as to the basis for your conclusions. 
The logical conclusion is: Ms. Gibson was psychologically 
injured because of the actions and process utilized against her 
through the efforts and direction of Sheriff Killeen. The resulting 
injures caused her to experience this level of Post-Traumatic Stress 
Disctirder she has been left to endure. 
You state, "In late 1998 or early 1999 the couple decided to file. 
for bankruptcy" and "She attributed this primarily to their tax 
pro9lems with the IRS due to Mr. Gibson's gambling winnings." 
That was a factor in filing, but never did she tell you that 
described by her to be the focus of the filing. During this "internal 
affairs" interrogation of Ms. Gibson, Detective Scott Johnson 
accused Ms. Gibson (and her husband) of using the Chapter 13 
reorganization proceeding initiated months before to avoid 
reimbursement to the County, despite the fact Grant King's Law 
Offiq;e had been involved with the Gibsons before the 
administrative error was even created (October 1998). Detective 
Scott Johnson persisted in falsely accusing Ms. Gibson of using 
the Chapter 13 proceedings to avoid payback to Ada County. His 
false concepts persisted, despite knowing the assistance of a 
Chapter 13 was initiated with Grant King's Law Office before the 
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been listed on any schedules as a creditor, as the County 
overpayment was never known to them. Mr. King filed the 
Cr/apter 13 in May 1999. 
Ms. Gibson never told you the Chapter 13 was filed 
because of problems with the IRS, or Mr. Gibson's gambling 
winnings. The essence of their tax dispute was based upon the 
Federal 1099s generated, creating a tax assessment against Mr. 
Gibson for "income" he never had, as it was generated during his 
period of gambler's luck in Nevada, and he replenished the 
entertainment machines with those short-term winnings. Mr. Gibson 
suffered an unplanned consequence of a tax liability when he did not 
rollover the $35,000.00 he withdrew from his 401 k when he took early 
retirement in September 1996. With the "phantom income" from the 
' Nevada 1099's and the tax liability created from early withdrawal from 
his 401 k, Mr. and Mrs. Gibson came into their relationship with debt 
load, and a commitment to "pool" their earnings and settle with 
creditors who were entitled to be paid, regardless of whose debt it 
was. 
You state, "She denied ever having been arrested or convicted 
of qriminal activity." 
You should be conscious of the fact Ms. Gibson would never 
be hired by the Sheriff's Office if she had any criminal activity. That is 
the exact reason she made the denial obvious to you. Ms. Gibson 
has never been arrested or convicted of any criminal activity. The 
Sheriff's Office conducted a thorough background check through 
NCiC to verify that with every employee. 
Page #15 
You state, once again, "as a Records Technician." 
Ms. Gibson completed all assessments required of her, and 
she was selected, appointed and hired by Sheriff Vaughn Killeen, as 
a Police Records Clerk I, assigned to the Boise State University 
(BSU) Substation of the Sheriff's Office, at a base monthly wage of 
$1,215.00, effective July 10, 1997, as approved by the Ada County 
Board of County Commissioners and the Ada County Human 
Resburces Director, Terry Johnson, and identified in the Notice of 
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You state, "She reportedly enjoyed her job and performed her 
work duties well" and "She reportedly enjoyed a good rapport with her 
co-workers and superior officers." 
You have verified on pages # 8, 9 & 15, Ms. Gibson was 
"perceived" or "reportedly" "enjoyed her job", "performed her work 
duties well" or "reportedly" "enjoyed a good rapport with her co-
workers and superior officers." Your use of "reportedly" lends a 
perception those statements are questioned or not true. The facts 
insist a conclusion be made Ms. Gibson was an excellent employee; 
never been reprimanded for anything; performed her duties well; did 
enjoy her job and did have good rapport with her co-workers and 
superior officers. Those statements lead to the conclusion Ms. 
Gibson was an honorable and trustworthy employee, and no 
underlying events to say her past demonstrated any trauma of a past 
. psychological injury, or was of the background to suggest she 
"acknowledges receiving these monthly overpayments for a period 
beginning in November 1998 through June 1999." Such was never 
the case, so you need to review the tapes or transcripts of the 
interviews where "She was questioned thoroughly, directly and 
intensively regarding her knowledge of and acceptance of this 
overpayment." 
You misrepresented what Ms. Gibson told you when you said, 
"She stated she did not know why she was being summoned to the 
Sheriffs Office." 
Ms. Gibson told you she did not know why Detective Glenn 
had asked her to come to the Sheriffs Office on July 20, 1999, but 
she expected it would be another special assignment, as other 
supervisors had arranged her schedule to gain additional knowledge 
for her law enforcement career and qualify for additional overtime. 
You state, "She said she was interviewed in a small room with 
a table and two chairs." 
Ms. Gibson told you she was interviewed in a small room with 
a desk and two chairs, not a table. 
You state, "When confronted with the pay vouchers Ms. 
Gibson said she acknowledged the eight months of receiving over 
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When Ms. Gibson was shown copies of the vouchers by 
Detective Glenn, she said the vouchers as always, did look incorrect 
and inaccurate, and told him, repeatedly, she was not aware of 
overpayments being made into her joint account. She told him of 
prJvious errors created by the County Payroll Department, and 
discussed her repeated attempts to have those errors corrected. She 
explained to Detective Glenn how she was told by her supervisor 
(Sergeant Gary Rouse) and by Karen Bond, that if she wanted to get 
paid, it was mandatory she had to sign the pay voucher, even if it was 
incorrect. 
You quoted Ms. Gibson when you stated she quoted Detective 
Glenn as having said, "We will come and get you." 
, Ms. Gibson was explaining to you her intrinsic fear that 
Detective Johnson or Glenn would "come and get her" because of 
their accusations and threats she would get jail time, become a felon, 
pay restitution, career terminated, and believed she was a co-
conspirator in this overpayment matter. 
You state, "She reported she offered to reimburse the County 
with her overtime, comp time, vacation time and a reduction in pay" 
and "She claimed she was never given an accurate accounting of the 
amount owed." 
This isn't just a reported concept, it is documented fact. If you 
listen to the interrogation tapes and review the transcript of those 
tapes, you would recognize Ms. Gibson did, not less than eight (8) 
times offer reimbursement with accrued overtime, accrued comp 
time, and accrued vacation time. 
Ms. Gibson never received an accurate accounting of any 
money Ada County claims overpaid to Ms. Gibson. Mr. Gibson hired 
Larry Stewart, a Licensed Public Accountant, to review all wages, and 
pay records available to Ms. Gibson, and confirmed discrepancies 
existed in wages and compensation due her, as reported on her W-2 
Form, compared to pay vouchers, records and pay documents. See 
Exhibit G. 
Commitments made by Ms. Gibson to Detectives Glenn and 
Johi;ison concerning reimbursement were ignored be the County, and 
the County also declined to act upon the doctrine of "good faith" and 
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intended and addressed in Ada County Code, § 1-?C-6B, which 
states: 
"The rate of pay of an employee may be reduced by the 
responsible elected official, with the consent of the Board, for 
administrative reasons such as: Overpayments made due to 
administrative or other errors." (Emphasis added). See 
Exhibit H. 
Your report should focus on the true problem (an 
administrative error creating an overpayment) and focus on the 
intended County solution (pay reduction under the Code). Why 
would your "forensic" report fail to discover and accept that fact? 
Page #15 · #16 
You state, "She also indicated her husband John feels guilty 
because he doesn't know where the money went." 
This is a misrepresentation of what Ms. Gibson told you during 
the "interviews". She told you neither she, nor her husband, John, 
were reconciling their joint checking account, and Mr. Gibson was 
frustrated because he had been too busy to view the account 
statEiment. She never told you her husband felt "guilty because he 
doesn't know where the money went." 
You state, "She also acknowledged that her husband, John, 
made frequent ATM withdrawals during that time. 
During the period the County overpaid Ms. Gibson (October 
1998 through June 1999), Mr. Gibson was employed as an industrial 
and agricultural equipment sales representative by Mountain View 
Equipment, Meridian, Idaho. He was responsible for the sale of new 
and used equipment, contacting the current and prospective new 
custbmers, and traveled throughout three (3) states frequently to 
achieve those goals. His travel caused him to be away from home, 
sometimes two (2) to three (3) nights per week, and instead of 
carrying cash with him, he accessed A TM machines in the towns he 
visited and used his debit card for motels and meals. It was not 
uncommon for Mr. Gibson to make deposits or withdrawals from their 
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Page#16 
You represent Ms. Gibson recollects specific events when you 
state, "These claims are inconsistent with her detailed recollections 
and direct quotations of those interviews." 
For approximately one (1) year following July 20, 1999, Ms. 
Gibson was distraught, depressed, and on prescribed medication for 
her injuries. She was in a state of shock from the County's 
misconduct, and she experienced a loss of memory as to some 
events that occurred after July 20, 1999. She was taking prescribed 
medication that left her unable to drive for a period of time, or 
remember consequently what occurred on July 20, 1999, and when 
her husband discussed events recorded on the interrogation tapes to 
refresh her memory, she experienced more pain and stress. Every 
time, as she was starting to recover and become stable again, the 
County would, and with a vengeance, re-injure her (i.e. October 5, 
1999), or asked to describe the event or listen to tapes, causing her 
to f draw into her shell as a defense mechanism. 
There is no variance between what Ms. Gibson told you and 
the transcripts and audio recordings of those two (2) interrogations. 
That's why she believes they will "come and get you." Mr. Gibson or 
her counsel, has continuously, but gently, discussed in detail, 
sometimes quoting exact statements from the transcripts to Ms. 
Gibson, or discussing relevant issues with her, and we have made a 
painstaking effort to help her understand she should not feel guilty for 
what the County has done to her. 
You state, "In her deposition, dated January 28, 2003, Ms. 
Gibson described these interviews as "brutal and verbally abusive", 
though she denied having been yelled at, physically intimidated, 
touched or called names during the interview. 
A current definition of psychological abuse is as follows: 
"The behavior and attitude of any person that 
negligently or purposely 
behavioral, intellectual, 
functioning of another is 
abuse" (Emphasis added). 
endangers or impairs the 
emotional or physical 
regarded as psychological 
These Detectives are trained to interrogate, and use 
psychological games to unnerve the so-called criminal element. 
23 
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When you turn a well-trained mad dog Qust like a well-trained 
Detective) on an innocent person, the experience is not just 
unnecessary, it's a well-planned brutal attack, with or without the 
physical presence of teeth marks. Here, we had two mad dogs, so 
expect to find double destruction. If you truly believe she was not 
psychologically and emotionally battered during those two "brutal and 
verbally abusive" interrogations, then we simply must say you haven't 
had the unfortunate experience to be subject to such a psychological 
torture chamber. Detectives Johnson and Glenn purposely behaved 
with an attitude which endangered Ms. Gibson's behavioral, 
intellectual and emotional functioning when they called her a liar, 
threatened her with criminal prosecution, when they-4:hreateRed...+ieF------
with jail time, all the while humiliating her during those sessions. 
Their actions were both malicious as well as negligent, purposely and 
maliciously orchestrated in a manner to extract a "confession" from 
Ms. Gibson, because they are trained to do that, yet they well knew 
prior to conducting their "interrogations" she was innocent, not 
involved in creating or perpetuating the administrative errors, and was 
not 'even aware of "overpayments". Sheriff Killeen and R. Monte 
Macconnell exhibited a behavior and attitude toward Ms. Gibson by 
unlawfully constructing the termination of her employment. In all 
aspects of this case, Ms. Gibson has not only been psychologically 
abused, but verbally abused and tortured within every sense of the 
purpose and meaning of the word. 
Of importance, psychological ( or emotional) abuse does not 
always abruptly happen, nor abruptly stop. It is a behavioral pattern 
that occurs over a period of time. As with Ms. Gibson, these County 
abusers pushed the limits of their tactics, such as Mr. Macconnell 
using extortion to get Ms. Gibson to resign her employment, or 
placing her on leave without pay and canceling her medical benefits. 
The County agents tend to discount or trivialize the County's 
partidpating role in this continuing saga, and even go to the extent of 
stonewalling Ms. Gibson's efforts to obtain Worker's Comp benefits, 
and have undermined and impugned Ms. Gibson's character. 
You state, "In reviewing the audio recordings and the 
tran9cripts of these interviews, there is no evidence of verbal or 
physical abuse, nor is there any evidence of sexual innuendo or 
harassment. The interviews were conducted in a professional 
manher. Tape recordings and transcripts reveal a pattern of 
persistent questioning and a discussion of possible legal and 
personnel consequences for Ms. Gibson's acceptance of 
overpayment in salary. Throughout these interviews Ms. Gibson 
claimed her innocence and ignorance regarding her receipt of eight 
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As previously addressed in my letter and this manuscript, and 
now confirmed as stated above in your report, Ms. Gibson had no 
knowledge of either the administrative error, or the overpayments to 
her joint checking account. 
If you think these Detectives (like mad dogs) exhibit "no 
evidence of verbal or physical abuse", then we must accept your 
conclusion as a statement of no past experience in mad dog behavior 
and the emotional ramifications that follow. You know from reviewing 
the interrogation tapes and transcripts, Sheriff's Office agents called 
Ms. Gibson a liar, threatened her with felony charges and jail time. 
The Sheriff's Policy Manual, § 7.05 (effective October 1998, and 
approved by Sheriff Killeen), in addition to the provisions of FLSA, 
prohibit the detective(s) from threatening Ms. Gibson with punitive 
action such as felony charges and jail time, and subsection (7) 
prohibit the detectives, Sheriff Killeen, Mr. MacConnell, Greg Bower, 
or any Ada County personnel from subjecting Ms. Gibson "to punitive 
action· because of the exercise of privileges granted (to her) under 
this order or the exercise of any rights under the U.S. Constitution, 
lda~o Constitution, or applicable law. Those attacks against Ms. 
Gibson were nothing less than being clearly verbally abusive, and a 
form of harassment, especially since Ms. Gibson truthfully told them 
she had done nothing wrong, was not aware of any overpayments, 
and even without any confirming audit of what monies were overpaid, 
she volunteered to make available her accrued overtime, comp time, 
vacation time and holiday time to correct the error that was 
"exC!usively" to be addressed by pay reductions and allowances. 
Ada County personnel confirmed a Payroll Department Technician 
created the administrative error in Ms. Gibson's wage determination 
(an FLSA violation), but you need to know that in three different 
written communications compiled by Ada County personnel, Ms. 
Gibson has been informed of three different amounts she was 
overpaid (more of the County's errors in progress). 
You state, "Ms Gibson apparently kept careful records and 
accounting of her work schedule and this formed the basis of her 
claims for overtime and comp time. 
Ms. Gibson kept only a small calendar, onto which she 
ente/·ed dates and times of her schedule and overtime work. She 
kept no elaborate tables, logs or spreadsheets to calculate what any 
pay period would generate, because those fiduciary obligations 





October 29, 2003 
can see that even the County can't keep it straight, and is why this 
became an FLSA issue. · 
You state, "Ms. Gibson claimed to have been confused and 
frustrated by mistakes made by the payroll department of Ada 
County. She stated she complained to the payroll department about 
having been shorted for payment of overtime until the time of her 
transfer to the jail in October 1998. Ms. Gibson apparently kept 
careful records and accounting of her work schedule and this formed 
the basis of her claims for overtime and comp time. Ms. Gibson 
stated she made several attempts to have paychecks corrected but 
claimed she was made to feel stupid by employees in the payroll 
department. She insisted they told her to sign her payroll voucher in 
ordr,r to receive her check. They assured her they could correct the 
errors the following month. She stated the paychecks were never 
correct and she was not being paid fully for accrued overtime. She 
claimed she simply gave up on keeping track of her paycheck and 
quit checking her payroll vouchers during the same month she 
transferred to the jail and began receiving a paycheck of 
approximately double her salary. She indicated her overtime made it 
too confusing for her and she simply decided it wasn't worth it to 
revi19w her pay stubs. This is inconsistent with the fact that Ms. 
Gibson kept a clear accounting of overtime for which she was due 
comoensation throughout her employment with the Ada County 
Sheriff's Office." (Emphasis added). 
Your apparent agenda is showing all to clearly. Maybe you 
need to see the sketchy calendar onto which she entered her work 
schedule and hours. It represents no "clear accounting." Ms. Gibson 
did tell the Detectives she had found record-keeping errors in her 
"pay vouchers'; that she had contacted Karen Bond about those "pay 
voucher" errors after being instructed to do so by her Supervisor, 
Sergeant Gary Rouse; that Karen Bond stated to her, "if she wanted 
to get paid anything, she had to sign the voucher, even if it was 
incorrect"; that after numerous attempts with no success at having 
Ada County Payroll Department issue a correct "pay voucher", she 
succumbed to living with incorrect "pay vouchers", like most, if not all 
employees who worked overtime. She made no further attempt to 
read or verify "pay vouchers" when they were known to be incorrect. 
' Ms. Gibson never signed or received any "payroll checks", 
since none were issued to her once in their system from the 
Automatic Paycheck Deposit Authorization form on May 6, 1998. The 
County automatically deposited monthly pay into · the joint bank 
account. No payroll checks were ever issued to or signed by or 
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9.fil1osited by Ms. Gibson anywhere, any time, during any period of 
June1998 through July 1999. With all due respect, there are some 
very critical facts you have yet to address. 
After Ms. Gibson's promotional transfer to the Ada County Jail 
Facility on October 16, 1998, Ada County Payroll Department, under 
the' direction of the Sheriff Killeen, misapplied the FLSA "7k 
exemption" to civilian employees of the Ada County Jail Facility, 
inciuding Ms. Gibson. The "7k exemption" is available only to be 
used for paying overtime compensation with "law enforcement" 
personnel as specifically defined. A public employer using the "7k 
exemption" standard does not pay overtime compensation until the 
"law enforcement" employee works more than 171 hours in a 28-day 
period. Overtime compensation is only then due after 171 hours in a 
28-day period. "Law enforcement" personnel are affirmatively defined 
to mean "employees who are empowered by state or local ordinance 
to enforce laws designed to maintain peace and order, protect life 
and property, and prevent and detect crimes; who have the power to 
arrest; and who have undergone training in law enforcement". 
Pursuant to the United States Code of Federal Regulations, Title 29, 
§ 553.211 through § 553.212, Ms. Gibson has never met this 
statutory criteria as being a "law enforcement" personnel, because 
she did not have the power to arrest (she was a non-commissioned 
deputy, not a candidate for the Post Academy, nor eligible to receive 
retirement benefits pursuant to "Rule 80", Public Employees 
Retirement System of Idaho (PERS/), with eligibility only for "law 
enforcement" personnel. Ada County was required by law to 
compensate Ms. Gibson for overtime under § 207 (a)(1) of FLSA, 
which requires work time in excess of forty (40) hours per week to be 
compensated "at a rate not less than one and one-half times the 
regular rate at which an employee is employed." That takes detailed 
calculation; something Ms. Gibson gave up trying to do because they 
were correcting errors from past pay periods. The County, alone, had 
the sole duty to calculate correct overtime. 
' At no time was Ada County, the Ada County Payroll 
Department, or the Ada County Sheriff's Office, ever entitled to utilize 
the "7k exemption" (FLSA, § 207 (k)) in the determination and 
disbursement of wages for overtime hours worked by Ms. Gibson 
while employed with the Ada County Sheriff's Office. See Title 29, 
Part 553 of the Code of Federal Regulations, § 553.211 and § 
553.212. 
Ms. Gibson did indicate her overtime made it too confusing for 
her, and she simply decided it wasn't worth it to review pay stubs, 
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was an employee for a public agency required to compensate her at 
an hourly rate. However, because of the clever extrapolation and 
accounting methods, Ada County decided to pay individuals (such as 
Ms. Gibson) with what the County called a monthly salary. Ms. 
Gibson's wages, while employed at the Jail Facility, were called a 
"m<1,nthly salary", another contradiction and violation of the provisions 
of FLSA. The County apparently estimated the average number of 
hours Ms. Gibson would work during an average period of twelve-
morths, and decided to multiply those hours by her hourly wage, and 
divide the total "annual" wage by twelve, which the Payroll 
Department called a "monthly salary". The County Payroll 
Department attempted to standardize a computer system for monthly 
disbursements and wanted it to be the same (with the exception of 
overtime) for each month. For Ms. Gibson to understand the 
provisions of the "7k exemption" and to accurately calculate monthly 
overtime (or 28-day overtime) it presents a conundrum of variations 
and possibilities. To enhance the existing conundrum concerning the 
"7k 'exemption", Ada County paid regular wages from the first of each 
month until the end of the month, and overtime accounting was done 
from the 21 st of the month through the 20th of the next month. With all 
that, how can you draw a conclusion Ms. Gibson could or did 
calculate her wages due, when the system was impossible to ever 
get any two computations to match? For example, look at the three 
different payback determinations they developed. To say Ms. Gibson 
was
1 
confused over how to calculate her overtime is aggravated by 
the County's misuse and violations of FLSA. 
As previously noted in this memorandum and my letter, Ms. 
Gibson was under no obligation or responsibility (legal or otherwise), 
to keep, calculate, verify, reconcile, or in any other manner take any 
action to insure the correctness of disbursements by the County, and 
the attempt of this County and County Sheriff to transfer their record-
keeping obligation to Ms. Gibson is deceitful, furtive and an unlawful 
violation of FLSA. 
Page #17 
You state, "She stated she was so upset, anxious and 
over.whelmed that she needed these medications." 
It was Dr. Spencer, not Ms. Gibson, who determined what Ms. 
Gibson needed for her inflicted injury, and the assistance of certain 
prescribed medications did help her to overcome the traumatic and 
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You state, "She stated she was dysfunctional during the 
months following these interviews and her subsequent termination of 
employment in August 1999. She described being overwhelmed, 
anxious and depressed for months. Initially Ms. Gibson reported she 
couldn't sleep at all and began compulsive cleaning." 
You must understand that initially, on July 20, 1999, Sheriff 
Kilk~en directed Detective Johnson to place Ms. Gibson on 
Administrative Leave With Pay. However, on August 23, 1999, R. 
Monte Macconnell, acting in behalf of the Sheriff, requested 
(through my office) that Ms. Gibson accept Administrative Leave 
Without Pay. Ms. Gibson, in a spirit of good faith, and until the 
error could be restored through salary reductions, agreed but only 
if, Ada County would continue medical benefits coverage, during 
the period of administrative leave, as she was now on medicine 
for acute depression, insomnia and anxiety attacks that had 
resulted from this County misconduct. That was the only basis 
she could agree to accept status of Leave Without Pay. You will 
note in your forensic review of the applicable Code provisions that 
the County was wrong to even ask that of her, without first 
conducting a due process hearing. Ms. Gibson caused a letter to 
be sent to confirm precisely what she would agree to, and 
identified the only status of non-pay she would accept regarding 
Administrative Leave in her effort to exercise her good faith duty of 
cooperation in her contractual employment relationship. 
Notwithstanding that letter and contrary to the County merit 
system found within the Ada County Code, the Sheriff's Legal 
Advisor, acting on behalf of the Sheriff, disregarded the stated 
basis of acceptance and unilaterally placed Ms. Gibson on 
Administrative Leave Without Pay, and deliberately cancelled her 
medical benefits. Those wrongful events were memorialized by 
letter of August 25, 1999, violating the express condition set forth 
by Ms. Gibson, and thereupon created a violation of Ada County 
Code, § 1-7G-3, setting forth the specific conditions upon which 
an employee can be placed on Administrative Leave Without Pay. 
See Exhibits I & J. 
Shortly after July 20, 1999, Mr. Gibson observed she was 
exp<jlriencing severe medical symptoms from her psychological 
injuries caused by the actions of Ada County, and for 
approximately three months following July 20, 1999, Mr. Gibson 
proactively encouraged his wife to get up and not stay in bed all 
day. In his effort to help alleviate some depression, Mr. Gibson 
decided to suggest daily "chores" and "activities" on Post-It-Notes® 
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events, and preoccupy her thinking time from what Ada County 
had done to her. 
Page #18 
You state, "This is inconsistent with her report of having 
little or no memory for these events." 
What you claim Ms. Gibson told you is not inconsistent with 
any part of the Record. As previously disclosed, Mr. Gibson has 
been the one who continuously discussed with her various events, 
sometimes quoting exact statements from the transcripts to Ms. 
Gibson, or discussing other issues with her, and he made the effort to 
make her understand she should not feel guilty for what the County 
has done to her, as it was not her duty to keep accounting records of 
wage disbursements. 
You state, "In one particularly poignant and disturbing 
dre:;im, she sees a Christmas tree and "all of the sudden the 
Christmas tree turns into a monster." 
Ms. Gibson states she never in her life experienced a 
nightmare as you have described in your report, nor did she tell you 
of any such occurrence during her appointments with you. Ms. 
Gibson told you about the tornado nightmare, and being the only one 
she ihas memories of. The only other dream was having to tell John 
and the children about these fake allegations made against her. She 
remembers the dream context only, and none of the details, and she 
made you aware when she told you about the tornado nightmares 
she has. 
You state, "Ms. Gibson reports having "anxiety attacks" and 
"flashbacks" when she sees an Ada County Sheriff's Department 
vehicle." 
Your report should have incorporated the experience and 
details of the specific event Ms. Gibson told you she experienced on 
July 8, 2003, three (3) days before her evaluation with you. It was 
discwssed with Dr. Heyrend on August 13, 2003. See Exhibit F. 
You state, "She stated she fears they are going to arrest her, 
though she acknowledged she knows this is irrational. She is aware 
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You may have been able to get Ms. Gibson to concede and 
agi'ee with you her concern was irrational and that Ada County will 
not arrest her, but Ms. Gibson never told you "the criminal 
investigation was dropped by the spring of 2000," In fact, on 
December 11, 2002, during oral argument in Ms. Gibson's wrongful 
termination case before the Idaho Supreme Court, the Ada County 
Deputy Prosecutor stated that criminal charges have a five-year 
period of limitation, but probably would not be processed against Ms. 
Gibson. Under the circumstances, it is not irrational for Ms. Gibson to 
live' in constant fear that more retaliation will follow from what has 
already occurred, and she could be subjected to more unlawful 
actions of County Sheriffs agents, as they attempt to cause 
restrictions against her rights. Ms. Gibson does fear injury by those 
individuals, as the Killeen administration or regime has been 
vindictive toward other employee disputes. 
You state, "There is some indication in the record that he 
observed her on two occasions." 
The fact is, on December 16th and 17th 1999, Sheriff Killeen 
ordered Detective Scott Johnson to "follow" Ms. Gibson on two 
separate occasions without the existence of any lawful purpose. This 
"following" had no purpose other than to frighten her into resigning 
from her position as Ada County Jail Technician, as the statement 
was made she would be prosecuted if she did not resign and she 
would be terminated if she did not resign, and she would not be able 
to find another job (to that effect). This act of intentionally following 
her, 1with no lawful purpose to carry out threats, is known as "stalking". 
See Exhibit K; page #7 & #8 from Detective Johnson's Supplemental 
Report, IA 99-008. 
Page #19 
You state, "She stated that she and her husband agree 
they will continue to fight the battle even if they lose the cases, 
their home and everything they own because "no one should ever 
have to go through this" and "She stated she has never really 
thought about the long-term financial consequences and legal 
implications of filing these lawsuits." 
' 
Ms. Gibson told you she and her husband were extremely 
concerned Sheriff Killeen and other County agents had violated 
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United States Constitution, and if the Gibsons can get the regime 
to change their unlawful practices of misconduct against County 
employees, their efforts would be worth the cost, notwithstanding 
the fact Mr. and Mrs. Gibson might loose everything they own from 
their efforts. Mr. and Mrs. Gibson have no fear (frustration, yes) 
over the financial consequences of the position they have elected 
to take. 
You state, "This is inconsistent with statements she made 
to Detective Johnson in her interview on July 20, 1999 indicating 
she had applied for another job offering better pay." 
Neither you nor Detective Johnson ever asked Ms. Gibson 
about the "other job" she had applied for consideration. With 
incomplete facts or no background evidence, you state an opinion 
inconsistent now with the facts. Shortly before July 20, 1999, Ms 
Gibson became aware of the County need for Director, arid she 
submitted her application for the position of Human Resource 
Director (replacing Mr. Bill Chalk), at the Ada County Sheriff's 
Office. The position had a disclosed salary for more than a Jail 
Technician, but she wouldn't helve the huge overtime opportunities 
she had here, so the wage could have been the same or even 
less. 
You state, "She recently saw Dr. Heyrend again because of 
the increased activity on her legal cases" and "However, she is not 
following any recommended treatment plan." 
1 
Dr. Heyrend told Ms. Gibson she would experience 
psychological "flare-ups" because of her PTSD condition; those 
"flare-ups" will coexist with her involvement and awareness of her 
pending legal issues, and if she became too emotionally 
overwhelmed with the situation, she should make an appointment 
with him. Dr. Heyrend discussed the possibility of putting Ms. 
Gibson on a treatment plan, but Dr. Heyrend originally agreed to 
avoid any prescribed medications, if possible, because she could 
benefit from the understanding and support from her husband, and 
she should wait to see what progress she made. 
Because of the psychological inJury Ms. Gibson 
experienced, she was unable to work for approximately one year. 
Because Mr. Macconnell unilaterally cancelled Ms. Gibson's 
medical benefits, she could not afford the cost of a psychiatrist or 
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future financial stress. Approximately one year ago, Ms. Gibson's 
current employer allowed her to benefit from an employee health 
care plan that allows her to receive assistance with payments to 
medical providers such as Dr. Heyrend. 
You state, "She says she doesn't want to talk about it and 
doesn't believe it will do any good." 
We are uncertain as to the reference by that statement. 
We request clarification of your thought. 
You state, "Also, her husband is very against psychologists 
and psychiatrists" and "She says her husband thinks it is all 
"hocus pocus."' 
Ms. Gibson does not recall telling you, "her husband thinks 
it is all "hocus pocus."' If you have a recording of your interviews, 
she wants to listen to it. Ms. Gibson told you her husband and her 
attorney have deep-rooted suspicions concerning the use of a 
"forensic psychologist", especially in a non-criminal case setting, 
and have further curiosity as to the select motives when you 
incorrectly listed the wrong case on your resume' as being past 
"experience" before you even saw Ms. Gibson. You had not had 
access to investigatory and interrogation records. You were 
willing to review some "hand picked" and "selected" records for 
Mr. Bauman and the State Insurance Fund, without having the 
needed review of all relevant documents. You should have 
requested the information and documentation from my office. Mr. 
Gibson does not perceive psychologists or psychiatrists as "hocus 
pocus", but he does know a thorough and complete "forensic 
eva;luation", at any level, can only be accomplished with a full, 
complete and intact set of facts and observations. Loosely 
worded opinions, use of non-behavioral phrases, words and 
statements, or "I think so" or "maybes" are not appreciated, and a 
"loose" report is unacceptable. 
Page #22 
You state, "She admitted to being "defiant about psychoactive 
medication. She complained of side effects and also stated she did 
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She does not like medications, but you neglected to report 
why she resisted taking medication. If you had interviewed Dr. 
Spencer (or reviewed Dr. Spencer's medical records of Ms. 
Gibson), or reviewed Mr. Gibson's "daily diary", you would 
understand the concerns about taking "psychoactive" medications. 
During the period following July 20, 1999, Ms. Gibson experienced 
three episodes of anaphylactic shock from the use of those types 
of medications. The effects of those episodes left her with hives, 
swollen joints, dried and cracked skin and feelings of 
helplessness. 
You state, "She also indicated her husband is very opposed 
to psychologists and psychiatrists. He doesn't believe in 
psychotherapy and thinks this is all "hocus pocus."' 
' . 
We need to hear this portion of the interview, as Ms. 
Gibson never made these comments to you. See Rebuttal & Fact 
(paQe #19 of your report). 
Page #22 - #23 
You state, "However thes.e interviews do not constitute the 
DSM-IV-TR Criterion A1 definition of trauma: 
"Direct personal experience of an event that involves actual 
or threatened death or serious iniurv, or other threats to 
one's physical integrity: or witnessing an event that involves 
death, injury or a threat to physical integrity of another 
person; or learning about unexpected or violent death, 
serious harm, or threat of death or injury experienced by a 
family member or other close associate." DSM-IV-TR 
(American Psychiatric Association, 2000, pp. 463-464)."' 
(Emphasis added). 
As a licensed psychologist, you may not be qualified, or 
authorized, to make a medical opinion or conclusion based upon 
criterion intended for use by licensed medical doctors and 
psychiatrists. 
We disagree with your assessment, based upon what Dr. 
Spencer and Dr. Heyrend have said, and we do believe these 
interviews do constitute the definition of trauma. The 
interrogations (events) of Ms. Gibson (a direct personal 
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experience) did involve serious threats by two detectives that Ms. 
Gibson would be criminally charged with felony grand theft and jail 
lime. Those serious threats made against Ms. Gibson did 
constitute harm and injury to the emotional well-being and 
l21:!Ysical integrity of Ms. Gibson. 
According to the National Center for PTSD website, in order 
to qualify as a traumatic event using the DSM-IV criteria, we 
understand the event must meet two criteria: 
(1) "the person has experienced, witnessed, or been 
confronted with an event or events that involve actual or 
threatened death or serious injury, or a threat to the 
physical integrity of oneself or others"; and, 
(2) "the person's response involved intense fear, 
helplessness and horror." 
When the Detectives called Ms. Gibson a liar, those events began 
the context of psychological abuse, but threatening to prosecute 
Ms. Gibson with felony grand theft and threatening her with jail 
time, constitutes confrontational events that involve threats of 
serious injury to Ms. Gibson's physical integrity. To her, that could 
mean she would be physically detained, physically handcuffed, 
physically transported (to and from court), physically placed in a 
jail cell. At the time of those threatening events, Ms. Gibson did 
experience intense fear, intense helplessness, and unbelievable 
horror. 
Furthermore, when Mr. Macconnell used his serious 
unlawful extortious threat (an event) against Ms. Gibson (a direct 
personal experience), in an effort to have Ms. Gibson forfeit her 
property right to employment in exchange for the County not 
pursuing criminal grand theft charges against her, that also did 
constitute harm and injury to the emotional well-being and 
ph~sical integrity of Ms. Gibson. Mr. MacConnell's unilateral and 
unlawful revocation of Ms. Gibson's right to employment, right to 
due process and her right to receive medical benefits in 
accordance with her cooperation and the County merit system, did 
cause additional serious irreparable injury to Ms. Gibson's 
emotional well-being and physical integrity. 
Ms. Gibson has not been the only victim as a consequence 
of Sheriff Killeen's misconduct. The emotional well being of Ms. 
Gibson's children and her husband have been compromised and 
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Page #23 
You state, "Ms. Gibson clearly experienced intense fear, 
anxiety and depression in response to personnel actions taken 
against her. She immediately grasped the certainty that she 
would lose her job and that legal action would be taken against 
her to recover monies paid to her in overpayment on her payroll 
check. She certainly feared the possibility of criminal charges 
being filed. She felt unfairly and unreasonably accused of 
wrongdoing since the detectives acknowledged in their interviews 
that an error was made by the Ada County Payroll Department." 
(Eri1phasis added). 
As before stated, Ms. Gibson received no payroll checks, 
nor did Ada County Payroll Department issue payroll checks to 
her during the overpayment period. 
Your opinion, "Ms. Gibson clearly experienced intense fear, 
anxiety and depression in response to personnel actions taken 
against her" and that "She felt unfairly and unreasonably accused 
of wrongdoing since the detectives acknowledged in their 
interviews that an fil.[Q.[ was made by the Ada County Payroll 
Department." is an opinion we share in common. Ms. Gibson was 
unfairly, unreasonably and unlawfully accused of wrongdoing, in 
light of the fact the detectives not only knew, but they 
acknowledged the County was at fault for the creation of the 
adrhinistrative error. Your opinion should now challenge the logic 
for Sheriff Killeen's choice of conduct to then proactively, 
capriciously and maliciously construct, advance and exploit the 
County's error into an attempt to maliciously prosecute, deny 
employee benefits, and pursue the eventual and wrongful 
termination of her employment rights, as she was an exemplary 
employee. You should challenge the motive of a County that 
wants to defend its actions by claiming Ms. Gibson's Worker's 
Comp claim is spurious and Ada County (and State Insurance 
Fund) want to deny any culpability, responsibility or obligation for 
their actions that caused the injuries to that exemplary employee. 
You state, "She is suffering from nightmares which consist 
of a number of different themes" and "Her description of a 
Cht'istmas tree that turns into a monster is evidence that some of 
her nightmares may well be associated with earlier abuse, rather 
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We need to listen to any taped interview. Ms. Gibson states 
she never experienced such a nightmare and never reported one to 
you as described in your report, nor did she tell you of any such 
occurrence during any of her appointments with you. This 
"nightmare" in your report is an accident, a case mix up, and you 
need to address this error and remove it from your opinion and report. 
Your evaluation and report needs to focus on the nightmare 
Ms. Gibson told you about, as she explained "a tornado comes 
through her house and she and John are trying to protect their 
children". You need to analyze what was told you, not provide 
diagnosis or prognosis from an event that never happened, nor told 
yow ever occurred, at any time. 
Ms. Gibson told you she had other dreams, but cannot 
remember details of those dreams. Ms. Gibson says you asked her 
numerous times if she could remember dreams other than the 
"tornado dream", and she told you she could not. 
i 
You state, "She has suffered severe physical abuse on at least 
tw0 occasions in her life, once at the hand of her father and another 
by her boyfriend." 
As previously addressed, she did not recall events from her 
father, as the information concerning her father was only told her by 
her brother and sister. She has no memory of it, so we must question 
the concept of abuse. 
You state, "She has virtually no hope of ever being able to pay 
off' her legal debt unless she is successful in gaining financial 
compensation through legal means." 
Is that your opinion, or are you saying she told you that? Ms. 
Gibson never made this comment to you. What she told you was her 
legal cases were not about making money, but they need to be 
compensated for these loses and wrongful conduct. The focus was 
also on regime change to stop their unlawful practices of 
misconduct against County employees, and to do that, their efforts 
would be well worth the cost, notwithstanding the fact Mr. and 
Mrs. Gibson might have to sell everything they own to pay for their 
dedicated efforts. Mr. and Mrs. Gibson have expressed no fear 
Uust frustration) over the financial consequence of the position 
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You state, "A number of concomitant stressors have been 
ocdurring along with Ms. Gibson's overpayment on her payroll 
checks." 
You don't indicate what these stressors are, but in any 
conclusion you reach, no paychecks were ever prepared by Ada 
County and handed to Ms. Gibson; no paychecks were ever 
disbursed by Ada County to Ms. Gibson; and no paychecks were 
ever received or signed by Ms. Gibson, during this overpay period 
of June1998 through July 1999. Had she ever seen a check, she 
would have caught the error herself, and none of this error would 
have gone beyond the first erroneous pay period. Instead, the 
County relied on their Direct Deposit Program, and suffered their own 
errors. 
Page #23 - #24 
You state, "During the first year of marriage to Mr. Gibson 
in 1996 she faced a large tax liability with the IRS due to his 
garrbling", "Ms. Gibson withdrew funding from her own retirement 
account to partially pay the tax debt", "The IRS placed a lien on 
their home to satisfy their tax liability, which has not been paid", 
"Since that time Mr. Gibson has not been able to maintain 
ongoing, meaningful employment", and "He is working without pay 
for their attorney to assist in her multiple lawsuits." 
It appears you have taken an irrelevant issue about Mr. 
Gib.son's employment history to relate to Ms. Gibson's PTSD 
con·dition caused through her employment. Your focus should be her 
employment injuries occurring July 20, 1999, and thereafter, while an 
employee with the Ada County Sheriff's Office. 
We have provided you the factual information concerning 
Mr. Gibson's tax dispute with the IRS and how it developed 
(1099's plus 401k early withdrawal), and also the factual basis that 
Ms. Gibson did not use any of her retirement funds to liquidate tax 
liability (she paid other debt the parties had). You state the tax 
liability had not been paid, but you must address in fact, on April 
28,i2003, the IRS settled the dispute. 
Page #24 
You state, "Since her termination of employment, Ms. 
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family. This would be stressful and exhausting to any reasonable 
person." 
Your statement implies you would fault Mr. Gibson for being 
"unemployed", and 'imply Ms. Gibson is "stressed" and 
"ex·hausted" from excessive employment. You have not 
addressed the actual situation and facts involved. Ms. Gibson's 
injuries prevented her from working until August 2000. Since 
August 2000, Ms. Gibson has had at least 2, and sometimes 3 
concurrent part-time jobs. Her current employer, Mr. Bernie 
Rakozy, allows her to work 25 hours per week. She has other 
employment, which allows her an additional 15-20 hours per 
week. To prevent further confusion as to what Mr. Gibson 
receives from his early-retirement that allows him to provide 
financial assistance to his family, we will disclose financial 
documentation if you request it. Ms. Gibson is not the sole family 
provider. 
Of interest, when Ms. Gibson was employed at the Ada 
County Sheriff's Office, she worked a minimum of 48 hours per 
workweek, and at most times, worked 72 hours per workweek, 
depending on overtime hours available for her. During January 
1999 through June 1999, Ms. Gibson accumulated 281 hours of 
overtime (average of 46.8 hours per month). She was working a 
regular shift of 48 hours per week, and did not believe she was 
"stressed" or "exhausted" as your diagnosis may suggest would 
occur. She enjoyed the work. 
You state, "Ms. Gibson also expressed concern about the 
well being and stability of all three of her children." 
This statement is incomplete, as Mr. and Ms. Gibson do not 
differentiate between. their children by using "step-child", "her 
children" or "his children". Ms. Gibson told you she was 
concerned about their five children (her three and Mr. Gibson's 
two). 
You state, "Ms. Gibson is currently employed in her chosen 
field as a bookkeeper and maintains a second job." 
This conclusion made by you is incorrect. Ms. Gibson told 
you her chosen career was law enforcement, not bookkeeper. 
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she was seeking employment after being wrongfully terminated by 
Sheriff Killeen, 
You state, "Ms, Gibson is suffering from a number of 
psychological and physical complaints, however her interrogations 
coriducted by Detectives Glenn and Johnson of the Ada County 
ShE?riff's Office do not constitute the predominant cause of her 
symptoms as compared to all other causes combined in her life, 
likewise they do not constitute a traumatic event as defined by the 
DSM-IV-TR Criterion A (American Psychiatric Association, 2000 
pp, 463-468)," 
As a licensed psychologist, you may not be qualified, or 
autnorized, to make a medical opinion or conclusion based upon 
criterion intended for use by licensed medical doctors and 
ps~chiatrists. 
As you are aware, Dr. LaMarr Heyrend is a licensed 
medical physician and psychiatrist, and he has determined Ms. 
Gibson suffers from Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder in addition to 
this situational anxiety and depression. As a licensed psychiatrist, 
Dr. Heyrend is familiar with DSM-IV-TR Criterion A (American 
Psychiatric Association, 2000, pp, 463-468). He concluded Ms. 
Giqson had a direct personal experience of an event that involved 
actual and threatened serious injury that resulted in her suffering 
from PTSD. 
I trust, to your satisfaction, you verified Ms. Gibson was not 
experiencing any unusual health problems before July 20, 1999, 
while employed at the Sheriff's Office, Your opinion on Page 23 
states "Ms. Gibson clearly experienced intense fear, anxiety and 
depression in response to personnel actions taken against her." 
We, must conclude that experience began July 20, 1999. 
You clearly expressed Ms. Gibson experienced intense 
feair, anxiety and depression in response to the unlawful personnel 
action taken against, yet you confuse us with an attempt to deny 
Ada County agents (Sheriff, Legal Advisor, Detectives, Payroll 
Department, etc.) have culpability for the actions they took against 
this dedicated, faithful and exemplary employee. You must 
appreciate she did nothing wrong and did nothing to deserve the 
conduct causing her PTSD health concerns. We request you 
place the blame where it belongs, not leave it in limbo, 








October 29, 2003 
You state, "In activities of daily living Ms. Gibson is 
functioning in all spheres without sufficient impairment so as to 
warrant a rating. 
Ms. Gibson does function, at some level, as she has · 
learned to focus above and beyond the damage to her 
psychological makeup. However, she does qualify for a rating, as 
Dr.' Heyrend has addressed, and she deserves to be paid for the 
compensation she is entitled, in addition to payments for medical 
services, future medical needs, and of course, her legal fees for 
this protracted engagement. 
Page #24 (Diagnostic Impression) 
In your Diagnostic Impression, in reference to Axis IV, you 
conclude Ms. Gibson has "Economic problems, problems related to 
interaction with the legal system and problems with primary support 
gro'up." 
It is uncertain what is meant by your opinion that suggests Ms. 
Gibson has problems with her primary support group. That would 
only be her husband, John, her children, her psychiatrist and possibly 
her current employment stability. Ms. Gibson told you if it weren't for 
the support of her husband, any effort to recover from the injuries 
caJsed by the County :would never occur. Ms. Gibson does 
recognize the sacrifices her husband made to secure her fragile 
condition, and devote his effort to develop the healing process she 
has around her. 
The other part of your opinion concerns Ms. Gibson's 
"interaction with the legal system", and that is also confusing. The 
power of politics has allowed Ms. Gibson to be treated and discarded 
as some "common criminal", as the County Sheriff has been 
successful with his regime efforts at damage control for the actions 
he and his Ada County Detectives have done, and successfully 
ignored the payroll error County personnel created. It has been said 
many times there is little justice to be found in the judicial system, 
when politics, and personalities have a common stake to limit and 
stabilize damage control for a mistake made by the controlling County 
personnel who will eventually improve from their mistakes. However, 
in time, someone will recognize the wrongs and unlawfulness that 
has been allowed to occur, and slip through the flawed legal system, 





Yovr role is either to become part of the damage or rise above it and 
become part of the justly due cure. 
You state in your recommendation, "though her present need 
for treatment is associated with her multiple life stressors and her pre-
existing chronic dysthymia." 
We challenge that conclusion in your recommendation. 
According to the diagnosis and prognosis advanced by Dr. F. LaMarr 
Heyrend, M.D., a licensed psychiatrist, Ms. Gibson's fundamental 
need for treatment is due to Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder directly 
caused by the misconduct of Ada County personnel. 
Summary and Conclusion 
Your expose concerning the abusive and traumatic treatment Ms. Gibson received 
from Ada County Sheriff's Office agents does not address the true incidents and events as 
they occurred. The emotional battering Ms. Gibson endured did include an assault on her 
ego, code of ethics, self-identity, self-respect and challenges to her character, honesty and 
truth. Those attacks caused Ms. Gibson to experience a sense of fear, pain and 
helplessness, and if the County had "constructed" a malicious prosecution against her like 
they "constructed" her malicious employment termination, she would have greater injuries 
yet 
Your evaluation of Ms. Gibson occurred as her major symptoms were in a state of 
winding down, not at the beginning when the predominate symptoms were more apparent, 
visible and more easily recognized. You need to collaborate with her psychiatrist. 
I 
Your "forensic psychological" evaluation may have been done in an effort to get Ms. 
Gibson to accept some fault and minimize the culpability of the County for a situation in 
which she was never aware of, and one in which the fault belongs solely to the County. 
This psychological maneuver (of trying to induce a self-incrimination), if that is what it 
ultimately is called, has resulted in the re-victimization of Ms. Gibson, and is viewed by us 
as a questionable tactic because it has no healing or closure effect. It seems to support 
the idea of condoning conduct that destroys exemplary employees. 
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SECTION 7.05 MEMBERS' RIGHTS 
When any member becomes the subject of an internal investigation, the following 
guidelines will be adhered to: 
t. During any stage of an internal investigation the member subject to the 
investigation has the right to have his/her own attorney or representative 
present during questioning, provide~ however, that the presence of an attorney 
does not unreasonably delay a scheduled interview. An unreasonable delay is 
one of more than two hours. The representative may not be involved in the 
incident{s) under. investigation. The representative or attorney may not 
participate in the interview unless requested to do so by the investigator. 
2. Toe interview shall be conducted at a reasonable hour, preferably when the 
member is working unless the seriousness of the investigation requires 
otherwise. If the interview is conducted while the member is off duty, 
compensation shall be granted in accordance with regular department 
procedures. 
3. Tue interview will be limited in scope to circumstances and conduct pertaining 
to the subject of the investigation. The interview will be conducted for a 
reasonable period of time with breaks made available if the interview is 
Jmgthy. 
4. The member tinder investigation shall not be subjected to offensive language or 
threatened with punitive action except that a member refusing to respond to 
questions or submit to an interview must be informed that failure to do so may 
result in the termination of the interview process and institution of disciplinary 
penalties. 
5. The member shall at all times be able to assert and the department will observe 
his/her constitutional rights whenever criminal investigations and charges are 
pursued. In that event. a standard rights waiver fonn will be given to the 
member to review and sign. 
6. A member may be advised that if he/she refuses to testify or answer questions 
relating to the pcrfonnance of official duties or fitness for duty, he/she will be 
subject to discipline: that may result in tennination from employmenL If a 
member d<x:S answer" statements, 'information or evidence that are gained by 
reason of such statements cannot be used against that member in any 
subsequent criminal prosecution. However, those statements may be used 
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7. No member will be subjected to punitive action because of the cx.ercise of 
privileges granted under this order or the exercise of any rights under the U.S. 
Constitution, Idaho Constitution, or applicable law. 
8. [f circumstances warrant a recorded conversation with the accused employee, a 
copy of the audiotape will be provided to the employee upon request, or he 
may record the interview with his own equipment. If any part of the recording 
is subsequently transcri~ the offica may, upon request, receive a copy of the 
transcript. 
9. Polygraph examinations may be given to an employee during any internal 
iJ1vcstigation when 1) it is requested by the Sheriff2 or 2) it is requested by the 
employee; provided, however. that an employee may exercise his/her right of 
refusal to take a polygraph examination without prejudice, and provided further 
that polygraph evidence shall . not be considered as conclusive but may be 
considered with other pertinent evidence. 
1 O.Employees may request information from their internal investigations files, 
howeva-, any requests must comply with the Idaho Public Records Act, Ada 
County Code. and other grievance procedures. 
SECTION 7.06 PRE-INVESTIGATION ACI10NS 
When a Tanking officer reasonably believes a member to be in violation of a rule, 
re1::,rulation or law. the circumstances may dictate that the ranking officer, under 
authority of this order, remove the member from normal duty under one of the 
following: 
I) Restricted. Restricted status means that the member has been. relieved of 
normaJ duties but may be assigned alternate duties as determined to be 
appropriate by the ranking officer. 
2) Suspended with pay. Suspended with pay status means that the member has 
been telleved of all duties except those connected with the 
investigative/disciplinary process. 
Conditions of restricted and suspended with pay status. 
I) The ranking officer may withdraw powers, authority and responsibility of the 
member to the extent deemed necessary. 
2) The member may be required to surrender any duty equipment to the ranking 
officer when circumstances dictate the need (such as danger to self or 
suspicion of a felony). Such equipment may be returned to the member upon 





Vernon K. Smith 
1900 West Main Street 
Boise, Idaho 83709 
Dear Mr. Smith: 
March 11, 2003 
I have been informed to the effect Mr. Jon Bauman has scheduled my 
employee, Stacy Gibson, with two (2) appointments with Dr. Cynthia Brownsmith 
(from 9:00 a.m. until 4:00 p.m.) on March 14, 2003 and again on March 21, 2003. I 
have been advised these appointments are intended for undergoing some intrusive 
evaluation of Ms. Gibson in reference to her pending Workman's Comp claim. She 
does not do well, whenever she dwells on her past relationship with her Ada County 
employment. 
As l before explained, not only is Ms. Gibson currently undergoing a training 
program for the position to become a Bankruptcy Administrator, but my office is 
now also short two (2) employees for the next 6 to 8 weeks due to maternity leave 
of absence (FMLA). 
This intended scheduling is now jeopardizing my office, as Ms. Gibson was 
absent from my office from February 3rd through February 10th 2003 for jury duty in 
the Fourth District Court, and I had to excuse that court summoned obligation, but I 
must now express my concerns that it would be unreasonable and inappropriate for 
me to allow Ms. Gibson to be away from my office for any reason other than dire 
medical illness, as we cannot get the required work processed to my full 
satisfaction as it is under these pressing circumstances. I insist you tell Mr. 
Bauman the matter will need to be rescheduled after May 1, 2003, as I will not 
permit any more absences from this critical workload commitment. 
P.O. Box 1738 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
I trust I have made my concerns and decision clear. 
Yours very truly, 
~?~~tifs 
EXHIBIT 
\) Chapter 13 - (208) 343-4476 f Fax: (208) :''43-449~( 
ADA COUNTY SHERIFF'S OFFICE 
V ,I.UGHN KIi.LEEN Shor1ff 
7200 BAAA!SlcA OAJW 
BOISE, !CAHO 83704,92!7 
Dr. Stephen E. Spencer 
Internal Medicine Specialists 
6094 Emerald 
Boise, Idaho 83704 
Dr. Spencer: 
BOISE, IDAHO 
August 2, 200 I 
TIH.i:PHONE (200) an-C&X> 
ADMINISTRATION FAX (200) 3TT>65S5 
POLICE FH!COADS FAX {206) 3n.6.578 
RECEIVED 
A/~1:;01 
On several occasions over the last couple of years I have had the opportunity to read your 
assessment of my and the Sheriff's behavior during the process involving former deputy Stacy 
Gibson. I had that chance once again when Vernon K. Smith recently filed an "Amended"' 
Worker's Compensation complaint. 
Given the medical profession's fondness for double blind studies and demands for all available 
evidence in any medical investigiition, I must confess to some chagrin at your blind acceptance 
of the word of Ms. Gibson and her husband. You have made no attempt to justify your rash 
conclusions with empirical evidence, but have taken the statements of two involved people at 
face value. Stated bluntly, you do not know anything about the course of events that led to the 
termination of Ms. Gibson, except what she and her husband have told you. 
In an evidentiary sense, your conclusions about this department's treatment of Ms. Gibson are 
irrelevant. You are trained as a physician. I question your competence as either an investigator 
or a psychiatrist. At the most, your notes on Ms. Gibson should have been confined to 
assessments of her physical (and possibly mental) condition. Anything beyond that is outside 
your role. 
Should this matter ever g~t to a hearing I look forward to watching your cross-examination. 
Cc: V.K. Smith 
Sincerely, 
VAUGHN KILLEEN : 




by: R.M. Macconnell 







SUBJECTIVE: We have to focus on the 8th of July, when in her case, they had notification 
from the Supreme Court that there had been an error in procedure, and that the error lay on 
the side of the county. They got notification that this had occurred, and that they would 
probably have to go through the process again. They had to go back to the County 
Commissioner's and then to judicial review. 
As we look carefully at this, it becomes patently obvious that this represented a stress. On the 
8th when she was driving, she saw a county car behind her, and simply pulled over to the 
side. She said this was because she was feeling strange. She had a fugue state where she 
couldn't remember anything, and a tremendous amount of panic. This was in reaction to 
simply seeing a county car. Therefore, one has to attest to the fact that even though we know 
that in the majority of cases, PTSD does improve, and is not a sick diagnosis but a diagnosis 
that is related to a stimulus. One that she should not be expected to have to endure. She 
therefore by this reaction is still in the recovering phase, and is still in the post-traumatic 
stress disorder. 
In seeing her today, there is no question that she has shown improvement. She stitl reports 
the times in which there is a sleep disturbance. Also, at times, in an attempt to defend herself; 
she will get caught up in daydreams. Along with daydreams of course, is the most severe 
reaction, which is a fugue state. These are psychological escape mechanisms that are 
designed to protect the person, because they are having intrusive recollections that are too 
painful. 
Because of the fact that the Supreme Court took them back to ground zero, they have to sta,ct 
all over again after four years of problems. I am going to give her some Lexa pro. An SSRI 
will increase her tolerance of stress, and aid her in thinking a little more clearly. 
We should note that the panic attacks and waves of anxiety hadn't occurred for over a year 
and a halt; until this occurred. 
F. LaMarr Heyrend, M.D. 
FLH:s1s 
EXIHIBIT 
.... t ::.::~F.::·..:;..7i_,,~ 
MEM8eR 




LICENSED PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS 
124 121h Arv. Rd. 
Namp&, Idaho a36~6 
PHon• (20ll) 488-1284 OT 46H4311 
~;u (203) 46,-5&0& 
February 18, 2000 
John Gibson 
5501 Tinker Street 
Boi~ Idaho 83709 
FAX: 362-6959 
RE: ADA County Auditor W-2 Forms 
Dear John. 
McCAI.L &RANCH 




IOAHO ASSOCIATION OF 
PUii.iC ACCOUNTANTS 
After reviewing the p~y $tub voucher'$, I am unable to come up with some oftbe 
figures on the W-2 to rnatch the pay vouchers. Thero seems to be romo discr~ancy in 
wages, tips and other compensation, and Social S=irity wages vs the pay vouchers. 
lfyou hav() any other informatii,n please forward it to me. 
1-7C-5 1-7C-6 
1-7C-5: PROMOTIONS: 
A. An employee receiving a promotion shall be paid at a rate of pay in 
the pay grade of the class jnto which they are promoted, which 
provides a salary increase of not less than five percent (5%) above 
the employee's rate of pay just prior to promotion. The maximum pay 
adjustment for promotions shall be limited to the percentage differ-
ence between the entrance level pay of the employee's pay grade 
before promotion and the entrance level of pay of the employee's 
pay grade after promotion, Each department and office will adopt a 
policy to Insure that all employees affected by promotions are 
treated uniforn:,ly in terms of pay increases, (Ord. 110, 12-10-80; 
amd, 1984 Code; amd, Ord, 141, 8-29-85; amd. Ord. 182, 9-24-87) 
B, At the discretion of the department head or elected official, employ-
ees may be required to fill a position in a class with a higher pay 
grade on a temporary or short-term basis, Such temporary or 
short-term assignment does not necessarily constitute authority for 
additional pay increases until the position is held more than forty five 
(45) consecutive calendar days, Should the employee hold the 
position beyond forty five (45) consecutive calendar days, he or she 
shall receive the minimum rate of pay of the pay grade to which the 
employee is assigned on a \empcrary or short-term basis, or receive 
a five percent (5%) increase, whichever is greater. The salary 
increase· shall be retroactive to the day of assignment, and shall 
continue until the position is filled with an employee on permanent 
assignment. (Ord, 110, 12-10-80; amd, 1984 Code; amd, Ord. 182, 
9-24-87) 
1 · 7C-6: · REDUCTION OF SALARY: 
A. The rate of pay of an employee receiving more than the minimum 
rate of pay of the pay grade for his or her class may be reduced to a 
rate of pay of not less than the minimum for the pay grade by the 
elected official responsible for said position, for disciplinary reasons 
enumerated in Article G ol this Chapter, (Ord, 110, 12·10-80; amd. 
Ord, 141, 8-29-85; amd, Ord, 182, 9-24-87) 
B, The rate ,of pay of an employee may be reduced by the responsible 
elected official, with the consent of the Board, for administrative 
reasons such as: 
195 
Overpayments made due to administrative or other errors; 






V VERNON K. SMITH 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
1900 \Y, MAIN 5TR .;~T 
SOISf:, IDAHO 83702 
208·345·1125 
208·345·1'29 (FAX) 
August 24, 1999 
Ada county Sheriff's Office 
7200 Barrister 
Boise, Idaho BJ704 
ATTN: R, Monte Macconnell 
RE: Stacy Gibson 
Dear Mr, Macconnell: 
Pursuant to our discussion on August 23 1 1999 1 at 
approximately 3:00 p,m., I spoke with Stacy and John Gibson and 
they concur that effective, August 24, 1999, Ms, Gibson will agree 
to be on Administrative Leave, without pay, but continue with the 
medical coverage and benefits associated with her Group Medical 
coverage and Life Insurance, as she is currently under medical care 
and may require additional short-term medical. disability as a 
result of the stress oreated by this employment issue, This status 
will then continue, pending the rescheduling of this hearing 1 
thereby allowing her to be released by tms7jtrc1l-¢r to participate 
in these proceedings, We anticipate she ill be.ava ble in late 
September-early October, subject to doctor s ap~ ou have 
further questiqns, pl ease so advise, until t):l-<an, I relmain, 
Yours very ru y, 
/</---
Vernon K, smith..___.:,.,..._ 
VKS/ckp. 
cc: Stac~ Gibson 
EXI~ f :-·. , I 
, _·r4C\ 
"----Qi 
ADA COtJNTY SHERIFF'S OFFICE 
VAUGHN KILLEEN, ShorlH 
Vernon K. Smith, Esq. 
1900 W. Main Street 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
Re: Stacy Gibson 
. DearMr:Smith: 
BOISE, IDAHO 
August 25, 1999 
I have received your letter of August 24, 1999. In keeping with our agreement, as of close of business on 
August 24, Ms. Gibson will be on Administrative Leave without pay pending her recovery enough to 
appear at an infonnal hearing with the Sheriff. The purpose of the hearing will be to permit her the 
opportunity to explain her position regarding the Sheriff's stated intent to terminate her from employment 
with this department, This· meeting will be considered a continuation of the hearing on August 23, at 
which you presented to Sheriff Killeen Ms. Gibson's version of the events giving rise to the Notice o( 
In ten( to Terminate. · 
' 
As you can appreciate; the Sheriff would like to conclude this matter as soon as possible. Please contact 
me to discuss ·ctates for the meeting, 
• 
You mentioned Ms. Gibson's medical benefits and life insurance in your letter. Those benefits have been' 
:paid for through September. After that she will have to pay the premiums in order to maintain the 
policies, · 
As before, please feel free to contact me if you have any questions. 




By: R. Monte Macconnell 





On 12/15/1999 at 1930 hours I spoke to Tony Eason on the telephone. Mr. Eason was 
a coworker of Stacy Gibson when she was employed by the Sheriff's office. Mr. Eason 
is now in the employ of the Mountain Home Police Department. From July 22, 1999 to 
July 25, 1999, Mr. Eason was house sitting for Sgt. L. D. Smith. On one of the evenings 
during this period, Mr. Eason saw Stacy and a male subject in the Hasting's store at 
Overland Road and Five Mile Road. 
On 12/16/1999 at 1017 riours I observed a male subject park across the street from the 
Gibson residence, The male walked up to the door and spoke to Stacy Gibson for 
about three minutes. He then returned to the car and left the area. The car had Idaho 
plates, 1A 2136. This car is registered to Jerry Smith. I spoke to Mr. Smith, who stated 
he was asking Stacy about the status of her neighbor. Stacy was coherent and 
answered Mr. Smith questions, stating her neighbor was out of town. · 
On 12/16/1999 at 1114 hours I observed Stacy Gibson leave her residence in a green 
Ford pickup. The license on the truck is Idaho personalized plate NVRSVVT, this plate 
is registered to John Gibson. Also in the truck was a young girl. 
Stacy drove from her house to an apartment building north of the Albertson's store 
located at Gowen and Federal Way. Stacy parked the truck for a few minutes then was , 
joined by a male subje,::t. The subject had the same color hair that Stacy has. The 
male got into the passenger side of the truck, and Stacy left the apartment complex 
and drove south on Federal Way. She then turned west on Gowen. Due to traffic 
conditions I was unable to follow Stacy from that point. 
I returned to the residence at 5501 Tinker, arriving at 1229 hours. The vehicle was not 
at the residence at that time. 
Sgt. 'Johnson, 2/16/1999 1325 hours 
99-008 - 7 . 
(' 
. - ' 
Supplemental Report Two 
IA 99-008 
On 12/17/1999 at 1150 hours I observed Stacy Gibson leave her residence in a green 
pickup, license NVRSWf. Another female was in the \ruck with her. She drove to the 
McDonalds at Cole and Over/and, arriving at 1156 hours. Stacy used the drive-thru 
lane, then drove west on Overland to Mountain View Equipment. She arrived at 
Mountain View Equipme-1t at 1223 hours. 
After 21 minutes, Stacy left Mountain View Equipment and drove east on Overland to 
Five Mile Road. Stacy then drove north on Five Mile Road. Due to traffic I was unable 
to follow. I last saw the vehicle at 1257 hours. 
son 12/17/1999 1400 hours 
99-008 - 8 -
